October 25, 2006

When Jimmy Carter went to Pyongyang in the summer of 1994 on an unofficial, last-ditch mission to negotiate a solution to the nuclear impasse that was threatening to engulf the Korean peninsula in war, Marion Creekmore went along as a top aide. Speaking about his recently published book on Carter's trip-A Moment of Crisis: Jimmy Carter, the Power of a Peacemaker and North Korea's Nuclear Ambitions-Creekmore, now a distinguished visiting professor of history and political science at Emory University, related the lessons Carter's surprising diplomatic success might have for leaders still trying to curb a nuclear DPRK.

In mid-1994, the DPRK was poised to eject international monitors from the country and begin reprocessing plutonium, the U.S. was preparing to strike the North's nuclear facilities and neither side was talking to the other. Carter had a standing invitation to visit North Korea, and decided that even if there was only a slim chance of avoiding war, he should use his invitation to start a dialog with North Korea's leadership. The Clinton administration was not enthusiastic about Carter's mission, but acquiesced after insisting that he conduct his trip as a private citizen and make no promises to the North.

Carter's meeting with North Korean leader Kim Il Sung proved to be a breakthrough, with the two establishing a warm rapport. The former president told Kim that the U.S. would likely accept a deal that committed the North to a verifiable nuclear freeze in exchange for U.S. economic assistance and talks on normalizing diplomatic ties. Kim agreed in principle to the proposal.

Creekmore said the underpinnings of Carter's negotiating success were his twin convictions that a solution required the U.S. to provide the DPRK with incentives to suspend its nuclear activities, and that he personally needed to show respect for his North Korean interlocutors.        

In the following days, North Korean officials attempted to backtrack on the agreement and the Clinton administration grew furious that Carter had announced the deal without first consulting them. However, the agreement held, serving as a blueprint for the subsequent Agreed Framework.

The situation today is very different than in 1994. The North Koreans have tested a nuclear weapon, and the Bush administration's approach to North Korea is very different from its predecessor's.  Still, asked whether the U.S. should pursue the sort of high-level, bilateral negotiations with the DPRK that led to Carter's breakthrough, Creekmore said "I'm not sure it'll work, but we should try."