Korea-U.S. Cooperation Formula on North Korean Issues
Jeong Se-Hyun
Former Minister of Unification
Republic of Korea
At the September 14th Korea-U.S. summit, President Roh and President Bush agreed upon three issues concerning North Korea. The first was a confirmation of a peaceful and diplomatic solution on the North Korean nuclear issue through the Six-Party Talks. The second was an agreement to prepare a "common and comprehensive approach" for resuming the Six-Party Talks. The last was an expression of concern over missile launches from North Korea. According to announcements from the Korean government, the Korean and U.S. chief representatives of the Six-Party Talks will commence forming agreements on a "common and comprehensive approach."
The outlook was grim before the summit, but as the Korean press pointed out, it "succeeded in not failing.1"It gave more hope than if one side had persisted in its standpoint and the other resisted firmly. I believe this was due to the meaningful exchange of opinions during the working level consultations that have been in progress since early July, as well as a Korea-U.S. two-plus-two meeting, which was held right before the summit.
However, the American press is not giving much respect to the "common and comprehensive approach." The New York Times dubbed it "mere diplomatic rhetoric which shows the gap between the sides", and the Washington Post claimed that "the differences were simply dismissed without any solution." Conservative Korean media showed similar responses, but many Korean experts are proposing possible policy options related to working level moderation which starts this week
There may be various reasons for such a difference, but the first thing that comes to mind is the different priority order of policies regarding the North Korean nuclear issue. For Korea it is a vital issue both domestically and internationally, but for the U.S., issues concerning Iraq, Iran, Bin Laden, Israel and Jordan might be more important; this leads to the difference in the level and format of briefing the outcome from the summit talks. The Korean government briefed media on the results exclusively as a "moderated press guideline for the media" which reflected the outcome of the two-plus-two meeting, while the American government only gave a simple report during a regular press conference of the White House. Furthermore, the report only mentioned that "President Bush reconfirmed his public promise of diplomatically solving North Korean issues".
However, the fundamental reason for the difference between the policies of the two countries is the different points of view on North Korea. For the U.S., North Korea is a geographically distant, poor and powerless country which continues to pressure the U.S. by using brinkmanship with nuclear and missiles, while saying it wants to improve its relationships with the U.S. Therefore for the U.S., North Korea is merely a rogue state, a [member of the] axis of evil, or [an] outpost of tyranny. The label of "kleptocracy" has recently been added to the list due to counterfeiting issues. Therefore the U.S. might feel to ignore, hate, or surgically strike North Korea.
However, for South Korea, the North has two faces. It is primarily a militarily dangerous country that keeps the South unable to neglect peacekeeping procedures. But at the same time, the South also cannot neglect the peacemaking procedures with the North for stabilization of the Peninsula and eventual unification. The reason the South spends $21 billion yearly on national defense while spending $500 million for cooperative measures with the North is because the North has two faces. The U.S. government, especially the Bush administration, needs to acknowledge this simple fact. We Koreans are not in a position where we can consider the North simply good or evil.
Therefore the U.S. must accept the fact that our policies will go in the same direction with the U.S., but the measures can be different, and that both parties need to share [their] roles with each other if necessary.
Since the September 19th Joint Statements were made last year at the Six-Party Talks, the U.S. began financial sanctions against the North for counterfeiting issues. The North withdrew, and thus the Joint Statements have not been executed. Furthermore, the Six-Party Talks themselves have not been held for almost a year. The talks will endlessly drift away as long as the North insists that they will only return to the talks when the sanctions are lifted, while the U.S. urges North Korea's unconditional return to the talks.
In the meantime, the North has only put its position in a deeper hole by launching seven missiles on America's Independence Day in order to pressure the U.S. on the financial sanctions. The U.N. Security Council has since passed a resolution regarding North Korea, with a unanimous vote, that reinforces the financial sanctions by the U.S. Japan has also intensified its own sanctions.
On August 26th, 40 days after the resolutions were passed at the Security Council, North Korea expressed a "wish to return to the Six-Party Talks because September 19th Joint Statements were in favor of North Korea." The comment left a little too much aftertaste to view it merely as a strategic move to say that they cannot return because of the sanctions made by the U.S. It would have been reasonable for other countries to help North Korea return to the table when it fought for a just cause, but its fallen image stopped that situation from happening. The U.S. reacted with the statement "that is exactly why North Korea needs to return to the table unconditionally."
It is formally correct that the sanctions and the return to the table are two different things to the U.S. However, this issuing of morality is only weakening the momentum of the talks, when the U.S. proclaimed in public many times that it will "solve the North Korea issue peacefully through talks." From what I have learned in the long process of negotiations with the North, the North will not surrender to these economic pressures because it has already been plagued with poverty a long time. If anything, it will only respond with additional missile launches, nuclear testing or mass production of nuclear weapons as a part of further brinkmanship.
Such a process will in turn make North Korea a nuclear possessing country. Whether this move is reasonable or morally correct or not is not the question for North Korea. It is their only choice for response. As a matter of fact, it will not be such a great threat to the U.S. even if the North armed itself with a few nuclear weapons, if they are at controllable numbers. The problem is that it will put South Korea in a very cramped position. If the Japanese nuclear arming request can be controlled, the U.S. can intensify its political and military seizure over the Far East region, using the North Korean nuclear weapons as an excuse.
The basic proclaimed policy by the U.S. on the North's possession of nuclear weapons is definitely negative, but there have been increasingly many worries in South Korea that maybe U.S' real view is that, even if North Korea possesses a nuclear weapon, it is not very harmful to the U.S. if it can be controlled by the U.S.
The North Korea nuclear issue must be resolved for the sake of healthy development of the Korea-U.S. alliance. In order to do so, the North must return to the table. The most certain and simplest way to do this is to force North Korea to withdraw the conditions for return. If the U.S. has solid proof regarding the issue according to the analysis of BDA information, it should be made public first to the related countries. If such an option is not possible, the "common and comprehensive approach" should be produced immediately. It is also necessary to create plans for progress once the North has returned to the table, but the thing of the utmost importance is to make them return.
In order to create a point of contact in this confusing stalemate, we need to find a way that bypasses [the North's] demands. If the analysis on the counterfeiting issues is not finished yet, dropping the issue in the priority order to after the Six-Party Talks can be an option, by opening up some of the frozen accounts that do not have issues, for example.
I believe it is very important to execute assistant secretary Hill's visit to the North, which North Korea had asked for two times, but had been rejected by the U. S. To shift the phase, it is best for the stronger one to make a move first. It is a top priority to make the North cooperate with the "common and comprehensive approach." This might open up another possibility at the Kim Jong-Il / Hu Jintao summit that is expected to be held soon.
I believe that the warnings and sanctions for the provocations have already been made effective on some level. However, it is necessary for the U.S. to have a tolerant attitude towards the North, for even the criticized and the sanctioned need an excuse to rationalize their changes of action.
Korea, the U.S., and China will be the main powers in seeking ways to reopen the six party talks and to fulfill the Sept. 19 Joint Statements, but it will be desirable to moderate Korea U.S. cooperative measures on non nuclear North Korean issues as well.
The Korea-U.S. alliance first started to stop the spread of communism during the Cold War era and to protect freedom, but it needs to turn its focus to the spreading of democracy and freedom in the wake of a new era. Korea has an advantage in making changes from below by helping the North Korean population itself. On the other hand, the U.S. has much more powerful leverage to make changes from the above, for the North strongly wishes to normalize its relationship with the U.S.
Therefore, a two-track policy which divides up the roles depending on what one can do best should be reviewed thoroughly in this new era, and we need a new policy that suits the current situation.
