March 29, 2007

The food shortages that wracked North Korea through the 1990s constituted one of the worst famines in human history—and even a decade later, the crisis hasn’t fully abated. Despite this, and the unprecedented involvement of world-class NGOs in the situation, remarkably little is actually known about the famine or its consequences for North Korean society. Speaking at an event co-presented with The Asia Society, economist Marcus Noland, co-author (with Steven Haggard) of the new book Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid and Reform, said both the famine and the secrecy can be laid at the feet of North Korea’s political system.

Noland laid out his explanation of the famine’s origins. When the country’s communist leadership first acknowledged the famine, and requested international help, in 1995, they attributed it to that year’s massive floods. The real origins were more systemic, according to Noland. Owing to its inhospitable environment, Noland said, North Korea’s agricultural system was heavily reliant on electric irrigation and chemical fertilizers. When electricity and petrochemical production contracted after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, the shortages dragged the agricultural economy down with them.

Noland and Haggard estimate the resulting food shortages, exacerbated by the inefficiencies of the North’s monopolistic public distribution system, led to between 600,000 and 1,000,000 North Korean deaths (between 3% and 5% of the population). Starvation wasn’t the primary cause of death. Instead, an undernourished and weakened population succumbed easily to diseases like tuberculosis. The old and young suffered most. Cohorts of 7 year-olds that survived were the shortest and lightest of any in recorded Korean history. Ten years later, 30% to 50% of the population is still undernourished.

The famine was unnecessarily extended, Noland continued, by the way the North responded to aid flows. When donated food began arriving in the country, the North’s government reduced its food imports by a corresponding amount to improve the country’s balance-of-payments. Thus, in the aggregate, food levels remained static.

To maintain the country’s authoritarian isolation, the North has greatly restricted donor monitoring activities. However, the frequently-made claim that in the absence of monitoring the government is diverting the aid to loyal party cadres and army officers isn’t as much as of an issue as is usually thought. More likely than a centralized conspiracy to divert aid, Noland said, was that local officials who processed the aid pilfered a great deal of it, and instead of distributing it to the population, sold it for profit.

Though an ugly practice, this channel does ultimately deliver food to those who need it, and the process aids the development of free markets. If the North’s government can buck its instincts for total control and accept, institutionalize and eventually encourage this fledgling free market in foodstuffs, it may have taken a substantial step towards lasting food security.

Thursday, March 29, 2007

Program:  6:30-7:30 PM
Book signing and reception:  7:30-8:00pm

Asia Society, 725 Park Avenue at 70^th Street, New York