

KOREAN REUNIFICATION: WHAT ROLE SHOULD THE UNITED STATES PLAY?

GRADES: 9-12

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SUBJECT: Social Studies, History

TIME REQUIRED: 5 class periods

OBJECTIVES:

1. Identify goals of U.S.-Korea relations between 1870-1910
2. Identify goals of U.S. policy toward Korea since 1945
3. Analyze current foreign policy choices regarding the reunification of Korea
4. Assess the ramifications of these choices for the future
5. Use information to develop foreign policies and identify long-term implications of present policy choices

MATERIALS REQUIRED:

- Copies of prepared handouts
- Reference map of East Asia

PROCEDURE:

INTRODUCTION:

Assign handout 1 to be read as homework.

CLASS PERIOD 1:

Using a reference map of East Asia, review the background material with the entire class.

CLASS PERIODS 2-4:

Organize students into six groups. Five of these will consider an option in U.S. policy, develop an argument in support of this, and prepare to present this in simulated Senate hearings. The sixth group will constitute the Senate committee and will focus on developing questions for the proponents of the various options, conduct the hearings and focus the group on a final decision.

Assign an option to each team and give the handout for that option only to the team presenting it. The Senate committee should receive copies of all options in order to prepare questions. All students should have copies of the supplementary documents, news articles and worksheets to help in preparation of their assignment.

CLASS PERIOD 5:

Have students work on evaluation sheets and conclude with a final discussion on which directions U.S. policy should take in regards to the future of Korea.

EVALUATION:

- Grades should be based on students' comprehension, group participation and presentations.

HANDOUT 1: HISTORIC BACKGROUND

HISTORIC KOREA

Korea is an ancient civilization occupying a strategic peninsula in Northeastern Asia. In large part due to its location, Korea has been the object of expansionists' desires of various empires on its borders. The Chinese invaded Korea under the Sui and T'ang dynasties and the Mongols invaded in 1231 without success. Later, the Japanese and Russian Empires fought to control the region. Despite centuries of foreign intervention, Koreans are a people bound together by ethnic background, language and customs.

"OPENING" KOREA

Western ideas first came to Korea in the 18th century when Catholicism was introduced by Korean scholars returning from China. By 1831, a Catholic community was established in Korea, but this missionary work was not always peaceful. Koreans opposed to the religion executed several French priests, prompting France to send a fleet of warships to Korea in 1866.

By 1871, the Korean government declared isolationist policies in light of continued aggression by France, which were aided by U.S. forces, as well as threats by Japan, which had been spurned in its attempt to open formal diplomatic relations with Korea in 1868.

But Japan and the western nations continued to violate Korean waters. Japan invaded Korea in 1876 and demanded diplomatic and commercial relations. The Kanhwa Treaty acceded to these demands. The United States, seeking access to Korean markets, pressed the Korean government to sign the Schufeldt Treaty to formally open diplomatic relations. With the conclusion of the treaties, Korea moved to enter the modern world, sending numerous students abroad to study. When these students returned, they worked to modernize Korea. Japanese military instructors appeared in Korea in 1881. At about the same time, a massive missionary effort was begun to Christianize Korea. American Presbyterians led the way in 1885 followed by the Methodists in 1886. These denominations opened schools and taught English and western notions of rights, freedom and equality. These efforts foreshadowed intensified attempts by expanding powers to dominate Korea.

During the 19th century, powerful European nations were carving out empires and spheres of influence throughout Asia. Britain controlled India, Burma, Malaysia and a large area of China from Shanghai westward through the Yangtze basin. France controlled French Indochina (Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam) and a portion of south China. The Russian empire expanded across northern Asia to the Pacific and was positioned to move southward into Manchuria and Korea. Germany had a sphere of influence in China's Shantung peninsula as well as in the Caroline Islands in the Pacific. Japan, seeking to compete with the western powers, annexed Taiwan in 1895 as a result of its victory in the Sino-Japanese War. The United States entered the Asian imperialist game with the acquisition of the Philippines as a result of the Spanish-American War in 1898.

JAPANESE DOMINATION

Japan sought to establish hegemony in Asia and end the domination of the western powers. To check Russian expansion, Japan presented a plan in 1896 to divide Korea at the 39th parallel into a Russian and a Japanese sphere of influence. The Russian government rejected this plan. Hoping to prevent Japanese domination, the Koreans had secretly made an agreement with Russia for financial and military aid. Shortly thereafter, large

numbers of Russian advisors arrived in Korea. Russia moved to enhance their position by sending troops into Manchuria in 1901. The Japanese sought to reduce Russian influence and demanded that Russia withdraw from Manchuria. When that was rejected, Japan declared war on Russia in 1904. The ensuing Russo-Japanese War led to large numbers of Japanese military units in Korea. The Korean government was forced into many agreements that gave more and more power to the Japanese. The Russo-Japanese War was concluded with the intercession of the United States. The warring parties met in Portsmouth, NH, in 1905 and there signed the Treaty of Portsmouth. The Treaty of Protection, also signed in 1905, established Japanese dominance in Korea. The Koreans rejected Japanese rule and appealed to the World Court, to no avail. Korean resistance continued from 1905-1910 when Japan's rule of Korea was formalized in the Treaty of Annexation in 1910. This brought Korean independence to an end. Korea was a Japanese colony until the end of World War II in August 1945.

POST-WAR POWER-POLITICS AND KOREA

In the last year of World War II, with the defeat of the Axis powers at hand, the allied leaders, Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin, met in Yalta, Crimean Sea to plan for the post-war world. The agreements made among these leaders included Russia's promise to enter the war against Japan after Germany surrendered. On August 8, with Japan near collapse, Russia declared war on the Japanese empire and sent its army into Korea. The United States, fearing that the communist Soviet Union would take over all of Korea, proposed a division of the nation at the 38th parallel, with Russia to occupy the north and the United States the south. Moscow accepted the proposal. Following the Japanese surrender, U.S. troops established a military government in the south and began to introduce democratic principles. The Koreans rejected the U.S. occupation, however, and in 1947, the United Nations proposed a Temporary Commission to conduct elections and end the occupation. The Russians refused to participate, so the elections took place only in South Korea. A year later, the Republic of Korea (ROK) was established. The Russians retaliated by creating the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and established Kim Il Sung as chairman. The United States withdrew its troops from South Korea in 1949, despite ROK requests for protection. On June 25, 1950, the North Koreans, in an attempt to forcibly unite Korea under communist rule, invaded South Korea. The United States and its allies considered it a war of communist aggression by the Russian-directed North Koreans against the free democratic republic of South Korea. President Harry Truman ordered troops back to Korea and asked the United Nations for help in resisting the aggression. The UN Security Council condemned the North and established a 15-nation UN force to join the United States. The multi-national force, under the direction of General Douglas MacArthur, drove the North Korean army from the South. The combined forces had almost won the entire peninsula, when the Chinese army invaded to drive UN forces from the North. Ultimately, an armistice was signed on July 27, 1953. This established a Demilitarized Zone between the two Koreas, with the 38th parallel remaining the official boundary between North and South Korea. The United States and South Korea established a Mutual Defense Treaty in 1953. A formal peace has not yet been achieved and U.S. troops remain in South Korea to this day.

ISSUES OF REUNIFICATION

The Korean people continue to see themselves as one people who have been separated from family members and friends by the division of the country. Desire to find a final settlement to the war and proceed with reunification is tempered with concerns over how this can be accomplished. Both the ROK and the DPRK do not wish to compromise on certain issues. The United States and China, both major players in the Korean War, also

hold positions that may not be open to compromise. The level at which the United States should participate in reunification and the type of role it should play is a major question facing policy makers. Deciding how the United States will approach Korean reunification and the long term implications of these choices are of enormous importance to the future of the United States, Korea and Asia as a whole.

HANDOUT 2: KOREAN REUNIFICATION AND UNITED STATES POLICY OPTIONS

OPTION 1: THE UNITED STATES MUST TAKE A LEADING ROLE

As a world leader, the United States has an obligation to take a leading role in finding a solution to the Korean problem. It is in the interest of the United States as well as North and South Korea to bring about a "soft landing" that would include the gradual reduction of DPRK's militaristic regime and the resulting decline of its communist ideology. The tragic food crisis in North Korea opens the opportunity for the United States to offer positive aid through direct humanitarian assistance—supplying emergency food relief, providing the technology used for flood control and teaching updated agricultural techniques. U.S. world leadership would encourage broader international cooperation in these endeavors. These positive responses would be the carrot to lead DPRK into constructive reactions. As the United States draws DPRK out of its isolation, gradual changes would likely occur. The greatest obstacle is DPRK's nuclear potential. In concert with the UN and the larger East Asian community, the United States would establish a workable program to prevent future development of atomic weaponry.

List the main arguments for your option:

List ways in which this option might work successfully:

List ways in which this option seems unlikely to succeed:

List the pro and con results this option is likely to have for the future of Korea/Asia/United States:

PRO

CON

Develop an argument to present at the Senate hearings that supports your option. Be prepared to defend your option from attack by the other groups and the Senate committee.

HANDOUT 2: KOREAN REUNIFICATION AND UNITED STATES POLICY OPTIONS

OPTION 2: THE UNITED STATES MUST INSIST ON ACCEPTANCE OF WESTERN INSTITUTIONS

The United States must continue its role as protector of democracy around the world. As a nation, it has fought for the values of freedom in major world wars and in Korea itself. Its long-term efforts and the sacrifice of American lives in Korea demands an unyielding position on the fundamental values of a free market economy and political democracy. Reunification of North and South Korea must be based on acceptance of these principles. Further, DPRK must immediately accept United Nations inspections of its nuclear facilities and conform immediately to international nuclear-related agreements. Existing nuclear weapons must be surrendered to the United States. Further, the United States must continue to maintain troops in Korea indefinitely to ensure the implementation of its policies. South Korea must accept International Monetary Fund (IMF) goals to stabilize its current economic crisis. A free market economy can bring together the natural resources of North Korea and the business skills of South Korea to build an integrated economy. This will promote a common cause in growing prosperity and encourage compromise on other issues.

List the main arguments for your option:

List ways in which this option might work successfully:

List ways in which this option seems unlikely to succeed:

List the pro and con results this option is likely to have for the future of Korea/Asia/United States:

PRO

CON

Develop an argument to present at the Senate hearings that supports your option. Be prepared to defend your option from attack by the other groups and the Senate committee.

HANDOUT 2: KOREAN REUNIFICATION AND UNITED STATES POLICY OPTIONS

OPTION 3: THE UNITED STATES SHOULD MIND ITS OWN BUSINESS

The United States completely misunderstood the situation in Korea at the end of World War II. The U.S. fear of Russian expansion into the Korean peninsula led to an ill conceived plan to divide Korea at the 38th parallel. In actuality, the Koreans, at last free from hated Japanese domination, sought to control their own country following the Japanese defeat and, in the case of South Koreans, highly resented the ensuing U.S. military occupation and unnatural division of their homeland. The United Nations' plan for nation-wide elections was rejected by the Russians. As a result, in May 1948, elections were held in the South only and the Republic of Korea (ROK) was established under a U.S.-style constitution. In retaliation the following September, the North created the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK). Koreans on both sides of the division still considered themselves one people and one culture, unfortunately under two incompatible systems. The invasion of the ROK by North Korea in 1950 was an attempt to forcibly unify the nation under the socialist system of North Korea. U.S. interference caused the ensuing civil war to become entangled in the Cold war struggle. Now the United States should transfer the burden of policy and defense to South Korea. They can take care of themselves.

List the main arguments for your option:

List ways in which this option might work successfully:

List ways in which this option seems unlikely to succeed:

List the pro and con results this option is likely to have for the future of Korea/Asia/United States:

PRO

CON

Develop an argument to present at the Senate hearings that supports your option. Be prepared to defend your option from attack by the other groups and the Senate committee.

HANDOUT 2: KOREAN REUNIFICATION AND UNITED STATES POLICY OPTIONS

OPTION 4: THE UNITED STATES MUST MAINTAIN ITS ASIAN DEFENSE PERIMETER

Reunification of North and South Korea is not in the United States' best interest. Both North Korea and China remain a threat to U.S. interests. These nations are unalterably opposed to the American way of life and threaten freedom in the surrounding region. Only the United States is powerful enough to contain this threat to peace and freedom. Under American supervision, South Korea is developing into a democracy that will be an example to other Asian nations. Further, South Korea wants U.S. troops to remain. North Korea's food crisis may cause its leaders to pursue rash tactics, including the invasion of the ROK. The United States must be prepared to meet this threat. It should help South Korea stabilize its economy, beef up U.S. military presence and reaffirm a commitment to protect free nations from communist threats.

List the main arguments for your option:

List ways in which this option might work successfully:

List ways in which this option seems unlikely to succeed:

List the pro and con results this option is likely to have for the future of Korea/Asia/United States:

PRO

CON

Develop an argument to present at the Senate hearings that supports your option. Be prepared to defend your option from attack by the other groups and the Senate committee.

HANDOUT 2: KOREAN REUNIFICATION AND UNITED STATES POLICY OPTIONS

OPTION 5: THE UNITED NATIONS SHOULD OVERSEE THE PROCESS OF REUNIFICATION

The bipolar world of competing superpowers is over. The United States should recognize this and abandon unilateral approaches to Korea. A United Nations team could bring wider support and more diverse experiences to resolving the multiple issues still dividing Korea. The United Nations can deal with the problems of starvation without the political overtones that would accompany U.S. aid. UN troops can maintain order during difficult political transitions as a neutral force that the United States could not be. Problems of instability and economic crisis might respond better to an organization representing a wider variety of options. The United States should withdraw its military forces from South Korea and allow the United Nations to ensure the North does not resume its nuclear threat. A demilitarized peninsula, overseen by a neutral international agency, would open the door for the North and South to work out a plan for reunification. Additionally, this approach would gain much wider support from the larger Asian community than a U.S.-directed plan.

List the main arguments for your option:

List ways in which this option might work successfully:

List ways in which this option seems unlikely to succeed:

List the pro and con results this option is likely to have for the future of Korea/Asia/United States:

PRO

CON

Develop an argument to present at the Senate hearings that supports your option. Be prepared to defend your option from attack by the other groups and the Senate committee.

HANDOUT 2: KOREAN REUNIFICATION AND UNITED STATES POLICY OPTIONS

OPTIONS WORKSHEET: CRITIQUING THE OPTIONS

Listen carefully to the arguments presented for each option. List the pro's and con's of each:

PRO

CON

OPTION 1

OPTION 2

OPTION 3

OPTION 4

OPTION 5

Review the pro's and cons of each option with your team. Develop a new option that you believe eliminates as many cons as possible and suggests long term success. Prepare to read your team's new option to the class.

HANDOUT 3: OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

THE SCHUFELDT TREATY

This treaty opened official diplomatic and trade relations between the United States and Korea in 1882.

The United States of America and the Kingdom of Chosen (Korea), being sincerely desirous of establishing permanent relations of amity and friendship between their respective peoples..., have agreed upon the several following Articles:

I. There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the President of the United States and the King of Chosen, and the citizens and subjects of their respective Governments. If other Powers deal unjustly or oppressively with either Government, the other will exert their good offices, on being informed of the case, to bring about an amicable arrangement, thus showing their friendly feelings.

II. After the Conclusion of this Treaty of Amity and Commerce, the High Contracting Powers may each appoint Diplomatic Representatives to reside at the Court of the other, and may each appoint Consular Representatives at the ports of the other, which are open to foreign commerce, at their own convenience.

These officials shall have relations with the corresponding local authorities of equal rank upon a basis of mutual equality. The Diplomatic and Consular Representatives of the two Governments shall receive mutually all the privileges, rights, and immunities, without discrimination, which are accorded to the same classes of Representatives from the most favored nation.

Consuls shall exercise their functions only on receipt of an exequatur from the Government to which they are accredited. Consular authorities shall be bona fide officials.

No merchants shall be permitted to exercise the duties of the office, nor shall Consular officers be allowed to engage in trade. At ports to which no Consular Representatives have been appointed, the Consuls of other Powers may be invited to act, provided that no merchant shall be allowed to assume Consular functions, or the provisions of this Treaty may, in such case, be enforced by the local authorities.

If Consular Representatives of the United States in Chosen conduct their business in an improper manner, their exequaturs may be revoked, subject to the approval, previously obtained, of the Diplomatic Representative of the United States.

III. Whenever United States vessels, either because of stress of weather, or by want of fuel or provisions, cannot reach the nearest open port in Chosen, they may enter any port or harbour, either to take refuge therein, or to get supplies of wood, coal, and other necessities, or to make repairs, the expenses incurred thereby being defrayed by the ship's master. In such event the officers and people of the locality shall display their sympathy by rendering full assistance, and their liberality by furnishing the necessities required.

If a United States vessel carries on a clandestine trade at a port not open to foreign commerce, such vessel, with her cargo, shall be seized and confiscated. If a United States vessel be wrecked on the coast of Chosen, the local authorities, on being informed of the occurrence, shall immediately render assistance to the crew, provide for their present necessities, and take the measures necessary for the salvage of the ship and the preservation of her cargo. They shall also bring the matter to the knowledge of the near-

est Consular Representative of the United States, in order that steps may be taken to send the crew home, and to save the ship and cargo. The necessary expenses shall be defrayed either by the ships master or by the United States.

V. Merchants and merchant-vessels of Chosen visiting the United States for purposes of traffic shall pay duties and tonnage-dues, and all fees according to the Customs Regulations of the United States, but no higher or other rates of duties and tonnage-dues shall be exacted of them than are levied upon citizens of the United States or upon citizens or subjects of the most favoured nation. Merchants and merchant-vessels of the United States visiting Chosen for purposes of traffic shall pay duties upon all merchandise imported and exported.

The authority to levy duties is of right vested in the Government of Chosen. The tariff of duties upon exports and imports, together with the Customs Regulations for the prevention of smuggling and other irregularities, will be fixed by the authorities of Chosen and communicated to the proper officials of the United States, to be by the latter notified to their citizens and duly observed... And it is further agreed that the duty upon foreign imports shall be paid once for all at the port of entry, and that no other dues, duties, fees, taxes, or charges of any sort shall be levied upon such imports, either in the interior of Chosen or at the ports.

VIII. Whenever the Government of Chosen shall have reason to apprehend a scarcity of food within the limits of the kingdom, His Majesty may by Decree temporarily prohibit the export of all breadstuffs and such Decree shall be binding on all citizens of the United States in Chosen upon due notice having been given them by the authorities of Chosen through the proper officers of the United States: but it is to be understood that the exportation of rice and breadstuffs of every description is prohibited from the open port of Vin-Chuen. Chosen having of old prohibited the exportation of red ginseng, if citizens of the United States clandestinely purchase it for export, it shall be confiscated and the offenders punished.

THE TAFT-KATSURA AGREEMENT

The following description briefly summarizes the agreement and is not an official document.

President Theodore Roosevelt thought the United States was ready to become a world leader. He believed it necessary for the United States to take an assertive role in the Pacific to protect American interests in the Philippines and to gain an advantage in trading with Asian nations. Japan, which had been an isolated nation before 1854, had become the most modern nation in Asia. Japan wanted to replace European powers as the dominant country in the Asian world. As Japan aggressively attempted to increase its influence, it entered into war first with China (Sino-Japanese War 1895) and gained control of Formosa. Then, in 1905, as both Japan and Russia moved to dominate Manchuria and Korea, the Russo-Japanese War broke out. President Roosevelt offered the services of the United States to help work out an end to that war. As part of Roosevelt's Asian strategy, Secretary of War William Howard Taft traveled in July 1905 to Tokyo, where he entered into discussions with the Japanese Prime Minister Katsura. Taft and Katsura agreed to respect each other's territorial interests in the Pacific. As a result, Japan promised noninterference in the Philippines, an American colony since 1898. The United States in return recognized Japan's control of Korea.

The Taft-Katsura talks led to an informal memorandum that affirmed these territorial promises. The Portsmouth Treaty, concluded in August 1905, reflected this agreement. In 1910, Japan took the memorandum as U.S. acceptance of its planned annexation of Korea.

TREATY OF PORTSMOUTH

This treaty, negotiated at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, from August 23 to September 5, 1905, ended the Russo-Japanese war.

HIS MAJESTY the Emperor of Japan on the one part, and His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias on the other part, animated by the desire to restore the blessings of peace to their countries and peoples, have resolved to conclude a treaty of peace... and have, for this purpose, named their plenipotentiaries... who, after having exchanged their full powers, which were found to be in good and due form, have concluded the following articles:

I. There shall henceforth be peace and amity between their Majesties the Emperor of Japan and the Emperor of All the Russias and between their respective States and subjects.

II. The Imperial Russian Government, acknowledging that Japan possesses in Korea paramount political, military, and economical interests, engage neither to obstruct nor interfere with the measures of guidance, protection, and control which the Imperial Government of Japan may find it necessary to take in Korea. It is understood that Russian subjects in Korea shall be treated exactly in the same manner as the subjects or citizens of other foreign Powers—that is to say, they shall be placed on the same footing as the subjects or citizens of the most-favoured nation. It is also agreed that, in order to avoid all causes of misunderstanding, the two High Contracting Parties will abstain, on the Russo-Korean frontier, from taking any military measures which may menace the security of Russian or Korean territory.

III. Japan and Russia mutually engage: 1) To evacuate completely and simultaneously Manchuria, except the territory affected by the lease of the Liao-tung Peninsula, in conformity with the provisions of additional Article I annexed to this treaty, and 2) To restore entirely and completely to the exclusive administration of China. All portions of Manchuria now in the occupation or under the control of the Japanese or Russian troops with the exception of the territory above mentioned.

The Imperial Government of Russia declares that it has not in Manchuria any territorial advantages or preferential or exclusive concessions in impairment of Chinese sovereignty or inconsistent with the principle of equal opportunity.

IV. The present treaty shall be ratified by their Majesties the Emperor of Japan and the Emperor of All the Russias. And from the date of the latter of such announcements this treaty shall in all its parts come into full force.

The formal exchange of ratifications shall take place in Washington D.C. as soon as possible.

The ratifications were exchanged at Washington D.C. on September 25, 1905.

THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE 1948

President Harry Truman, concerned over potential communist takeovers in Greece and

Turkey, made the following policy statement to Congress.

I am fully aware of the broad implications involved if the United States extends assistance to Greece and Turkey, and I shall discuss these implications with you at this time.

One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion. This was a fundamental issue in the war with Germany and Japan. Our victory was won over countries which sought to impose their will and their way of life, upon other nations.

To insure the peaceful development of nations, free from coercion, the United States has taken a leading part in establishing the United Nations. The United Nations is designed to make possible lasting freedom and independence for all its members. We shall not realize our objectives, however, unless we are willing to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes. [Applause.] This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed upon free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States.

The peoples of a number of countries of the world have recently had totalitarian regimes forced upon them against their will. The Government of the United States has made frequent protests against coercion and intimidation in violation of the Yalta Agreement in Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria. I must also state that in a number of other countries there have been similar developments.

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destiny in their own way.

I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid, which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes.

The world is not static and the status quo is not sacred. But we cannot allow changes in the status quo in violation of the Charter of the United Nations by such methods as coercion, or by such subterfuge as political infiltration. In helping free and independent nations to maintain their freedom, the United States will be giving effect to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

This is a serious course upon which we embark. I would not recommend it except that the alternative is much more serious. [Applause.] The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms.

If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world—and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own Nation...

TRUMAN AND THE UNITED NATIONS RESPOND TO THE INVASION OF SOUTH KOREA 1950

After being notified of the North Korean invasion of South Korea by Secretary of State Dean Acheson, the president, decided to respond forcefully. He considered this invasion an act of communist aggression similar to the aggression of the Axis Powers preceding World War II. He believed swift military response would prevent other aggressions and prevent another war. He ordered U.S. troops back to Korea and requested UN action. The following resolutions were adopted by the Security Council in June and July 1950 (the U.S.S.R. delegate was not present).

Resolution I: The Security Council

Recalling the finding of the General Assembly in its resolution of 21 October 1949 that

the Government of the Republic of Korea is a lawfully established government "having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea was able to observe and consult and in which the great majority of the people of Korea reside; and that this Government is based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which were observed by the Temporary Commission... Noting with grave concern armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea, Determines that this action constitutes a breach of the peace.

I. Calls for the immediate cessation of hostilities; and calls upon the authorities of North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the thirty-eighth parallel;

II. Requests the United Nations Commission on Korea

(a) To communicate its fully considered recommendations on the situation with the least possible delay;

(b) To observe the withdrawal of the North Korean forces to the thirty-eighth parallel; and

(c) To keep the Security Council informed on the execution of this resolution.

III. Calls upon all Members to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities.

Resolution II: The Security Council

Having determined that the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea constitutes a breach of the peace, having called for an immediate cessation of hostilities, and having called upon the authorities of North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed force to the 38th parallel, and having noted from the report of the United Nations Commission for Korea that the authorities in North Korea have neither ceased hostilities nor withdrawn their armed forces to the 38th parallel and that urgent military measures are required to restore international peace and security, and having noted the appeal from the Republic of Korea to the United Nations for immediate and effective steps to secure peace and security, recommends that the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area.

Resolution III: (3) The Security Council, having determined that the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea constitutes a breach of the peace, and having recommended that the members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korean may be necessary to repel armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area,

(1) Welcomes the prompt and vigorous support which Governments and peoples of the United Nations have given to its resolutions of 25 and 27 June 1950 to assist the Republic of Korea in defending itself against armed attack and thus to restore international peace and security in the area;

(2) Notes that members of the United Nations have transmitted to the United Nations offers of assistance for the Republic of Korea;

(3) Recommends that all members providing military forces and other assistance pursuant to the aforesaid Security Council resolutions make such forces and other assistance available to a unified command under the United States;

- (4) Requests the United States to designate the commander of such forces;*
- (5) Authorizes the unified command at its discretion to use the United Nations flag in the course of operations against North Korean forces concurrently with the flag of the various nations participating;*
- (6) Requests the United States to provide the Security Council with reports as appropriate on the course of action taken under the unified command.*

KOREAN ARMISTICE 1953

The armistice ending the hostilities between the United Nations and the forces of North Korea and the People's Republic of China was signed in the village of Panmunjom, July 27, 1953.

THE UNDERSIGNED, the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the one hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, on the other hand, in the interest of stopping the Korean conflict, with its great toll of suffering and bloodshed on both sides, and with the objective of establishing an armistice which will ensure a complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea until a final peaceful settlement is achieved, do individually, collectively, and mutually agree to accept and to be bound and governed by the conditions and terms of armistice set forth in the following Articles and Paragraphs, which said conditions and terms are intended to be purely military in character and to pertain solely to the belligerents in Korea.

ARTICLE I. Military Demarcation Line and Demilitarized Zone

1) A Military Demarcation Line shall be fixed and both sides shall withdraw two kilometers from this line so as to establish a Demilitarized Zone between the opposing forces. A Demilitarized Zone shall be established as a buffer zone to prevent the occurrence of incidents which might lead to a resumption of hostilities...

4) The Military Demarcation Line shall be plainly marked as directed by the Military Armistice Commission hereinafter established. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall have suitable markers erected along the boundary between the Demilitarized Zone and their respective areas.

The Military Armistice Commission shall supervise the erection of all markers placed along the Military Demarcation Line and along the boundaries of the Demilitarized Zone...

6) Neither side shall execute any hostile act within, from, or against the Demilitarized Zone.

7) No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to cross the Military Demarcation Line unless specifically authorized to do so by the Military Armistice Commission.

8) No person, military or civilian, in the Demilitarized Zone shall be permitted to enter the territory under the military control of either side unless specifically authorized to do so by the Commander into whose territory entry is sought.

9) No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to enter the Demilitarized Zone except persons concerned with the conduct of civil administration and relief and per-

sons specifically authorized to enter by the Military Armistice Commission.
ARTICLE II. Concrete Arrangements for Cease-Fire and Armistice
A. GENERAL...

12) *The Commanders of the opposing sides shall order and enforce a complete cessation of all hostilities in Korea by all armed forces under their control, including units and personnel of the ground, naval, and air forces, effective twelve (12) hours after this Armistice Agreement is signed.*

13) *In order to insure the stability of the Military Armistice so as to facilitate the attainment of a peaceful settlement through the holding by both sides of a political conference of a higher level, the Commanders of the opposing sides shall:*

a) *Within seventy-two (72) hours after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, withdraw all of their military forces, supplies, and equipment from the Demilitarized Zone except as otherwise provided herein. All demolitions, minefields, wire entanglements, and other hazards to the safe movement of personnel of the Military Armistice Commission or its Joint Observer Teams, known to exist within the Demilitarized Zone after the withdrawal of military forces therefrom, together with lanes known to be free of all such hazards, shall be reported to the Military Armistice Commission by the Commander of the side whose forces employed such hazards. Subsequently, additional safe lanes shall be cleared; and eventually, within forty-five (45) days after the termination of the seventy-two (72) hour period, all such hazards shall be removed from the Demilitarized Zone as directed by and under the supervision of the Military Armistice Commission. At the termination of the seventy-two (72) hour period, except for unarmed troops authorized a forty-five (45) day period to complete salvage operations under Military Armistice Commission supervision, such units of a police nature as may be specifically requested by the Military Armistice Commission and agreed to by the Commanders of the opposing sides, and personnel authorized under Paragraphs 10 and 11 hereof, no personnel of either side shall be permitted to enter the Demilitarized Zone.*

b) *Within ten (10) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, withdraw all of their military forces, supplies, and equipment from the rear and the coastal islands and waters of Korea of the other side. If such military forces are not withdrawn within the stated time limit, and there is no mutually agreed and valid reason for the delay, the other side shall have the right to take any action which it deems necessary for the maintenance of security and order...*

g) *Afford full protection and all possible assistance and cooperation to the Military Armistice Commission, its Joint Observer Teams, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, and its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, in the carrying out of their functions and responsibilities hereinafter assigned; and accord to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, and to its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, full convenience of movement between the headquarters of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof over main lines of communication agreed upon by both sides, and between the headquarters of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and the places where violations of this Armistice Agreement have been reported to have occurred. In order to prevent unnecessary delays, the use of alternate routes and means of transportation will be permitted whenever the*

main lines of communication are closed or impassable...

14) This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing ground forces under the military control of either side, which ground forces shall respect the Demilitarized Zone and the area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side.

15) This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing naval forces, which naval forces shall respect the waters contiguous to the Demilitarized Zone and to the land area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side, and shall not engage in blockade of any kind of Korea.

16) This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing air forces, which air forces shall respect the air space over the Demilitarized Zone and over the area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side, and over the waters contiguous to both...

18) The costs of the operations of the Military Armistice Commission and of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and of their Teams shall be shared equally by the two opposing sides.

ANALYZING DOCUMENTS: WORKSHEET 1

Use the excerpts from official documents to answer the questions on Worksheet 1.

1. What did the United States seek to gain from Korea (Chosen) in the Schufeldt Treaty of 1882?
2. What did Korea (Chosen) seek to gain from this treaty?
3. Which nation seemed to gain the most?
4. What is the Taft-Katsura Agreement? What did the United States seek to gain?
5. How do you think Koreans feel about the Taft-Katsura Agreement?
6. Why did the U.S. sponsor the peace negotiations at Portsmouth, New Hampshire (1905) ending the Russo-Japanese War?
7. What did President Truman promise in the Truman Doctrine?
8. Why did President Truman think it was essential to defend South Korea?
9. Do you agree with his reasons?
10. How did the United Nations respond to the invasion of South Korea?
11. On what terms did the Korean Armistice end the fighting?

HANDOUT 4: NEWSPAPER ARTICLES

“Koreas Shake Hands and Come Out Talking”

from *The Star-Ledger* (March 6, 1997)

By Terril Yue Jones

ASSOCIATED PRESS

NEW YORK—North and South Korea met yesterday for the first time in 25 years to talk about peace on the divided peninsula, with the United States sitting in and pressing North Korea to agree to enter formal negotiations. The North Koreans said they needed more time to decide.

Exchanging smiles and pleasantries, high-level representatives of the rival Korea states met to discuss an end to hostilities on their peninsula, one of the last flash points of the Cold war. In a New York hotel room the Americans and South Koreans briefed the North Koreans on a proposal for four-power talks, including China, for a peace treaty formally ending the Korean War.

An armistice ended fighting in Korea in 1953 but created an uneasy truce along the heavily armed border between communist North Korea and capitalist South Korea. Some 37,000 U.S. troops also are stationed on the peninsula. A peace treaty ending the war was never signed.

After the daylong briefing, North Korea's chief delegate, Deputy Foreign Minister Kim Kye Gwan, said the discussions had taken place in a "sincere atmosphere."

"We are prepared to listen to any proposals considered beneficial to promote peace and stability," Kim said. But he added: "We need further study on this proposal" before deciding whether to enter four-power talks.

Tomorrow, the North Koreans are to hold separate talks with the United States to address the search for remains of American soldiers missing in the Korean War and the opening of liaison offices.

Speaking before the closed-door briefings, South Korean officials said they would offer economic cooperation and help in coping with North Korea's critical food shortage as incentives to join the negotiations. The United States and South Korea have pledged \$16 million in food relief for the North.

Yesterday's meeting between often-hostile rivals began with handshakes and niceties. The heads of the three delegations—Deputy U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Charles Kartman, Kim of North Korea and South Korean Assistant Foreign Minister Song Young-shik—joined hands for photographers.

The Korean delegations chatted pleasantly, a U.S. official said.

In Washington, State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns described the atmosphere as "serious and sincere" and "very businesslike." He said there were no breakthroughs, but he expressed hope that the talks will lead to North Korea joining four-party talks.

"They asked questions about the nature of the proposal we put together," Burns said. "We believe the United States and South Korea made a sincere and fair proposal and, frankly,

we don't see any reason why the North Koreans won't respond to it positively."

Before the talks, U.S. and South Korean sources said they did not expect the North Koreans to agree immediately to the four-power negotiations. North Korea was expected to wait past the third anniversary of the death of its late leader, Kim Il Sung, which comes this summer.

The North also could be waiting until the late leader's son, Kim Jong Il is formally given the reins of power. He has been the de facto leader since 1994.

But South Korean sources, speaking on condition of anonymity, said they believe the North Koreans ultimately will agree to the talks because of the country's economic crisis and food shortage.

North Korea's participation represents a major concession by the Communist government. For years, the North Koreans sought direct talks with the United States, excluding South Korea.

The New York Times
(May 11, 1997)

***U.S. and North Korea
Ending Talks on M.I.A.'s***

By The Associated Press

American and North Korean negotiators ended six days of talks in New York City with no agreement on expanding cooperation to account for Americans missing from the Korean War, the head of the United States delegation said yesterday.

"Despite assurances in advance that the talks would deal conclusively with all issues, their delegation was unable to respond constructively to U.S. proposals in any of the three areas," James W. Wold said in a statement.

The two sides met daily since last Sunday on joint excavations to search for missing soldiers, on returning remains of American soldiers who died in Korea and on access for American researchers to North Korean military archives.

"I know that the family members and veterans are as disappointed as I am," said Mr. Wold, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Prisoners and Missing Personnel.

The North Koreans requested a one- or two-day extension of the talks on Friday, but the Americans refused, said Larry Greer, a Pentagon spokesman.

Ready to Implode?

Starvation and political instability underline a defector's warning that North Korea is desperate

AT A HUICH'ON KINDERGARTEN in central North Korea, the starving children appear almost skeletal. Nurses in Pyongyang hospitals can see their breath because the buildings have no heat. U.S. Congressman Tony Hall, on a visit to North Korea, spotted a teenage girl, so malnourished she looked like a six- or seven-year-old, picking weeds and grass to eat. Emergency food shipments from China, South Korea, Europe and the U.S. are being rushed in, but U.S. intelligence agencies warn that not enough will arrive in time to prevent tens of thousands from starving to death. North Korea, says World Food Program

ters, ordering up a huge military parade last week in which thousands of goose-stepping soldiers marched past him.

The State Department was skeptical of Hwang's warning. United Nations inspectors believe North Korea was left with only enough plutonium to fuel about two bombs after it agreed to freeze its nuclear-weapons program in 1994. The Pentagon saw no evidence that Pyongyang was preparing for an attack and did not order the 37,000 U.S. soldiers stationed in South Korea to a higher alert level.

But there was no doubt that North Korea was in danger of imploding economically. In Pyongyang, where food is most

available, rations for bureaucrats have been reduced to between 3 and 6 oz. of rice per day. Many factories have closed; the rest are operating at 25% of capacity. Pyongyang is without electricity for hours each day. Many farmers are too weak from hunger to harvest crops or plant seeds. Not only have poor diets made North Koreans shorter and lighter over the past 20 years, but parents "may be raising a generation with lower IQs because of the malnutrition," says a U.S. official with access to the intelligence reports.

Kim still has a firm grip on power, but there are signs of turmoil in the leadership. About half a dozen senior officials have died or been fired recently. The CIA has received reports that some military commanders have been cashiered and some units redeployed because their loyalty was questioned. The Pentagon estimates that North Korea's supply-starved army could not sustain an attack for much longer than a month. But U.S. Pacific Command chief Admiral Joseph Prueher fears that Kim could still "lash out should the survival of the regime become threatened." As long as that's possible, Kim has the power to bring others down with him. —By Douglas Waller.

With reporting by Jaime A. FlorCruz/Beijing and Frank Gibney/Tokyo



DISASTER: A U.N. relief worker examines a malnourished child in the North Korean industrial town of Huich'on

director Catherine Bertini, faces "a major humanitarian disaster."

Enough of a disaster to topple its 49-year-old communist regime? Or to scare its reclusive "Dear Leader," Kim Jong Il, into a last-gasp invasion of South Korea? Last week Hwang Jang Yop, the highest-ranking North Korean official ever to defect to the South, rattled nerves with a warning that Kim's million-man army was preparing for a suicidal attack. What's more, the North "is capable of scorching" South Korea and Japan with nuclear and chemical weapons, according to an article published by South Korea's largest daily newspaper, *Chosun Ilbo*, which secretly obtained the information from Hwang just before his defection. Kim did nothing to calm the jit-

The Tigers Teeter Dangerously

Twenty years of prosperity made the Pacific Rim a model of political stability. Can 'Asian values' weather hard times, too? BY STEVEN STRASSER

AS PACIFIC LEADERS GRAPPLED WITH ASIA'S MARKET meltdown at their economic summit in Vancouver last week, they may have missed the news about the cake crisis in Hong Kong. High strung in the best of times, the city has recently endured attacks on its currency, a stock-market crash and a run on a small Chinese bank. Then last week, out of nowhere, rumors spread that a chain of cake shops was going out of business. It wasn't, but thousands of people bearing gift coupons from the company converged on the shops in a panic. Waving their certificates and jostling with police, they snapped up cakes, biscuits, bread—anything on the shelves. Local journalists sought out psychologists to analyze it all. The best they could come up with: "Hong Kong is a funny place."

There's a better explanation. Though leaders along the Pacific Rim insist that fundamentals in Asia continue to be strong, their constituents are not so sure. Crowds of antigovernment demonstrators have marched in Bangkok. Bank depositors have jostled with police in Jakarta. And from Malaysia to South Korea, populists are railing against hardships they blame on the "imperialist" West.

Twenty years of prosperity under a U.S. security shield transformed East Asia into a global model of political stability. Times were good, and the region's leaders regularly boasted about superior "Asian values" of hard work, frugality and family solidarity. The question now is whether hard times will wound the Asian tigers badly enough to create instability—and endanger U.S. interests. "The world is asking," noted Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in Vancouver, "will our partnerships fall apart, or will we pull together?"

The price of pulling together is growing fast: so far, the International Monetary Fund has come up with an estimated \$70 billion in rescue plans for South Korea, Indonesia and Thailand. There are other, less tangible, costs as well. As Tokyo launches into urgent economic repairs, Washington's latest grumblings about the rising trade deficit between the two countries are getting little attention. Japan has also signaled cuts in its defense budget—again contrary to U.S. appeals that it take on greater responsibilities. Among other things, Japan will trim back its support payments for the 43,000 U.S. troops based in the country. "So far, we haven't heard any complaints from the U.S. side," says a senior Japanese official. But he warns that if Japan's economic problems deepen and the country is forced to make further budget cuts, "we may have to face disagreement with the United States."

Japan's role as the keystone of East Asian prosperity and stability is also suddenly shaky. Japanese direct investment is down by 60

percent in China alone, and Japan's foreign-aid budget is also shrinking. Though it remains the world's largest donor, Japan's grants plunged by 35 percent last year to less than \$9.5 billion, and Tokyo plans to cut the foreign-aid budget by 10 percent next year. That's bad news for developing countries that use the money to help take the edge off poverty and social inequalities.

Japan also has a major stake on the Korean peninsula. Pyongyang recently agreed to peace talks with Washington, Seoul and Beijing in which North Korea will attempt to trade peace for economic aid.

That worked when the North gave up its nuclear-weapons program in return for peaceful reactors financed mostly by the South, with help from Japan. But the cost of that deal has escalated to \$5.2 billion, and Kim Dae Jung, a front runner in this month's South Korean presidential elections, says he will "ask the U.S. and Japan to contribute more." With Asia's richest powers on the rocks, an ambitious North Korean deal could be very expensive for Washington.

If that's not enough, consider the nightmare of chaos in Indonesia. During the go-go years of the early 1990s, the giant of Southeast Asia took a regional leadership role, quietly positioning itself as a balancing force against Chinese expansion. All the while, Indonesia ranked as the region's flamboyant example of nepotism and corruption. President Suharto seems willing to cap the fortunes of his friends and children as part of an IMF bailout; but tensions are rising in a nation where the gulf between rich and poor remains wide. Officials in Jakarta privately fear disturbances during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan early next year.

Panic and unrest among the Asian tigers? A Great Depression in Japan? The collapse of South Korea? Six months ago, such scenarios would have

been written off as the imaginings of doomsayers. The assumption then was that Seoul and Tokyo would finance stability on the Korean peninsula. China's prosperity would draw it into the international system (a trend still on track for now). The Southeast Asian achievers, meanwhile, would rise to the rank of developed nations, inspire countries from Burma to India to follow their example and continue their partnership of progress with the United States. With some emergency patches applied to "a few glitches in the road," as Clinton puts it, Washington hopes that happy scenario will still prevail. It might, but America's partnership with East Asia will be less certain from now on, and, without question, more expensive.

With MELINDA LEE in Vancouver, HIDEO TAKAYAMA in Tokyo and bureau reports



A Dissident Has His Day

Koreans elect a liberal populist. Now he faces his toughest role in trying to fix the troubled economy

By NISID HAJARI

SOUTH KOREANS DIDN'T JUST GET mad, they got even. Humiliated by a power structure that had brought their economy to its knees, voters threw the rascals out last week and chose a legendary dissident as their new President, the first opposition candidate they have ever elected. And so, after a long crusade for greater democracy and human rights, Kim Dae Jung finally takes charge of a government that jailed him, exiled him and attempted to assassinate him. It is an epochal choice for Korea, ushering in a promise of political transformation after a half-century of authoritarian orthodoxy and one-party rule. Already Kim has proposed a summit meeting with North Korea as a first move toward reconciliation on the divided Korean peninsula.

Kim's success is all the more remarkable against the background of South Korea's acute financial turmoil. While his popularity benefited from the economic malfeasance of the long-ruling Grand National Party—hastily renamed to distance itself from past mistakes—he is an unlikely leader for this difficult time. Kim's nationalistic populism is hardly the approach skittish investors are looking for, and he unnerved them during the campaign when he promised he would renegotiate the unpopular terms that were imposed by the International Monetary Fund in return for \$57 billion to bail out the economy. Even as Kim slipped into office with 40.3% of the vote, moneymen around the world were wondering whether he had the strength and willingness to launch the far-reaching reforms needed to rebuild the economy.

Perhaps it took just such a dramatic moment to elevate a man who is loved and hated in equal measure. "People realized that this was the best chance to change the government," said Park Hong Keun, 28, a former student activist who was in hiding

during the last election, held in 1992. Any reservations the voters had about Kim were overwhelmed by their hostility to the incumbent Administration for its role in the current crisis, and Establishment candidate Lee Hoi Chang could not free himself from the taint. More important, though,



SAVORING VICTORY: By a slim margin, Kim Dae Jung will lead the nation

onetime firebrand Kim, 73, had by circumstance and strategy finally solved the calculus of Korean politics. Running in his fourth presidential campaign, he boasted that he had been preparing for the job "for 40 years." His pledge to renegotiate the IMF bailout appealed to his core constituency of workers and the poor. Kim managed to defuse fears that he was too old for the job when he joked that even "young President Clinton" wore a hearing aid, as Kim does.

The balloting marked another departure: election of a man from the much scorned southwest. "This is a real turning point for Korean political history, moving toward mature democracy by overcoming regional prejudice," said Hahn Chai

Bong, a political-science professor at Yonsei University. Analysts credit campaign reforms with easing Koreans' strong provincial allegiances; limits imposed on campaign spending—and the introduction of TV debates and advertising—finally leveled the playing field enough for a true opposition candidate to compete with the Establishment machine.

Kim has spent his extraordinary career battling for greater individual freedoms even as an entrenched conservatocracy was willing to use any means to stop him. A gifted orator, he roused passionate, even violent, crowds at his pro-democracy protests. After mounting an unexpectedly strong challenge in his first presidential race in 1971, he was nearly killed when, suspiciously, a truck smashed into his car, leaving him with a permanent limp. Two years later, government agents shanghaied him from a Tokyo hotel to a ship at sea, where they planned to drown him. In 1980 the military government sentenced him to death for dissidence.

Just how much upheaval will Kim bring? The President-elect moved quickly to reassure the anxious markets. "I will adhere to the agreement already reached with the IMF and faithfully carry out reforms," Kim promised the nation the morning after his win. Well aware of how deep antipathy toward him runs among conservatives, Kim will need to reach out immediately if he is to amass enough support to push through those prescriptions. Last week he successfully requested pardons for two ex-presidents who, as generals, had persecuted him.

Just as quickly he will need to shed the candidate's instinct to please everyone as often as possible. "It doesn't matter who makes what promises to get votes," said an executive at one of Korea's largest conglomerates, or *chaebol*, "because their policies will be bounded by IMF guidelines." Within those limits, though, Kim's background does give reason for hope. His strong labor credentials could help keep workers off the streets when the layoffs begin. And as IMF reforms dissolve the cozy networks that have wed politicians and *chaebol* executives, the longtime outsiders will finally have his chance to present the country with a new vision.

—Reported by Stella Kim/Seoul

ANALYZING NEWS ARTICLES: WORKSHEET 2

Based on the newspaper articles included in the readings, answer the following questions:

1. What seem to be the greatest obstacles to concluding a formal peace treaty ending the Korean War?
2. What are the greatest problems facing North Korea?
3. What major concerns does the U.S. have concerning North Korea?
4. What are the greatest problems facing South Korea?
5. How can the International Monetary Fund help South Korea?
6. Which of the problems facing North Korea and South Korea poses the greatest obstacle to unification?
7. To what extent can the United States help resolve these problems?