Transcript of Panel Discussion
Korea, the United States and Strategic Relations: Russia
October 20, 2011
Speakers:
Dr. Alexander Mansourov
Visiting Scholar at the U.S.-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins SAIS
Dr. Alexander Vorontsov
Department Head, Korean and
Mongolian Studies at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the
Russian Academy of Sciences
Moderated by
Dr. Stephen Noerper
Senior Vice President
The Korea Society
STEPHEN NOERPER:
This is the second in our series exploring commercial, political and strategic relations for Korea and the United States. The third will take place in two weeks time, when we welcome Dr. Satu Limaye, the Washington director of the East-West Center who will be addressing the India relationship, vis-à-vis Korea and the United States. Two weeks ago, we began with an exploration of Mongolia, and that was certainly a fascinating beginning to this very rich series.
We did want to let you know that this series will continue next spring with an expanded focus on Korea and the world. We will look at Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. Some of you have joined us for our Northeast Asian relations series, which has dealt with China and North Korea relations this year. In the spring we will meet for two sessions on ROK-Japan relations, which are very complex and challenging.
Tonight is about Korea, the United States and Strategic Relations relative to Russia. We're very, very delighted to welcome two prominent experts. One, Dr. Alexander Mansourov, Visiting Scholar at the U.S.-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins SAIS; and directly from Moscow, Dr. Alexander Vorontsov, Department Head of Korean and Mongolian Studies at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences.
Dr. Mansourov brings several decades of analysis on Northeast Asian security, politics and economics. Aside from his work as Visiting Scholar at the U.S.-Korea Institute of SAIS at Johns Hopkins, he is also a founding member of the U.S. National Committee on North Korea and a Senior Associate of the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development.
Dr. Vorontsov, aside from being head of the Department for Korean and Mongolian Studies at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, also holds several teaching and research posts: at Moscow State University as Russian Federation Military Science Academy Professor and the Institute for Asian Studies at Osaka University of Economy and Law in Japan, where he is a visiting professor. He is a member of the Russian part of the Russia-DPRK Intergovernmental Commission, dealing with trade-economic and scientific-technical cooperation. So, this evening will be about geostrategic issues, but as we'll hear from both speakers, also about the economics of the Peninsula, opportunities for research and development, and certainly opportunities relative to development of North Korea.
Let me also thank Ivan Zakharchenko, who has joined us. He is the RIA Novosti New York and UN Bureau Chief, and he has spent very significant time on the Korean Peninsula, including five years in the DPRK. We're really delighted he's with us tonight. If you go to the RIA Novosti site, you will see a series with an article today, "Deeper Than Oil: An Evening Stroll in North Korea" by the columnist Marc Bennetts, who has contributed several pieces on his experiences in the DPRK.
Lastly, let me thank our corporate sponsors, Renova USA, for its effort in supporting the MIR series at The Korea Society. We appreciate what they do for Russia-U.S. relations here in New York City, as well as in Northern California through their support of the Fort Ross project.
Let me turn first this evening to Dr. Mansourov, who has some thoughts about the geostrategic aspects of Russia's involvement on the Korean Peninsula, and then he'll touch on some of the economics. We'll then move to Dr. Vorontsov for his comments. I'll come back with a few comments, and we'll then open it up to the table. Thank you.
ALEXANDER MANSOUROV:
Thank you. Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. It's my pleasure to address this distinguished audience, and before I start, let me express my profound gratitude to the organizers of this event: the Chairman of The Korea Society, Ambassador Mark Minton; the Senior Vice President Dr. Stephen Noerper as well as Nikita Desai, who made it possible for me to come here from Washington.
I was asked to give you a few bullets and to open this event with some observations of where the relationship between Russia, the two Koreas and the United States are headed in the near future. In my assessment, what's happening is Russia is re-embracing North Korea, and that process started in the beginning of this year; visibly, at least while distancing itself from the Republic of Korea and in a way "resetting the reset" in its relations with the United States with respect to the Korean question. And that trend is demonstrated in at least four significant reversals in Russian policy towards the Peninsula which we could observe this year. A couple of them deal with economic issues, one with the political and another with the military issue.
On the economic front, clearly we see a reversal in the Russian position on the gas pipeline construction from the Russian Far East down the Korean Peninsula. And although this idea has been out there for at least two decades, but in the past several years, as you probably know, the Russian position has become to avoid, by all means, the transit states; not to build any pipelines in the areas where they have to go through transit countries, whether it's fraternal countries like Belarus or Ukraine, or whether it's more remote and distant countries.
And so when President Medvedev and Chairman Kim Jong Il agreed to build a pipeline, at least to set up an intergovernmental commission to consider this issue, which is again kind of a long shot still, that indicated to us that it was a departure from the Russian policy of avoiding, by all means, the necessity to deal with the transit states, especially given the fact that Russia is building an LNG terminal in the Far East, and given all the geopolitical uncertainties with respect to North Korea. So something must have happened to cause that if it's serious. If it's a serious decision, then something must have happened to cause that reversal and we can talk about it in the Q&A. The second reversal was on the debt issue. As you probably heard, again, President Medvedev and Chairman Kim, during their latest summit, agreed to move ahead with the debt settlement. I began to study Korea twenty-seven years ago, back in 1984, and that issue was a serious issue at that time. It's even a much more serious issue today, and for Russia to suddenly say that it's ready to forgive about 90 percent of that debt; it's a reversal, at least in its stance on the North Korean debt issue.
Again, it's not something unusual. That's what Russia did vis-à-vis the Libyan debt, Mongolian debt; in Afghanistan, Russia forgave a lot of debt the past ten years. But with respect to the North Korean debt, always the expectation was once Korea is unified, the caretaker government of a unified Korea will be willing to pay off this debt as a price for Russian acceptance of whatever the terms of the unification will be.
Again, the idea of the debt-for-equity swap, which now is discussed and apparently is agreed on, the 90 percent debt forgiveness and the remaining 10 percent, up to a $1 billion of debt will be swapped for equity in North Korean state-owned enterprises built by Russians; it's not a new idea. It's an old idea. For a long time the Russians wanted it. Now, for some reason, something happened which made it possible, which led Russia to agree to forgive the bulk of the debt, at least as preliminary terms.
In military cooperation, another policy reversal. Again, back in the eighties when Russia and North Korea were military allies bound by the treaty provisions, it was very active. I remember when I worked in Pyongyang, there were up to 500 Russian military technical experts resident in Pyongyang, active naval exchanges, military education and training jointly. So all that became a matter of the past when the Soviet Union collapsed, and President Yeltsin moved Russia away from North Korea; one of the conditions for improvement in the South Korean-Russian relationship was the termination of any type of military exchanges with the North.
So, when Kim Jong Il came to Russia this August, and held his summit with President Medvedev at Russia's Eastern Military District of the Russian military command and where now the 11th Airborne Brigade is located. He observed very interesting exercises staged by the Russian paratroopers showing him how they can rescue (in search and rescue) a person of interest in trouble. When he took pictures with President Medvedev surrounded by the defense ministers of both countries, Russia and North Korea, as well as the chiefs of the Air Force, that sent a message, especially at a time when the U.S. and South Korea were conducting a major military exercise across the DMZ. And the message was that there is somebody else Kim Jong Il can rely on in case of emergency.
Again, we are far away from any kind of commitment talk here, but nevertheless, what followed was the visit of the commander of the Eastern Military District of Russia to North Korea where he agreed to conduct joint military exercises. They called them "search and rescue" exercises, but we know what it means in reality, which is the first in the past two decades. So something again must have happened for Russia to reverse its position on that one.
And the whole idea of the summit diplomacy; the last time President Putin met with Chairman Kim was nine years ago, and so for President Medvedev to re-engage at that level the North Korean leadership and most likely visit Pyongyang soon [is significant]. I would not be surprised if President Medvedev goes to Pyongyang before the end of his term, before next March, because we just saw the visit by the First Deputy Foreign Minister Denisov to Pyongyang; people of that rank, don't go to Pyongyang just to talk about six-party talks, so clearly something is cooking here.
So the resumption of the summit diplomacy; and by the way, when Kim Jong Il came to Russia, he brought with him all those people who are on the international travel ban list like Ju Kyu Chang and Kim Yong Chun and Chang Sung Taek, all these people who are banned from international travel and are supposed to be arrested once they leave the country. Nevertheless, he felt comfortable enough to do it.
What's the rationale for these reversals in Russian policy toward the Peninsula and of re-embracing the North, moving away from the South? [In brief] President Lee Myung Bak’s hard-line policy toward the North in the past couple of years really spooked Moscow. The dramatic tightening of the U.S.-ROK alliance which followed in the wake of the North Korean action vis-à-vis the Cheonan battleship and around the Yeonpyeong Island also raised significant fears in Moscow. And [to counter] growing Chinese influence in North Korea, as a result of North Korean desperation and not wanting to be left out in the cold; and what's happening, we see it across the board: North Korea bandwagoning with China on all fronts, essentially becoming an economic dependency of China, but also a military vassal of China.
If you look around the world, and especially in the Middle East, you see what's happening there, and definitely Moscow does not want this to happen along its borders, especially during the forthcoming second presidency of Vladimir Putin. In the next few years, he does not want to have a little war in the Russian Far East across the border with Korea.
At the time when Russia is gearing up for the hopefully successful conduct of the APEC Summit in Vladivostok in 2012, Sochi Olympic Games in 2014, let alone the World Cup in 2018; you don't want to have a war in Korea on your border; something like what happened in Libya or in other Middle Eastern countries, because Russia will have to take a stand, and that stand will not be pro-Western, and as a result it may have repercussions which will affect not only the image of Russia, but these major international events.
We know what happened after Russia entered Afghanistan in 1979. In 1980, the Moscow Olympiad was pretty much embargoed by the West, and they don't want this to happen. So, to prevent the emergence of the Arab Spring-type situation in North Korea, to avoid the repetition of the Libyan scenario in Pyongyang, for all these reasons, Moscow began to re-embrace North Korea and distance itself from the South.
But also, if you think about it, Moscow has to prepare for the APEC Summit. I don't know when the last time was you flew over Vladivostok (which I did just a month ago). They have to build a lot of infrastructure there to be ready for that summit. There is no labor in Russia to do it. So you need to bring this labor from somewhere, and these construction materials from somewhere. They don't want to bring it from China. It's a matter of international prestige. They cannot bring it from Japan, because Japan is tied up with its own situation.
So, you can bring cheap labor, who build quickly, relatively good quality from North Korea. Alexander probably will confirm this issue of significant importation of the North Korean labor for the infrastructure construction projects in the Russian Far East. We're talking about 50,000 people, maybe up to 100,000 North Koreans who may be invited to participate in the accelerated construction of all these infrastructure facilities geared for the APEC Summit.
None of this would have been possible without significant concessions which apparently Kim Jong Il, made on the eve of this summit to open the way for Russia to change its position on some of the issues. And we can talk about it during the Q&A, especially on the gas pipeline issue. I believe if North Korea had not agreed, probably, to give Russia the ownership stake in that gas pipeline, Russia would have never agreed to this transit option. And the same on the debt settlement. It was the North Korean change of mind to agree to the debt-for-equity swap; not really the Russian change of position that led probably to this decision.
Let me conclude by highlighting the implications of Russian re-embracing of the North and distancing from the South. In a way, it's bad for the policy of isolation of North Korea and strategic patience that the Western countries are pursuing, because basically no matter how hard the United States and its allies tried to isolate the North Korean government--tried to wait it out--the fact that Moscow and Beijing hugged Pyongyang and hugged it more closely really undermines the effectiveness of this policy.
But I would submit to you that it's good for the six-party talks. It's good for the multilateral cooperation and prospects in Northeast Asia, although clearly Moscow's distancing from South Korea recently does not bode well for the South Korean-led reunification prospects. Thank you very much for your attention and I will be happy to answer your questions when the time comes.
ALEXANDER VORONTSOV:
I would like to join my good friend Professor Alexander Mansourov in his greeting you and I also would like to emphasize that I am very, very grateful to The Korea Society for inviting me. And for me it's both a great honor and great pleasure to be here today.
I agree with the analysis which Mr. Mansourov presented just now and would like to add some points. Yes, it's obvious that this year, Russia raised very dramatically its attention to Korean Peninsula, maybe first of all, to the North part of the Korean Peninsula. First of all, its security consideration is peace and security--and stability--on the Korean Peninsula. It is an integral part of security on the Russian border.
I think that the Yeonpyeong Island incident became a turning point for raising Russia's attention to the region. Last December, Russia initiated the United Nation Security Council extraordinary meeting to discuss the situation on the Korean Peninsula after the incident, and it appealed to both Koreas to demonstrate restraint. It involved Russia more deeply than before on the Korean Peninsula situation.
There was a very productive visit by Russian deputy foreign minister Borodavkin to Pyongyang in March, when Pyongyang agreed with absolutely all concerns of the international community on the highly enriched uranium program and nuclear issues. North Korea agreed to return international inspectors to observe nuclear projects and so on after the six-party talks resumed.
A second reason is the policy of oppression and isolation on North Korea by the international community, namely South Korea, the United States and Japan. I think that there are some people who sincerely believe that the collapse of the North Korean regime is possible very soon, and maybe it was the driving force of such kind of policy. But to the mind of Russian experts, such expectations are absolutely groundless.
The result of such policy is that China happened to become the only window of opportunity for North Korea. It's possible to compare the situation with Burma. You remember that for a long time, the international community treated and neglected Burma as a rogue state, and the military as the bad guys, and tried to isolate Burma, to exert pressure. Once again, China was very happy with this situation, because all other countries voluntarily left Burma, and China became the monopolist in this country. When the international community decided to wake up and see Burma from another angle, it saw that the Chinese are everywhere in Burma, and Burma had become a semi-protectorate of China.
I'm afraid that the situation, to some extent of course, is repeated in dealings with North Korea, because the Chinese penetration into North Korea in recent years has been dramatic. And we know that some South Korean intellectuals have concerns that China plans to [turn] North Korea into a fourth province of Northeast China.
We see that the trade volume and investment of China raised dramatically, and that simultaneously inter-Korean trade and cooperation dramatically decreased. Russia was not happy with the situation, because not only the Republic of Korea but even Russia could lose North Korea. This was one reason why Russia [reactivated] its policy on the Korean Peninsula.
We now have real competition with Chinese partners in Rajin for example. Dr. Mansourov emphasized the tri-regional project dealing with the gas pipeline construction from Russia to South Korea via North Korea, but it's only one there. In Russia, they call them the three big trilateral projects: the gas pipeline; the railroad connection of the two Koreas; and the electricity grid connection and Russian electricity to South Korea via North Korea is the third.
The rail project is one of the most developed now, because the Russian Railroad Company is now completing the first stage of the project, construction of the 55 km railroad from the Russian-North Korean border, Rajin Harbor. And simultaneously the Russian Railroad Company is reconstructing one of the piers of the Rajin Harbor to begin to accept cargo containers from sea and to send them via rail to West Europe via Russia.
Russia started this project. China later agreed with North Korea that it also improve facilities in Rajin Harbor. But for many reasons, the railroad construction was not speedy; China started actively to reconstruct roads from the Chinese border to Rajin and to reconstruct two bridges in the harbor. Now Russia has real competition with Chinese companies there. But happily the development of this railroad project saw good results, and maybe three to four days ago a test train was sent by this railroad from Russia to Rajin Harbor; it began operation.
I participated in the 5th meeting of the intergovernmental commission dealing with trade economic and scientific cooperation between Russia and North Korea, which was held this August in Pyongyang, and it was quite successful. It was eight working groups dealing with different aspects of our cooperation and in all directions; some substantial results were achieved.
After a long period hopeless discussion over the debt of North Korea, our financial representative succeeded in finding some compromise and achieved real progress to remove obstacles. And of course, as Mansourov mentioned, use of the North Korean labor force is one of the very promising directions of our cooperation. Just now, about 21,000 North Korean workers are employed in Russia in different areas: in timber, construction and agriculture. In construction, it's very attractive for them, not only for APEC. Yes, of course, the Vladivostok APEC meeting requires a huge amount of infrastructure. But you have heads of the new power enlarging the range of Russia capital more than two times. It's a revolutionary decision for Moscow. It's a very promising direction and area for our cooperation.
Agriculture, an exchange of specialists, rail between the Rajin and Hassan area [are opportunities]. North Korean railroad specialists are trained in Ozersk City to learn new, sophisticated equipment which was establishing in this railroad. [Working with] North Korea coincides with our key national interests in the security economic areas.
Our cultural cooperation is good indeed, and many North Koreans continue to learn Russian. The Russia organization Russian World promotes language study in North Korea. Many North Koreans like Russia culture, including Russian music. The Russian Chorus is very popular in North Korea, and many Russians (about 100-150 people) are in organizations where they're invited on a permanent basis to [reside in] North Korea. We cannot compare with China, but we try to do something for economic, political and cultural interests in Korea.
We will contribute to inter-Korean cooperation, because this trilateral project is a direct instrument to enhance inter-Korean cooperation. It will contribute to the enhancement of the stability and security on the Korean Peninsula. This is a reflection and manifestation of the long-term Russian policy toward integration into Northeast Asian region in general, and the Korean Peninsula is considered in Moscow as a crucially important bridge for Russian cooperation, not only with the two Korean states, but with Northeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific region in general. Thank you very much.
STEPHEN NOERPER:
Thank you both for some very intriguing comments. And certainly one of our lessons learned is that Russia is a good place (as we learned two weeks ago in discussing Mongolia) to gather interesting and alternative perspectives to which those of us here in the United States are seldom exposed. Your exposure brings a lot to our dialogue and a lot to our analysis. Let me pose a few questions to you, and then I'd invite you to respond briefly.
I'd like to focus questions and short observations in three areas. One is China, an area of emphasis of both of you. Certainly it seems that a lot of Russian motivation has to do with concern about China and its growth. I think that that would certainly be true of almost all of China's neighbors as well. And one would want to ask the following: Relative to Prime Minister Putin's recent visit to China, is there is a competition (perhaps a healthy competition) that leads Russia to be engaged on the North Korea front? Dr. Mansourov, you mentioned the idea of a vassal economy and military, which I'm sure some in North Korea would probably readily object to. The reality among many North Koreans, one would think, by way of their strategic analysis might be a fear of China as well, especially given the heavy dependencies. And so, does Russia provide a viable strategic alternative?
The second area I'd like to ask you about is one that hasn't been mentioned, and that is the context of Russia-U.S. strategic relations. Certainly the United States enjoys a robust relationship with South Korea. It's a strategic partnership born of a very rich alliance. To what degree is Russia's engagement, in particular relative to North Korea, seen as either an alternative to the United States relative to South Korea; or as perhaps a complement, where the United States and Russia are working in tandem for cooperation and development on the Korean Peninsula as a confidence builder, by way of demobilization and demilitarization eventually and by way of humanitarian relief or other operational aspects.
My last area of questioning would be on South Korea. I think many observers, certainly some in our crowd interested in business and economics, would point to the very healthy relationship between Russia and South Korea on the economic front. You mentioned Russia's leadership hosting the 2014 Winter Olympics, and South Korea will be hosting the 2018 Winter Games. I think that's a signal that both are emerging economies, regional leaders and vibrant, and that certainly there will be positive exchange around sports diplomacy. South Korea has been active since the transition from communism in Russia. Now, Hyundais, Kias, Samsungs, LGs and others are very popular. They're popular among Russian youth, along with other aspects of consumer culture. You mentioned North Korea's affection, Dr. Vorontsov, for Russian music; but certainly in Russia itself there's a very huge market for South Korean film, telenovelas, K-pop and other aspects of South Korean culture.
Many people would say that there are aspects of this where Russia actually aims to get closer to South Korea through its facilitation in the North, and that perhaps Russian pragmatism might be such that developing a closer relationship with South Korea allows it a better strategic position vis-à-vis a United Peninsula.
ALEXANDER VORONTSOV:
Thank you very much. Really important, really nice questions. I think that the last visit of Mr. Putin to China was a routine meeting of prime ministers, a traditional protocol meeting. But yes, of course, we are an important economic partner and political partner with China, and the relations are good. But of course, the economy is the economy, and there is competition.
For example, it's no secret that Russia decided to construct the gas pipeline through the Korean Peninsula, because the discussion between Russia and China didn't raise the price for Russian gas. It happened to be very difficult, very tough. The summit in Moscow that took place this summer was successful, but not in the gas area. In August in Ulan Ude, Medvedev and Chairman Kim emphasized the gas pipeline project to Korean Peninsula. We have, of course, an element of competition with China, but it's not the key, not the core part of our relationship. Basically we are satisfied with our general cooperation with China.
I was surprised reading some articles in South Korea on the meeting between Medvedev and Chairman Kim suggesting Russia decided to neutralize the influence of the United States and Japan on the Korean Peninsula, and South Korea also. It was surprising for many reasons for many reasons. Simply, to replace the United States on the Korean Peninsula and join hands in cooperation with both Korean states is simply impossible.
Secondly, Russia regards the military alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea and between the United States and Japan as a stabilization factor in the Asia-Pacific region. Of course, we consider our contribution to economic development and political development and cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang, between Moscow and Seoul as complementary and supplementary lines of engagement, which together with the United States can contribute to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.
We understand very well that the role of the United States is and will be crucial in Korea and the Asia-Pacific region in general. Some Russian commentators focused their attention on the change of the language of Mr. Lee Myung Bak after the summit in Washington. Before Lee supported the gas pipeline total, and expressed his personal, positive attitude it's a realistic project,, that it can be fulfilled quickly, and that its contract doesn't violate any sanctions or requirements dealing with North Korea. But after the summit, his attitude changed. Maybe it's really only a very first impression. And once again, it's only, of course, confirmation of a well-known fact that to achieve progress on the Korean Peninsula, Russia needs and should agree with the United States. It's reality. That's why I think we have a lot of joint interest in the Korean Peninsula and for Northeast Asia as a whole. Russia is eager to cooperate with the United States.
ALEXANDER MANSOUROV:
Steve raised three very big questions. The first one on China. Russia has a lot of concerns about China, and the biggest concern is that China is rising, China is rising fast and soon there will be no way Russia or anybody else will be able to catch up with China. And so reasonable people believe that the window of opportunity is about ten years when Russia can still negotiate with China on more or less reasonable terms. I'm not even using the phrase "equal terms."
But ten years from now, basically, China will be in its own league. If Russia fails to tie China down to the international agreements--mutually binding agreements, which would moderate Chinese behavior within the next ten years--Russia will have problems after 2020: border issues, energy issues, economic issues, political issues.
Prime Minister Putin's visit to China was scheduled well in advance. But it was substantive, it was serious, and this whole approach to China is based on the premise that Russia must, in a way, tie China down to as many internationally binding agreements as possible, including on the Korean issue.
And so with respect to Korea, yes, North Korea is becoming a vassal economy of China. Although the North Korean military is fiercely independent--and I don't mean to leave an impression that the North Korean military is subservient to the Chinese--the military cooperation between the two countries has increased significantly since Wen Jiabao's visit in October 2009. Nevertheless, the KPA kind of stands firmly on its own feet right now.
By no means does Russia provide a strategic alternative to North Korea vis-à-vis China. If anything, Russia does not want to. It doesn't have the capabilities in the economic field or in the military field. To act in concert with China--not necessarily bandwagon with China--to make sure that whatever China does in North Korea is coinciding with the Russian interests [is the goal]. That Moscow is informed and that Moscow has an opportunity to express its opinions, let alone to express its consent to disagreement, I think that's important--especially in the United Nations Security Council, because sooner or later the Korean question will come up again (probably it will be much sooner) when the successor [Kim Jong Un] will stage a "big accomplishment" event to showcase his leadership credentials, whether a new missile test or nuclear test; whatever it may be, the issue will be put in front of the Security Council. Then this newly discovered Russian-North Korean friendship will be put to a test.
Whether Moscow will do as it did in 2006 and 2009, after the first and second nuclear tests when siding with the UN Security Council resolutions condemning the action—or whether it will stop these actions cold even before they begin, in the wake of the Libya resolution [is the question]. I would submit to you that it was not Pyongyang. Moscow couldn't care less about Pyongyang. It was Libya that really altered the equation. Before the Libya vote, what was Pyongyang's attitude and as a result, Beijing's and Moscow's attitude? For a long time it threatened if there was any Security Council resolution imposing sanctions, it would be war. So it was crying war. But the moment the UN Security Council did impose its first sanctions resolution, what did Pyongyang say? It said, "Oh. It's like spitting in the sky. We couldn't care less." And it didn't.
And so when the Chinese and the Russians supported [the] 2006 and 2009 resolutions, they basically brushed those resolutions aside. They were not implemented by those two countries, let alone by the North Koreans. And so, they were pretty relaxed about any further action by the United Nations Security Council. But the Libya vote changed the equation, because essentially what the Libya vote meant was that whatever the language, whether it's a no-fly zone, a protection of civilians; whatever the language, it can be used by the Western allies to basically bomb the hell out of Pyongyang. And today is the day, when as you know, Muammar Gaddafi is no more. And it was a very powerful message to Kim Jong Il, that all of a sudden, he had to pay attention again to every single vote in the UN, because any single vote could bring about a regime change in North Korea; unless he could pretty quickly, by himself, [arrange for a] Chinese military shield or a Russian military shield or what have you.
I think, in that sense, Russia's concern about China is serious, but with respect to Korea, Russia is not in a position to split China and Korea, and this idea that the gas pipeline proposal is to show the Chinese that Russia does have alternatives; to me it just doesn't pass the mustard test. What I do think is about to happen [is] if indeed Russia decided to be serious about this pipeline, because it's a transit country, that probably Kim Jong Il offered Moscow the ownership stake in the pipeline, and the ownership of the North Korean gas supply system. And when you think about unification and when you have a unified Korea, Gazprom will own the gas distribution network.
That's the dream of Russia, Germany and Europe. And Kim Jong Il can now deliver on that. And I'm sure a unified government, if unification does come, will not be able to dishonor that kind of agreement and commitment. And not just transit, where Gazprom would lease the pipelines. They will own the pipelines and the entire gas distribution system. That would entice Gazprom to go ahead even with this risky option, and even if it's not due today but in 2017 or what have you.
I think because the North Korean crude oil minister went to Moscow a month ago and did meet with Miller, the chairman of Gazprom, it seems to be moving along (although it's still a very long shot), but the North Koreans must have put something on the table to entice those people--very tough-minded guys at Gazprom--to take them seriously.
And again, don't be misguided. Moscow does not want South Korea to pay for this pipeline. It is flush with cash. It can build this pipeline on a dime with its own means. Russia doesn’t need any South Korean or Japanese or any other foreign investment to build this 700 or 800 km of pipeline. Look at the "Northern Stream" underneath the sea, there are much harsher geological conditions, which they built with Germans, just in a couple of years. So money is not the issue, and when the South Koreans say, "Oh, but we will not pay for it." Nobody wants them to pay for it. If Gazprom is going to build this pipeline, they want ownership of this pipeline. And again, if Kim Jong Il is willing to nationalize (some people that raise the issue) "What if he nationalizes the pipeline?" He knows that the next day at the UN Security Council his fate will be sealed with the Russian vote if he touches that pipeline. So something must have happened there. Again, Russia-North Korea is a complement, this Russian embracement of North Korea is an alternative to the U.S. policy of strategic neglect of the country.
The reason I talked a little bit about the "resetting the reset" if you wish is I no longer see Russian actions, vis-à-vis North Korea as complementary to what the U.S. is trying to do. I think Russia offers North Korea an alternative and the reason for that is really what happened in the Middle East, and especially what happened in Libya. The NATO action in that country was something which really changed the equation in the strategic calculations of the Russians.
On Russian-South Korean relations, I agree with you completely. They're healthy. Trade is booming. And they used to be excellent under Kim Daejung and under Rho Moohyun, under the liberal governments...From the standpoint of the US-ROK alliance, what could be greater than hosting the president of an allied nation in the Tank within the Pentagon to give him security briefings. Unheard of. The country now is referred to as a cornerstone of U.S. security in Northeast Asia and South Korea.
But for people in Moscow, when they hear this, especially when they know there are folks in Lee Myung Bak’s government who truly believe that Kim Jong Il’s regime is dying and it's counting its final days. I agree with Alexander completely that nothing could be further from the truth, from reality than this kind of assessment. That attitude is spooking Moscow and is causing it to have some second thoughts, especially because Moscow does not need a war next year or in 2014 or 2018 or what have you. And you know, there are people in South Korea who believe that it's a unified Korea that should host the 2018 Olympic Games.
I don't think Moscow really needs North Korean labor to build the capital. But they do need peace and quiet during Putin's second presidency in the Far East, especially given very high profile international events hosted in Moscow and Vladivostok and Kazan and other places. They don't want any kind of international approbation of Russian actions in Korea.
STEPHEN NOERPER:
I might add, to be contrarian, that real opportunities exist for Russia with South Korea, especially in technology and research and development. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov said earlier this year that Korea and Singapore are models for innovation economy, and with the development of the Russian Silicon Valley initiative, there are real opportunities for Russia with South Korea. Thank you.
[End of discussion]
The second in a series exploring commercial, political and strategic relationships for Korea and the United States, this session examines Russia’s growing business and political interests on the Korean Peninsula, its unique relationships with both North and South Korea, and its commitment with the United States to develop cooperative areas for global leadership, from countering nuclear proliferation to enhancing energy security and assisting in Northeast Asia development. As hosts of the 2014 and 2018 Olympics, respectively, Russia and Korea also are mounting large infrastructure and construction projects. This session features Dr. Alexander Mansourov, a Visiting Scholar at the U.S.-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins SAIS, and Dr. Alexander Vorontsov, the Department Head of Korean and Mongolian Studies and the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russia Academy of Sciences and in a discussion moderated by Dr. Stephen Noerper, both will address opportunities for business and strategists interested in such emerging market powers.
