Breaking the Deadlock in the Beijing Negotiations

Selig S. Harrison, director of the Asia Program and chairman of the Task Force on U.S. Korea Policy at the Center for International Policy, defended his assertion that the Bush administration has exaggerated the intelligence relating to a possible North Korean uranium enrichment program. This assertion was the central thesis of his controversial article in the January 4, 2005 issue of Foreign Affairs, "Did North Korea Cheat?" Harrison contended that the Bush administration presented a worst-case scenario as incontrovertible truth when it charged that Pyongyang has a program in place to enrich uranium to weapons grade. Further, he suggested that this stance was adopted with a broader policy agenda in mind: namely, to reverse the Clinton policy of engagement with North Korea and, more particularly, to abrogate the 1994 Agreed Framework. Emphasizing the urgency of removing the threat posed by an already existent plutonium program, Harrison concluded his presentation by arguing the case for a "plutonium first" policy as the key to breaking the diplomatic deadlock in Beijing and calling for measures to unravel the uranium mystery as part of a step-by-step de-nuclearization process. In his role as a discussant, Charles L. Pritchard, then visiting fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at The Brookings Institution, challenged this provocative presentation, and affirmed his confidence in the reliability of the intelligence based on his experience as a major player in the negotiations with the North Koreans on their nuclear program activities during both the Clinton and Bush administrations. Ambassador Donald P. Gregg served as moderator.

Wednesday, February 16, 2005

About the Speakers

Donald P. Gregg is Chairman of the Board of The Korea Society in New York City. Following graduation from Williams College in 1951, he joined the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and over the next quarter century was assigned to Japan, Burma, Vietnam and Korea. Gregg was seconded to the National Security Council staff in 1979, where he was in charge of intelligence activities and Asian policy affairs. In 1982, he was asked by the then Vice President George H. W. Bush to become his national security advisor. He then retired from the CIA, and was awarded its highest decoration, the Distinguished Intelligence Medal. During his six years with Vice President Bush, Gregg traveled to 65 countries, and also was a professorial lecturer at Georgetown University, where he taught a graduate level workshop entitled “Force and Diplomacy.” From September 1989, Gregg served as ambassador to Korea. Prior to his departure from Korea in 1993, Mr. Gregg received the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service, an honorary degree from Sogang University, and a decoration from the Prime Minister of Korea. Recent awards include an honorary degree from Green Mountain College (1996), the Secretary of Defense Medal for Outstanding Public Service (2001), Williams College’s Kellogg Award for career achievement (2001), and the 2004 Bartels World Affairs Fellowship from Cornell University.