THE OUTBREAK OF THE KOREAN WAR: A HISTORICAL SIMULATION

Grades: 9-12
Author: Paul Thompson

Subject: History

Time Required: Two class periods

Objectives:

1. Students will identify the causal factors of the Korean War
2. Students will analyze and evaluate primary sources of the early stages of the war.
3. Students will use the provided information to make key decisions regarding US action during the early stages of the war.
4. Students will work together and effectively communicate their ideas.

Standards:

Common Core:

SL1 Initiate and participate in effectively in a range of collaborative discussion
SL 2 Integrate multiple sources of information presented in diverse formats and media
SL 4 Present information, findings, and supporting evidence
RH 1 Cite specific textual evidence to support analysis of primary and secondary sources
RH 2 Determine the central ideas or information of a primary or secondary source
RH 3 Evaluate various explanations for actions or events
RH 7 Integrate and evaluate multiple sources of information presented in diverse formats and media

Background:

This simulation is designed to introduce students to the Korean War and its geopolitical implications. Much of the content provided is primary source based. Working in groups, students will act as advisors to President Truman, and present the President with a course of action in response to several key events that occurred during the Korean War. Much of the source material was classified as Top Secret and includes documents from the NSC, CIA, State Department, military, as well as correspondence between the top leaders in the American foreign policy establishment.

Materials Required:

This is a self-contained lesson and no outside materials are required. It is necessary to copy enough packets for groups of four to six in your class.
Procedure

1) Provide several copies of the packet for each group. There is a fair amount of reading involved in this simulation and it would be best to provide a packet to every other person in the group.

2) Divide students into groups of four to six.

3) All directions are provided to the students within the packet. There are multiple stages and it will require periodic teacher debrief (formative development).

4) Simulation includes round table discussions, background reading, assessment of various proposals and required action decisions.

5) Simulation is student centered and, depending on the class, may require little direct instruction from the teacher. I envision the teacher circulating among groups, clarifying information, and controlling the time.

6) When introducing the Action Decisions, I highly recommend putting a short time limit on student responses. This adds a bit of drama and tension to the simulation. I usually use a projector to display a large image of the time.

Evaluation:

There are both consistent formative tasks and a class wide discussion that will serve as an evaluation. It is, of course, quite possible to use the provided sources and Evaluation focus questions as the basis of an essay.

Class Discussion Questions

Did the United States achieve its objectives in South Korea? Did the benefits outweigh the costs? Did the US and S. Korean forces lose the opportunity to unify the peninsula? Did American policymakers make the right decisions during the first year of the Korean War?

Enrichment

The last several pages of this packet contain a number of primary sources and an important interview Dr. Kathryn Weathersby, an influential American historian – all of which provided interesting insight into the outbreak of the Korean War. The Truman Library has an extensive array of primary source material dedicated to the Korean War. The documents are fascinating.

Resources


Chappell, Gerald E and Chappell, Richard G. *Corpsmen - Letters from Korea*  Kent: Ohio The Kent State University Press  2000 (Helpful for background information.)

DeConde, Alexander. *Presidential Machismo Executive Authority, Military Intervention, and Foreign Relations*  Boston, Massachusetts: Northeastern University Press 2000 (discussion of Presidential decisions was most helpful.)

Excerpts from “NSC-68 A report to the National Security Council” April 14, 1950 (Primary source for analysis on containment).


Hammond, Paul Y. *The Cold War Years: American Foreign Policy since 1945.* Harcourt, Brace & World Inc. 1969 (Helpful in background reading)


LaFeber, Walter. *America, Russia, and the Cold War.* Revisionist.


**WEB SITES**

*http://www.cnn.com/Specials/cold.war/episodes/05/documents/cia/*
  (CIA Memorandum were taken from this site)

*http://www.americanradioworks.org/features/Korea/c4.html* (The interview for the seminar was taken from this site)

Truman Library
The Korean War: A Historical Simulation

The Scenario:

As close advisors to President Truman, you and members of your advisory committee are required to present the President with a course of action in response to several key events that occurred during the early stages of the Korean War. Often your decisions will be based your interpretation of Top Secret and now declassified government documents. Your sources include the NSC, CIA, State Department, official military communiqués, and correspondence between the top leaders in the American foreign policy establishment.

Time line of background events:

- August 1945 – WWII Ends
- March 1947 – Truman Doctrine
- June 1948 – Berlin Airlift Begins
- April 1949 – NATO Formed
- August 1949 – Soviets successfully test Atomic Bomb
- Oct. 1949 -- Mao declares the PRC
- April 1950 -- NSC 68 issued

Round Table Discussion:

Discuss the historical significance of the events listed on the timeline. To what extent will the failure to halt the spread of communism in Eastern Europe and China influence your decisions elsewhere? How has the Soviet's successful atomic test challenged American ability to project power and contain communism? What are the suggestions of NSC – 68 in regards to possible American actions in Korea and elsewhere? Review the significance of the Truman Doctrine.
Background on Korea and the Korean War

Japan took over Korea in 1910 and ruled it until August 1945. As World War II ended, Japanese troops north of the 38th parallel surrendered to the Soviets. Japanese troops south of the parallel surrendered to the Americans. The 38th parallel was not intended as a permanent boundary, but it artificially divided the country’s resources—industry in the north and agriculture in the south—making it difficult for either of the two regions to prosper. As was the case in Germany, however, two nations developed, one Communist and one not.

In 1948 the Republic of Korea, usually called South Korea was established in the zone that had been occupied by the United States. Its government, headed by Syngman Rhee, was based in Seoul, Korea’s traditional capital. Simultaneously, the Communists formed the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in the north. Kim Il Sung led the government that was based in Pyongyang. By 1949, both the Soviet Union and the United States had withdrawn their troops, leaving the two new nations glaring at each other across the 38th parallel. Each government claimed the sole right to rule all of Korea. Source: The Americans.
Topic 1 Regional and International Security.

The following is an excerpt from an important speech given by the influential American Secretary of State, Dean Achenson. Historians have argued that perhaps both Mao and Stalin came to believe that the United States would not intervene in Korea as it was outside the United States’ security zone. This interpretation has seen considerable revision.

*This defensive perimeter runs along the Aleutians to Japan and then goes to the Ryukyus. We hold important defense positions in the Ryukyu Islands, and those we will continue to hold. In the interest of the population of the Ryukyu Islands, we will at an appropriate time offer to hold these islands under trusteeship of the United Nations. But they are essential parts of the defensive perimeter of the Pacific, and they must and will be held…*

*The defensive perimeter runs from Ryukyus to the Philippine Islands. Our relations, our defensive relations with the Philippines are contained in agreements between us. Those agreements are being loyally carried out and will be loyally carried out. Both peoples have learned by bitter experience the vital connections between our mutual defense requirements…*

... What we conclude, I believe, is that there is a new day which has dawned in Asia. It is a day in which the Asian peoples are on their own, and know it, and intend to continue on their own. It is a day in which the old relationships between east and west are gone, relationships which at their worst were exploitation and at their best were paternalism. That relationship is over, and the relationship of east and west must now be in the Far East one of mutual respect and mutual helpfulness. We are their friends. Others are their friends…

Round Table Discussion:

Do you agree with the extent of the US Security zone as outlined by the Secretary of State? Note: The United States defined its defense and security zone as extending just west of the Asian mainland and included Japan and Taiwan. Clearly both Taiwan and South Korean were threatened by hostile communist forces.
The Simulation

Response #1: US Response to the North Korean Invasion. Read the following declassified US Army document. This is the information available to the US military command on June 25, the date of the North Korean invasion.
Subject: Korean Situation

References: C-55777; C-56775; Dept. 931; 250655Z.

Conferences:
Washington (G2)

Gen J Lawton Collins G/S
Lt Gen M B Ridgway Dep C/S
Maj Gen Charles L Bolte G3
Maj Gen A R Bolling G2
Maj Gen S Le Roy Irwin G2
R/Adm Carl Espe ONI
Brig Gen Thomas S Timberman G3
Col Charles V Bromley G2
Col B D Talley G2
Col Frank T Folk G3
Col Schow CIA
Lt Col Jung G2
Lt Col Richard H Lawson G3
Lt Col Joh R Beishline Sec Gen Staff
Maj Evans AFOIN
Capt Brown G2
Dr Wade ONI
Dr Robert S Spencer G2
Mr Roy S McNair G2
Mr K R Bendetsen Asst Sec
Mr Bond State
Mr Evan T Sage G2

Washington: DA-1

What NK units were committed?
   A. Ground - especially armor.
   B. Air - and in what areas.

(End DA-1)
Tokyo: FEC Item 1

Re item 1 ur agenda

1. A. Reports at 252100I indicate 3rd Border Constabulary Brigade on Ongjin Peninsula; two divisions, possible 1st and 2nd, attacking B on axis Pochon (1021-1632) Uijongbu (1005-1655) located at Pochon; 40 tanks, reported 5 kilometers north of Uijongbu, 1st Border Constabulary Brigade, minus 2 bns, reportedly landed on east coast and committed in Kangnung (1183-1658) area; two bns 1st Border Constabulary Brigade attacking south along East Coastal road (1205-1645); 7th Border Constabulary Brigade located vicinity Pochon; 6th Division reported formerly in Sarivon (1207-1758) moving south toward Kaesong (958-1592); independent mixed brigade, possibly 4th Division in general reserve, location unknown.

B. Map reference is AMS 551-1 to 250,000. No air identifications. Three or four planes bombed and strafed Kimpo Airfield at 251735I.

(End Item 1)


Resistance of SK

A. Rate and orderliness of Army withdrawal.

B. Are SK people fleeing or remaining in towns.

(End DA-2)

Tokyo: FEC Item 3

Re item 2 ur agenda

Resistance of South Korea:

A. Reports indicate orderliness of withdrawing South Korean units.

B. Late reports states morale of people good. No disorder or disturbances reported.

(End Item 3)

DA TT 3415

Jun 50
Is SK Government standing firm and maintaining internal order?
(End DA-3)

Tokyo: FEC Item 4

Re item 3 ur agenda

South Korean Government reported to be standing firm and maintaining internal order. Martial law declared in most towns. Curfew in Seoul.
(End item 4)

Washington: DA-4

What is your estimate of objective of current NK effort?
(End DA-4)

Tokyo: FEC Item 5.

Re item 4 ur agenda.

There is no evidence to substantiate a belief that the northern Koreans are engaged in a limited objective offensive or in a raid. On the contrary, the size of the North Korean Forces employed, the depth of penetration, the intensity of the attack, and the landings made miles south of the parallel on the east coast indicate that the north Koreans are engaged in an all-out offensive to subjugate South Korea.
(End item 5)

Washington DA-5

Has there been a formal, confirmed Declaration of War?

DA TT 3415

(Jun 50)
NR: DA TT 3415

Washington: FEC Item 5

Re Item 5 ur agenda

There has been no firm confirmation that a formal Declaration of War has been made by either contender. Radio Pyongyang (North Korea) is reported to have issued a Declaration of War. But our investigations have failed to substantiate this report. See also radio from Am Embassy, Seoul, (State Dept 931) 2503552 for additional information.
(End Item 5)

Washington DA-6

Do you have any information regarding numbers of North Korean Naval Forces involved in amphibious landings on Korean East Coast.
(End DA-6)

Tokyo FEC Item 9

Reur DA-6; G2, GHQ, FEC to DA

We have no information as to number of ships involved. However, landing of 3200-3800 troops reported at four points on East Coast:

400-500 at Chumunjin (1170-1580); 2,000 at Hoesan (1220-1590); 400-600 at Ulchin (1250-1570); 400-600 at Kuryong-Po (1250-1450).
(End Item 9)

Washington DA-7

Have South Korean Naval Forces engaged North Korean Naval units in any location other than Samchok.
(End DA-7)

DA TT 3415

(Jun 50)
Action Decision 1: Response to North Korean Invasion

For Discussion: Assess the extent of the North Korean Invasion (use source) and develop a response to present to the President. You should discuss the following issues before recording your response:


As advisors to President Truman, you must decide on a course of action. Options include:

1) No support for the South Korean Government. The peninsula, according to Secretary of State Acheson, is beyond the defense perimeter of the United States. Furthermore North Korea is not an imminent threat to the United States and the Korean peninsula is not of strategic or economic value to the United States.

2) Mobilize American troops currently stationed in Asian countries such as Japan and deploy as quickly as possible to halt the communist aggression.

3) Turn the matter over the newly formed United Nations in an effort to place this world security problem in the hands of the United Nations.

4) Order immediate bombing raids over Pyongyang and other key North Korean Cities in an effort to end the communist advance.

5) Bomb concentrations of North Korean troops, supply lines, and equipment in South Korea.

6) Other options? Series of Steps?

Briefly Record your plan of action

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Teacher Debrief

For Review: Extent of Attack and Background on UN and US response

950: UN condemns North Korean invasion
North Korea has invaded South Korea at several points along the two countries' joint border.

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has denounced North Korea's actions as a breach of the peace and has called for an immediate ceasefire.
The United States President Harry S Truman has gone a step further and urged western nations to go out to Korea and help repel the communist invasion.

"By their actions in Korea, communist leaders have demonstrated their contempt for the basic moral principles on which the United Nations is founded," he said.

**Surprise attack**

The invasion took the international community by surprise, even though the American Economic Co-operation Administration has its biggest mission - about 2,000 staff - in South Korea.

The seven-power commission of the United Nations in Korea (Uncok) confirmed North Korean troops crossed the border - known as the 38th parallel - in 11 places after artillery bombardments were reported in South Korea at 0400 local time.

Uncok has identified northern forces in the Ongjin peninsula and the north-western town of Kaesong and northerly town of Chunchon and landings on the east coast around Skagnung, almost 40 miles from the border.

Their statement also contained details of machine-gun attacks by four 'Yak' aircraft on military and civilian airfields outside the South Korean capital Seoul, destroying aircraft and jeeps and setting fire to petrol tanks.

President Syngman Rhee of South Korea - who denied early rumors of war - told Uncok at least 36 North Korean tanks and armored cars had been counted on their way to Seoul by the shortest routes.

The North Korean wireless station, in the capital Pyongyang, justified the invasion saying communist forces were counter-attacking against border incursions by the South Koreans in the early hours of the morning and reported a state of war shortly after noon local time.

After an emergency meeting with his cabinet South Korea's foreign minister Ben Limb urged the people of the republic to resist the "dastardly attack".

The UN Security Council met at Lake Success, Detroit after the Korean Ambassador John Myun Chang sent an urgent petition to the State Department in Washington.

Korea has been divided since the Japanese withdrawal at the end of World War II left the USSR occupying the area north of the 38th parallel and the US to the south.

**Source: BBC**

On the early morning of June 25, 1950 90,000 well armed North Korean Troops launched a surprise attack across the 38th parallel. Seoul is under intense attack and South Korean forces are being overrun.

**Source: William Keylor 20th Century World**
North Korean Advance: June 25, 1950 – October 1950

Notice that UN forces have been pushed down the Korean Peninsula and only hold an area in the Southwest known as the Pusan Perimeter.

For Review and Discussion

The developing Korean War obviously has much larger global implications. A Soviet and Chinese backed communist regime has attacked a US backed government in Asia. As advisors, you are gravely concerned about the intentions of the Soviets and Chinese. Credible reports on Chinese intentions are difficult to procure. The following sources were provided by the CIA days after the N. Korean attack and need to be studied carefully.

Intelligence Memorandum No. 302
July 8, 1950

Subject: Consequences of the Korean Incident

I. Soviet Purposes in Launching the Northern Korean Attack
A. Apart from immediate strategic advantages, the basic Soviet objectives in launching the Northern Korean attack probably were to: (1) test the strength of U.S. commitments implicit in the policy of containment of Communist expansion; and (2) gain political advantages for the further expansion of Communism in both Asia and Europe by undermining the confidence of non-Communist states in the value of U.S. support.
B. The Soviet estimate of the reaction to the North Korean attack was probably that: (1) U.N. action would be slow and cumbersome; (2) the U.S. would not intervene with its own forces; (3) South Korea would therefore collapse promptly, presenting the U.N. with a fait accompli; (4) the episode would therefore be completely localized; and (5) the fighting could be portrayed as U.S.-instigated South Korean aggression and the Northern Korean victory as a victory of Asiatic nationalism against Western colonialism…

III. Effects of a Failure of U.S. Forces to Hold South Korea

A. The immediate consequences of a failure to hold South Korea would be a damaging blow to U.S. prestige with loss in political influence greater than the loss that would have been incurred if the U.S. had not undertaken to support its moral containment in South Korea.

B. The U.S. would be confronted with a choice between two undesirable alternatives: (1) accepting the loss of U.S. prestige; or (2) attempting to regain as much prestige as possible by committing substantial U.S. military resources in a different and costly invasion of an area which is not of primary strategic importance to the over-all U.S. military position. In either case U.S. foreign policy and military capabilities would be discredited at home and abroad.

C. If U.S. forces were expelled from Korea, the U.S.S.R. would probably adopt alternative "C" as described above (Section II.) It might be tempted, however, to postpone further aggressive action elsewhere until it had determined whether, as a result of the loss of world confidence in the effectiveness of U.S. aid, other areas might not be brought within its sphere of influence through intimidation alone.

Intelligence Memorandum No. 304
July 10, 1950

Subject: Effects of a Voluntary Withdrawal of U.S. Forces from Korea

CONCLUSIONS
Voluntary withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea would be a calamity; seriously handicapping efforts to maintain U.S. alliances and build political influence among the nations on whose strength and energetic cooperation the policy of containment of Soviet-Communist expansion depends. It would discredit U.S. foreign policy and undermine confidence in U.S. military capabilities.

Voluntary withdrawal would be more damaging than a failure to send U.S. troops to Korea in the first place or than a failure of U.S. forces to hold Korea. Not only would U.S. commitments be shown to be unreliable when put to a severe test, but also considerable doubt would be cast on the ability of the U.S. to back up its commitments with military force.

For Discussion:

How has the reading of these documents contributed to your understanding of the geo-political implications of the Korean War? To what extent do you find them credible? Are you aware of any sources that contradict this information?

Excerpt on US response
The United States was surprised and shaken by this attack and immediately referred the matter to the United Nations. In a series of swift and decisive resolutions, the UN agreed to take military actions against the invading North Korean forces. This was made possible only because the USSR had been boycotting the UN. Fifteen countries agreed to send troops to defend South Korea, though the majority of the troops were American.

Source: IB HL History Guide
Action Response #2

Background

The UN forces were led by US general Douglas MacArthur, who developed a risky but ultimately successful plan. Rather than simply battling the North Koreans in the toehold that the South held in Pusan, the UN armies would also launch an amphibious attack at the port of Inchon, near Seoul. The North Koreans were surprised by this tactic, and quickly lost ground to the UN army. Not only did they lose their control over the south, but by October 1950 the UN army had chased the North Korean armies as far as the Yalu River, The Korean border with China.

Source: IB History Guide

The moment the UN forces crossed the 38th parallel the nature of the war was hotly debated: should this be a war of containment or unification?
Options:

North Korean troops are in full retreat and disarray. Seoul has been liberated and its brutal occupation by North Korean Forces has been uncovered.

1) Carry the war to the North in an effort to Unify the nation under non-communist rule.
2) Halt at the 38th Parallel with the understanding that US objectives (containment) have been met.
3) Other Options?

Briefly record your decision:

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Breaking News:

Although UN forces quickly routed outmaneuvered the retreating North Korean Forces, China has upheld its threat to intervene on its allies behalf. The following documents details the information available to the Presidents three days after the massive Chinese invasion.
UN forces have been overwhelmed by the massive Chinese assault. The President is in an extraordinary situation and time is critical. Discuss the following options and present the President with a response. Options Include:
1) Massive bombardment of Chinese forces, cities, Industrial zones, and military installations. Bombing may include a nuclear option.
2) Continue orderly retreat to a defensible position south of 38th parallel.
3) Immediately engage both the Chinese and the Soviets in an effort to secure a cease fire. What are your objectives and what will you accept.
4) Other Options

For consideration: The Soviet Union, though not providing combat troops, has lavishly supplied the communist forces in North Korea. How will this nuclear power respond to an escalation of the war? What are your objectives? Is this a limited war to secure South Korean independence, a war for independence of the entire peninsula, or perhaps an all-out war against communism? How will the Chinese respond to escalation? What are the implications for European allies? Will an escalation of the Cold War in Asia threaten European security? How would the Soviets respond to use of Atomic weapons on their chief Asian allies. Will the Chinese accept a potentially hostile, American backed government of their Eastern border?

Your Response:

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Teacher Debrief. Suggestion is to read Professor John Gaddis’ introduction to the Korean War in his book The Cold War: A New History. Chapter is titled Deathboats and Lifeboats. It is a counterfactual account on the implications of Truman’s response that he would use any means at disposal to secure S. Korea’s independence. Inference was that it would include a nuclear option.

Class Debrief

To what extent did the United States achieve its objectives in South Korea?

Did the benefits outweigh the costs?

Did the US and S Korean forces lose the opportunity to unify the peninsula?

Did American policymakers make the right decisions during the first year of the Korean War?

American policy makers learned many lessons from the Korean War. What were they? Think about public support, regional and global interests, future wars, actions of other major Cold War powers, allied support.
Subject: Consequences of the Korean Incident

I. Soviet Purposes in Launching the Northern Korean Attack
   A. Apart from immediate strategic advantages, the basic Soviet objectives in launching the
      Northern Korean attack probably were to: (1) test the strength of U.S. commitments implicit in the
      policy of containment of Communist expansion; and (2) gain political advantages for the further
      expansion of Communism in both Asia and Europe by undermining the confidence of non-
      Communist states in the value of U.S. support.
   B. The Soviet estimate of the reaction to the North Korean attack was probably that: (1) U.N.
      action would be slow and cumbersome; (2) the U.S. would not intervene with its own forces; (3)
      South Korea would therefore collapse promptly, presenting the U.N. with a fait accompli; (4) the
      episode would therefore be completely localized; and (5) the fighting could be portrayed as U.S.-
      instigated South Korean aggression and the Northern Korean victory as a victory of Asiatic
      nationalism against Western colonialism.

Alternative A: The U.S.S.R. may localize the Korean fighting, permitting U.S. forces to drive the
North Koreans back to the 38th Parallel and refrain from creating similar incidents elsewhere. In
the meantime, the U.S.S.R. would remain uncommitted in Korea and would develop the
propaganda themes of U.S. aggression and imperialistic interference in domestic affairs of an
Asiatic nation.
   1. This alternative is the most cautious course for the U.S.S.R. to take. Its adoption would indicate
      complete surprise at the U.S. reaction to the Korean incident and would suggest strongly that the
      U.S.S.R. was unwilling to run even a minimum risk of provoking a global conflict involving the
      U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
   2. U.S. prestige and political influence would be substantially augmented, particularly with
      Western European allies and other nations aligned with the U.S.
   3. Soviet prestige and influence would be damaged, but there would be compensations in the form
      of secondary political gains that would accrue as a result of:
      (a) promoting the "peace campaign" and portraying the U.S. as military aggressor;
      (b) exploiting the theme of Asian nationalism versus Western imperialism;
      (c) maintaining the North Koreans and Chinese Communist threat to South Korea as an
         embarrassment to development of a constructive U.S. or U.N. policy in Korea.
   3. This alternative course of action is unlikely; Soviet advantages would be secondary,
      comparatively long range, and intangible, while Soviet disadvantages would be immediate.

Alternative B: The U.S.S.R. may localize the Korean fighting, still refrain from creating similar
incidents elsewhere, but in order to prolong U.S. involvement in Korea, give increasing material
aid to the North Koreans, perhaps employing Chinese Communist troops, either covertly or overtly.
The U.S.S.R. would remain uncommitted in Korea and would develop the propaganda themes of
U.S. aggression and imperialistic interference in domestic affairs of an Asiatic nation.
1. This alternative is a moderately cautious course for the U.S.S.R. to take. The U.S.S.R. would probably consider that its adoption would involve only a slight risk of provoking a global conflict involving the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

2. U.S. prestige would be seriously damaged if the U.S.S.R. succeeded in prolonging the incident in this way. Western European allies and other nations aligned with the U.S. would question the immediate military value of U.S. commitments even though expecting them to be honored.

3. Soviet prestige would be augmented if the fighting in Korea were prolonged without an open Soviet commitment.

4. The U.S.S.R. would obtain appreciable secondary, comparatively long-range gains in political influence as a result of promoting the "peace-campaign" and portraying U.S. as imperialistic Western aggressor in Asia, unless successfully countered by a U.S. "Truth" campaign.

5. Deep involvement of U.S. military forces in Korea would seriously limit U.S. capabilities to support similar commitments elsewhere. Moreover, the Western European allies of the U.S. would feel dangerously exposed for some time (even if the U.S. began a partial mobilization for war.)

6. The U.S.S.R. probably will adopt this alternative course of action at least for the short run, since there would be few Soviet disadvantages or risks and the Soviet gains would be appreciable.

7. This alternative will appear especially attractive to the U.S.S.R. because at any time, if conditions appeared favorable to Soviet leaders, the U.S.S.R. could shift to the more ambitious program (alternative "C," immediately below,) in which alternative "B" would merely be a first phase.

Alternative C: The U.S.S.R., while attempting to prolong the fighting in Korea as in alternative "B," may also attempt to disperse and perhaps overstrain U.S. military forces-in-readiness by creating a series of incidents similar to the Korean affair. Without directly and openly involving Soviet forces, such incidents could be created in Formosa, Indochina, Burma, Iran, Yugoslavia, and Greece. The effects of such incidents could be aggravated by renewed pressure on Berlin and, possibly, Vienna.

1. This alternative would be a comparatively aggressive course for the U.S.S.R. to take. Its adoption would indicate willingness to run an appreciable risk of provoking a global conflict because of the possible U.S. reaction. The U.S.S.R. could easily turn to this alternative at any time, but it is not likely to turn to it until the U.S.S.R. has fully analyzed the implications of the U.S. commitment in Korea.

2. Having employed its armed forces in support if its commitment in Korea, the U.S. will have to honor similar commitments or lose most of the advantages of the policy of supporting the Korean commitment.

3. The U.S. does not have the military forces-in-readiness to honor its commitments with U.S. military forces and equipment in many areas other than Korea (perhaps none) without a substantial increase in U.S. military forces and industrial productivity in the military field, bringing about what would amount to at least a partial (as distinguished from a general) mobilization for war.

4. Deep involvement of U.S. military forces in the Far East or Near East would leave Western Europe even more dangerously exposed than at present.

5. At some point further Korean-style incidents (requiring the commitment of U.S. forces to stabilize the situation) presumably would force the U.S. to adopt one of the following alternatives: (a) revise the policy of general containment by limiting U.S. commitments and by planning to combat Soviet aggression only at those selected points where existing U.S. military strength would permit; (b) begin partial military and industrial mobilization in an attempt to enable the U.S. to combat any further Soviet-sponsored aggression anywhere in the world; or
(c) begin total mobilization to enable the U.S. to threaten to meet any Soviet or Soviet-sponsored aggression with war against the U.S.S.R.

6. The U.S.S.R. probably will adopt alternative "C" sooner or later if Soviet leaders do not estimate the risk of global war involved to be substantial or are prepared for a global war if it develops.

7. If Soviet development of this alternative course of action leads to a general U.S. mobilization, it appears at this time that the U.S.S.R. probably would in that event continue limited aggressions, accompanied by the customary "peace" propaganda, discounting actual U.S. initiation of a general war and perhaps estimating that the political and economic strains of mobilization would weaken or discredit the U.S. and its foreign policy.:
(a) desist from further aggression of the Korean type, fearing a global war and taking mobilization as an indication of greater risk than Soviet leaders had anticipated in choosing this course of action;
or
(b) expecting U.S.-initiated global war, attempt to seize the initiative by immediately attacking the U.S. (in effect turning to alternative "D," below.)

**Alternative D:** The U.S.S.R. may consider U.S. intervention in Korea either as the prelude of an inevitable global war or as justification for beginning a global war for which it is prepared -- in either case immediately attacking the U.S. and its allies.

1. Nothing in the Korean situation as yet indicates that the U.S.S.R. would deliberately decide to employ Soviet forces in direct military action precipitating global war. Such a decision is unlikely if, as now seems probable, Soviet leaders believe that:
(a) there are continuing opportunities to expand Soviet influence by the comparatively cheap and safe means of Soviet-controlled Communist revolutionary activity (including propaganda, sabotage, subversion, guerrilla warfare, and organized military action by local Communist troops -- as in Korea,) which can be supported by Soviet diplomacy and the mere threat of Soviet military strength-in-readiness; and
(b) there is substantial risk involved for the U.S.S.R. in the global war that almost certainly would ensue from direct military action by Soviet forces.

2. The U.S.S.R. would appear to have little reason to be pessimistic about gains by methods short of global war, particularly by adopting the courses of action described in Alternatives "B" and "C" above.

3. The U.S.S.R. is unlikely to choose the alternative of deliberately provoking global war at this time in view of: (a) the general superiority of the U.S. and its allies in total power-potential; and (b) the fact that the present Soviet atomic capability is insufficient to neutralize U.S. atomic retaliatory capabilities and to offset the generally superior power-potential of the U.S. and its allies by interfering with the U.S. military and industrial mobilization.

**III. Effects of a Failure of U.S. Forces to Hold South Korea**

A. The immediate consequences of a failure to hold South Korea would be a damaging blow to
A. The immediate consequences of a failure to hold South Korea would be a damaging blow to
U.S. prestige with loss in political influence greater than the loss that would have been incurred if the U.S. had not undertaken to support its moral containment in South Korea.

B. The U.S. would be confronted with a choice between two undesirable alternatives: (1) accepting the loss of U.S. prestige; or (2) attempting to regain as much prestige as possible by committing substantial U.S. military resources in a different and costly invasion of an area which is not of primary strategic importance to the over-all U.S. military position. In either case U.S. foreign policy and military capabilities would be discredited at home and abroad.
C. If U.S. forces were expelled from Korea, the U.S.S.R. would probably adopt alternative "C" as described above (Section II.) It might be tempted, however, to postpone further aggressive action elsewhere until it had determined whether, as a result of the loss of world confidence in the effectiveness of U.S. aid, other areas might not be brought within its sphere of influence through intimidation alone.

Intelligence Memorandum No. 304
July 10, 1950

Subject: Effects of a Voluntary Withdrawal of U.S. Forces from Korea

CONCLUSIONS
Voluntary withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea would be a calamity; seriously handicapping efforts to maintain U.S. alliances and build political influence among the nations on whose strength and energetic cooperation the policy of containment of Soviet-Communist expansion depends. It would discredit U.S. foreign policy and undermine confidence in U.S. military capabilities. Voluntary withdrawal would be more damaging than a failure to send U.S. troops to Korea in the first place or than a failure of U.S. forces to hold Korea. Not only would U.S. commitments be shown to be unreliable when put to a severe test, but also considerable doubt would be cast on the ability of the U.S. to back up its commitments with military force.

DISCUSSION
1. U.S. withdrawal from intervention in Korea on behalf of the U.N., especially since U.N. action resulted mainly from U.S. initiative, would disillusion all nations heretofore hopeful that U.S. leadership within the framework of the U.N. could preserve world peace. As a voluntary act of the U.S., a withdrawal would damage U.S. standing in U.N. affairs and would undermine the effectiveness of the U.N. as a device for mobilizing Western resistance to Soviet-Communist aggression.
2. The Western European allies and other nations closely aligned with the U.S. would lose confidence in the military value of U.S. commitments to assist them against armed aggression. This lack of confidence would militate against energetic measures to oppose the expansion of Soviet-Communism through NATO and MDAP programs. Although some slight credit still might accrue to the U.S. for initially attempting to honor its commitment in South Korea, most of the nations allied or aligned with the U.S. are more concerned about U.S. ability to counter threats of Soviet aggression than about U.S. intentions to do so.
3. Pro-U.S. governments, particularly in areas where the U.S.S.R. could initiate limited military aggressions without openly using Soviet forces, political control of the country or feel compelled to seek an accommodation with the U.S.S.R. (for example, Indochina, Iran.)
4. Whether or not U.S. forces withdraw from Korea, the U.S.S.R. has the capability of creating a series of incidents generally similar to the Korean affair, each one threatening either to bankrupt the U.S. policy of containing Soviet expansion or to disperse and overstrain U.S. military forces-in-readiness. Without directly and openly involving Soviet forces, such incidents could be created in Formosa, Indochina, Burma, Iran, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey. The U.S.S.R. will proceed with limited aggressions similar to the Korean incident if it does not estimate the risk of global war to be substantial or is prepared for a global war if it develops. Voluntary U.S. withdrawal from Korea probably would encourage rather than discourage Soviet initiation of limited wars in other areas.
5. Upon withdrawal from Korea or certainly after another Korean-style incident, the U.S. presumably would be forced to adopt one of the three following alternatives:
(a) Drastically revise the policy of general containment by reducing or limiting U.S. commitments and by planning to combat Soviet-inspired aggression only at selected points where existing military strength would be adequate for the task;
(b) Begin partial military and industrial mobilization in an attempt to enable the U.S. to combat any further Soviet-inspired aggression anywhere in the world; or
(c) Begin total mobilization to enable the U.S. to threaten to meet any Soviet or Soviet-sponsored aggression with war against the U.S.S.R.

6. If the U.S., under the pressure of Soviet-sponsored aggressions, did not drastically revise the policy of general containment but began mobilization on a fairly large scale, it would be politically and psychologically more advantageous for the U.S. to mobilize in support of U.S. and U.N. intervention in Korea rather than to mobilize after a voluntary withdrawal from Korea.
(a) U.S. mobilization after a voluntary withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea would do little to reduce the disillusion and defeatism that would spread in the Western world as a consequence of the withdrawal itself. While this disillusion and defeatism might not be fatal, it would seriously handicap military, political, and economic efforts to strengthen the North Atlantic community.
(b) If the U.S. should withdraw its forces from Korea and then begin partial mobilization, Soviet leaders would be more likely to anticipate war aimed directly at the U.S.S.R. than if the mobilization were begun in support of the U.N. intervention in Korea. It is possible that the U.S.S.R., if it should anticipate global war, would try to seize the initiative by attacking the U.S.

Weekly Summary Excerpt
July 7, 1950

Subject: The Korean Situation: Soviet Intentions and Capabilities

Two weeks after the beginning of hostilities in Korea, the world was still waiting for some firm indication of Soviet intentions regarding not only Korea but also other countries on the Soviet periphery. It became clear, however, that the North Koreans were not to be intimidated by U.S. involvement in the fighting and that the all-out effort to overrun South Korea would continue unabated. As long as the North Korean advance continues; the U.S.S.R. can remain aloof; the crucial moment will come when and if the battle turns in favor of U.S. and South Korean forces. At that time, the U.S.S.R. must decide whether to permit a North Korean defeat or to take whatever steps are necessary to prolong the action.

Soviet Intentions:
At the moment, the Soviet and Communist propaganda line offers no clue regarding Soviet intentions. Soviet propagandists would have no difficulty in using the present line as a basis either for withdrawal from South Korea or for prolongation of hostilities, even including armed action in other areas. The key to the fateful Soviet decision will be the extent to which the U.S.S.R. desires to risk instigating global war. All evidence available leads to the conclusion that the U.S.S.R. has substantial capabilities, without directly involving Soviet troops, for prolonging the fighting in Korea, as well as for initiating hostilities elsewhere. Thus, although the U.S.S.R. would prefer to confine the conflict to Korea, a reversal there might impel the U.S.S.R. to take greater risks of starting a global war either by committing substantial Chinese Communist forces in Korea or by sanctioning aggressive actions by Satellite forces in other areas of the world. The decisiveness of the U.S. reaction to the Korean invasion will thus cause the Kremlin to move cautiously, but the danger still exists that the U.S.S.R., as it did two weeks ago, will again miscalculate the Western reaction to any future moves it may feel are necessary.

The Far East:
The Korean invasion has had its most immediate and compelling impact on the Far East, particularly as it has affected international Communist intentions to speed the expansion of Communism throughout the area through the instrumentality of the Peiping regime. Pending clarification of the Soviet position, the Peiping regime has not yet committed itself and, as far as Korea is concerned, will probably not take any action at least as long as North Korean forces continue to advance. Meanwhile, Chinese Communist troop strength and dispositions would permit military aggression in a number of places with little or no warning, and the Peiping regime can be expected to give strong support to guerilla activities and subversion throughout Southeast Asia.

Military Potential:
The Korean invasion has produced a deluge of reports of Chinese Communist troop movements indicating a Chinese intent to support the North Korean invasion. Most of these reports, however, have emanated from Chinese Nationalist sources and are merely propaganda for U.S. consumption. Actually, the Communists are apparently still strengthening their forces opposite Taiwan, and possibly Hong Kong, and no significant changes have occurred in troop dispositions along Southeast Asian frontiers. Reported movements of large troop formations from South and Central China toward the Northeast are largely discounted. Communist troops already in North China and Manchuria are sufficient to provide substantial support to the North Koreans and of these approximately 40-50,000 are of Korean nationality. Despite these reported troop movements and Chinese Communist capability to launch simultaneous and successful military actions in Korea, Hong Kong, Macao, and Indochina, no immediate action is expected. With regard to Taiwan, the U.S. commitment to defend the island has almost certainly delayed the invasion timetable if only because it will make occupation of the island too costly an operation for the Peiping regime to undertake without outside assistance.

Non-Military Action:
Meanwhile, the Chinese Communist regime will continue and probably increase its efforts short of military aggression to further the spread of Communism throughout Southeast Asia. Political support and military supplies will be granted Ho Chi Minh's forces in Indochina, efforts will be made to strengthen the insurgent movement in Malaya, and the tempo of organizational activity among labor and political groups will be stepped up. In this campaign, efforts by the Peiping regime to use the nine million Overseas Chinese will be impeded by its recent loss of popularity at home and a growing anticipation in Overseas Chinese communities that the spread of Communism may be reversed as a result of U.S. action in Korea. An intensification of Peiping's efforts to gain control of the Overseas Chinese may well lead to a split which, while reducing the exploitability of the Overseas Chinese as instruments for extending Chinese Communist influence, may also result in the adoption of more militant tactics by the pro-Communist faction. An immediately explosive situation in South-East Asia, however, derives from the presence in northern Burma of approximately 2,000 Chinese Nationalist troops. The Peiping regime has demanded their internment, the Burmese Government is apparently incapable of doing so, and the Chinese Communists thus have a legal "excuse" for carrying out local or major military operations in Burma.

Interview with Cold War International History Project- Senior Fellow and Cold War International History Project Korea Initiative Coordinator-Dr. Kathryn Weathersby.(http://www.american Radioworks.org/features/Korea/c4.html)
**Topic 1 - Stalin’s Fear of America**

Biewen: And Stalin, how would you describe his perception of the Americans as a threat?

Weathersby: In 1949, 1950, at least until November of [1949], Stalin was extremely worried about war with the U.S.. He had almost lost the whole game in the summer of 1941 when the Germans attacked the Soviet Union. They came very close to taking control of the entire country. Stalin came very close to losing everything. Germany was much stronger than the Soviet Union at that time. So he had a very healthy respect for the danger that his country could fall, his regime could fall. At the end of World War II, the U.S. was the only industrialized power that had not had the war fought on its own territory. It had an enormous preponderance of the economic wealth, the productive capacity of the world. An enormous proportion of it was held by the United States. The Soviet Union had been devastated by the war. And so Stalin knew that he needed a period of some years to recover from the war before he was ready to fight the Americans. It's not that he wanted to avoid war in general; he thought that eventually Communism would come to power everywhere and it would come to power through a war. It was not entirely clear what he thought about the ultimate inevitability of war with the U.S. and the rest of the capitalist world, but generally speaking he seemed to, I think, assume that that would eventually happen. But he didn't want it to happen until the Soviets were ready to win it, to put it most simply. And certainly four years after the end of World War II they were not ready.

What we know however from the record is that Stalin changed his mind in early January. He changed his mind about all of East Asia, not only about Korea - this is important. The first signal of his changing his mind had to do with his relations with the Communist government in China, which had come to power just in October of ’49. The next month, Mao Tse-Tung, the leader of Communist China, came to Moscow to conclude a treaty. Now China was poor to begin with but had been devastated by civil war for a couple of decades and it desperately needed Soviet assistance; even though the Soviets themselves were rebuilding, still they were in a better position than the Chinese were.

So [Mao] desperately needed Soviet support economically, Soviet support militarily, Soviet support diplomatically. And the Soviets were the big brother in the Communist world. It was natural for Mao to do that. So he went to Moscow to conclude this, but it's very interesting what happened. When he first met with Stalin in December of ’49 - so just two months after he came to power - he said that he wanted to create a new treaty to replace the treaty that Stalin had concluded in 1945 with the nationalist government. So this was another piece to this end-of-the-war set of agreements that Stalin had concluded. Well, like the agreement on the 38th parallel in Korea, the agreement with the Chinese nationalists, first of all, was beneficial to Stalin. It gave him rights in Manchuria among other things. But secondly it was part of his broader worldwide agreement with the Americans and the British, which had given him a lot. And in December of 1949 he was not willing to violate that. And he told Mao, even though Mao was a great Communist revolutionary hero, had just brought Communism to China, still Stalin told him he would not conclude a treaty because it would be a violation of the Yalta Agreement and he did not want to do that. So that's quite interesting. However, on January 2 he informed Mao that he now was willing to conclude a treaty. So that's why I think that this change happened as a result of what was adopted in Washington the end of December. News of which would have reached him through Donald Maclean.

So [Stalin] then proceeded to start making a treaty with the Chinese Communists which was a very big violation of the Yalta Agreement, and they said so openly and in their first meeting Mao said, Well, isn't this going to make the Americans upset? It's a violation of the Yalta. Stalin said, yeah, but to hell with Yalta. Once we start changing things let's go all the way. And in fact he did go then further.
He also recognized very quickly Ho Chi Minh as the legitimate leader of Vietnam and he instructed the Communist Party in Japan to adopt an aggressive policy. He had instructed them until then to adopt a restrained, defensive policy, not to antagonize the Americans unduly. But now in January of ’50 he instructed them to begin engaging in massive strikes and to disrupt the whole country. So it was a forward policy in all of East Asia. It looks to me as I saw the evidence that he saw a power vacuum that the Americans had decided that they could not intervene on the mainland of Asia so Stalin is pushing forward. Korea was a part of that
Topic 2 - The Korean Civil War

Biewen: Isn't it true that it's Kim Il Sung who really sort of drives it and because [Kim] has this more aggressive stance, [Stalin] goes along?
Weathersby: Well, that's a tricky question.
Biewen: Let me put it to you this way: we started out by talking about the American perception [of the North Korean attack on South Korea]: a Soviet move by proxy. Is that accurate?
Weathersby: What we didn't appreciate adequately was the role of the domestic situation. Many people saw this as something Stalin ordered the North Koreans to do. The North Koreans were just sort of there, passive participants; Stalin ordered the North Koreans to attack South Korea. That's quite far from the truth.
The reality is that on the Korean peninsula there was a very intense competition on the left and the right after the collapse of Japanese colonial power. That was predictable. That happened after the collapse of colonial power all over the world. It was a great political struggle. That got geographically polarized because of the split in the occupation. So the communists ended up gathering in the North and the right wing gathering in the South. And then of course separate countries became established eventually in '48 because the Soviets and the Americans could never agree on creating a government for the whole country.
But when that happened, both sides in Korea were determined to reunite Korea under their control. No Korean accepted the division [at] the 38th parallel. That was completely arbitrary, horrible. Suddenly their country, which had been a unified country for a thousand years, was now divided in this strange way. What is this line on a map? It means nothing. It just goes through fields and villages. It has no reality on the ground. And so they were of course bitterly opposed to the division of their country and they desperately wanted their own side to gain power, naturally.
So Kim Il Sung was quite determined that he would be the ruler not of just North Korea but of the whole country, just as the rulers of the South were, as well. And so in a sense Kim Il Sung presented Stalin with this opportunity. Stalin just didn't create it out of cloth. And this is really quite important because the pattern is - how Stalin is different than Hitler is - that Hitler did create these things out of whole cloth. He was much more overreaching in his goals. Stalin was much more cautious. He was an opportunist. He would take advantage of opportunities that were presented to him. It was a subtle difference but it's an important difference. As we think about how the U.S. can respond to dangers, it's quite one thing to think of an enemy being just aggressive in an unlimited sense so that anything that happens around the world we think, Oh that's a signal that there's going to be some invasion, some massive action - versus thinking of the opponent as an opponent that will take advantage of an opportunity that might be created by other circumstances.
Biewen: Another way to put the question is: recognizing the role of the civil war, could Kim Il Sung do what he did without Stalin's blessing?

Weathersby: Right. That's another way of looking at the question. There was a lively debate about this in the scholarly literature in the 1970s and '80s, with the newer scholars coming down, particularly in the wake of the Vietnam War, saying, Well, maybe this was entirely a North Korean action. Maybe the Soviets had very little to do with it. Maybe the North Koreans could have done this on their own. So the pendulum swung very far from the perception in 1950 to the perception that many people had in the wake of Vietnam.

However, since the Russian archives have started to open, which happened in the beginning of 1991, it's become crystal clear that that is not the case. The North Korean government was completely dependent on the Soviets during those years. In later years, after Stalin's death, after Kruschev's attempt at denouncing Stalin, which really weakened Soviet prestige, then the North Koreans became remarkably autonomous in their ability to act on their own. But in '48, '49, '50, absolutely not. They were dependent on the Soviets in every way possible. Economically, militarily, politically. …

What we see is that Kim asked Stalin on several occasions for permission - and with the understanding that he had to abide by whatever Stalin decided. And he did abide by whatever Stalin decided. In January of 1950, the last time he asked for permission, the time just before Stalin said yes, he was very clear in saying: I'm a Communist and so for me the word of comrade Stalin is law. But I ask you for permission to go to Moscow and discuss the problem with comrade Stalin. So that was the situation. North Korea needed all of its military supplies from the Soviets, it needed Soviet military expertise. It had a newly created army but an army that had never fought as a regular army. He had some people who had fought as guerillas in China but that's very different from staging a conventional military assault.

Economically they were completely dependent on the Soviets - and ideologically. They were the junior partners to the big brother. So the U.S. was right to think that it was absolutely inconceivable that the North Koreans could have acted on their own.
Weathersby: We have a record of [Stalin's] talks with Kim Il Sung in April of 1950. Kim went to Moscow and was there for a month with his foreign minister planning the war. And those were the records we didn't have for the longest time. Finally we got a summary of the talks prepared by the Central Committee of the Communist party. And in it Stalin lays out his reasoning, and this is really very important for our larger discussion of deterrence from the American side. He explains to Kim how it was that the international situation had changed in a way that now made it possible to support his request. He said, first of all, the Chinese Communist party has come to power. And that's important because it means that China can send troops to Korea if Korea needs help. This is interesting. He hadn't talked about it yet to Mao that China would send troops but he's just volunteering Chinese troops. But in other words the Chinese Communist forces are no longer fighting a civil war so they can go fight in Korea. But moreover and more importantly, he said that the Chinese victory shows the weakness of the West, especially of the Americans. They didn't intervene in China to prevent in any significant way to prevent a communist victory in China. So if they're not going to intervene for the big prize of China then they're not going to intervene for little Korea. That's reasonable. And then he went on to say [that] information from the U.S. shows that this really is so. The mood is not to intervene. And that's what I think refers to the intelligence information about the actual American policy. So he was right. I mean he had good intelligence; he was reading the information correctly.

Biewen: He didn't count on the Americans changing their minds.

Weathersby: Exactly. And then he went on to also add that the Soviet acquisition of the atomic bomb also makes the Americans less likely to intervene and the alliance that he had just concluded with China also would…but he nonetheless was worried and so he told Kim they had to be very cautious. They had to maintain absolute secrecy. So he remained worried about an American intervention all the way up until the day of the attack. Increasingly worried about it, actually. But those were his reasons. So it sort of gives fuel to this 'who lost China' debate. And it's important for us to see the logic: Well, they didn't intervene in China; they're not going to intervene in Korea. And this tends to make me also draw the conclusion, then, that had we not intervened in Korea and North Korea had taken the rest of the country…then Stalin would have drawn from that the conclusion that unless he had other signals to the contrary that we were not likely to intervene in some other place.

Biewen: Formosa.

Weathersby: Certainly Formosa, perhaps Northern Iran, who knows where.

Biewen: In other words, in that regard some version of the domino theory appears to be working, that at some point it was important for the West to--

Weathersby: However, another lesson from that is that this whole war, this incredibly destructive three-year war, could have been prevented had the U.S. given a signal in advance that we would intervene. If we had made it clear that we would defend South Korea, Stalin never would have given the go-ahead and that's a rather tragic lesson to draw.
Topic 5- Saving North Korea

Biewen: Now, to skip ahead a little bit... How do the Communists, how do China and the Soviet Union, perceive an American decision to go back across the 38th parallel?

Weathersby: Now, the fall of 1950 is really very interesting from the Communist side. When U.N. forces, that is to say U.S. forces, crossed the 38th parallel in pursuit of the North Korean Army, which was rapidly disintegrating and retreating, the Chinese naturally viewed this with alarm because they were headed to their own border. The forces would have ultimately been along a small border with the Soviets as well, very near the important port of Vladivostok, but primarily this is a border issue with China more than the Soviet Union. But Stalin at that point was still terrified of war with the United States, appreciating how unprepared he was for that. And so he tried to get the Chinese to intervene.

The sequence of what happened is really very interesting. Kim Il Sung first asked the Soviets to intervene, even though in April of 1950 Stalin made it very clear that if he got into trouble, if he needed help, he would have to get it from China, that the Soviets would not intervene. It was not convenient, it "would not be convenient" for us to intervene because we have responsibilities elsewhere, especially in the West. If you need assistance you'll have to turn to China for assistance. And so because of that stipulation by Stalin in April, Kim Il Sung went to China the following month to get Mao's approval before the attack could begin. So that was a really clear bargain. Nonetheless, when push came to shove and it came time for Kim Il Sung to turn to somebody for help, he didn't turn to China; he turned first to Stalin and sent him a letter asking him for troops. His regime was about to collapse. This was in October, the first of October, so that's interesting.

Biewen: Maybe he thought he'd just go to the top first?

Weathersby: No, it was because China for the previous millennium had been the great power, lording it over Korea. So there was concern on the part of Kim Il Sung of Chinese hegemony reasserting itself over the Korean Peninsula. So things get complicated in here. But then Stalin declined again and told him to ask the Chinese, so the next day he sent a telegram asking the Chinese for support. However it took two weeks for the Chinese to finally decide to enter. We have good documentation on this from China as well as from Russia. This was a very difficult step for the Chinese to make. They had just come to power a few months before, they were very poor and they had every reason in the world not to get into a war with the United States. So it was hard. There was a lot of resistance to it within the leadership in Beijing.

And so while the Chinese were hesitating, Stalin was holding firm to saying he would not intervene and in the end on October 13th, when he got a message from Beijing saying they would not intervene because they simply couldn't, Stalin sent an order to Kim Il Sung to evacuate. To pull out, to give up North Korea, to pull back his forces into Manchuria and the Soviet Union. I mean - amazing. He was willing to have American troops all the way on the border near Vladivostok, to completely lose North Korea rather than fight the Americans. I think this must have been a terrible trauma for Kim Il Sung and one of the reasons, and perhaps the key reason, for why he became so obstinate and so aggressive for the rest of his life and why North Korea has been so obstinate and aggressive ever since. There was this terrible betrayal by his father, as it were. And then the next day the Chinese changed their mind, sent a telegram to Pyongyang and to Moscow that they would in fact send troops. So North Korea was, in fact, saved. That was the situation.
Then after, it was quite extraordinary when the Chinese intervened because they were so incredibly successful. That was really one of the most amazing military moments in U.S. history. The worst defeat of the U.S. Marine Corps ever was in late 1950 in North Korea. The Chinese, with very inferior weapons, hardly any adequate clothing and boots, were nonetheless coming in and decisively defeating the Americans and pushing them out of the northern part of the peninsula. 

Biewen: *I don’t think this is a piece of Cold War History that most Americans know about.*

Weathersby: Which is really unfortunate because it’s extremely prominent in the consciousness of Chinese, and certainly of the Koreans as well. But in the Chinese and as we look at relations between the U.S. and China right now we really need to understand the legacy of the Korean War. That so shapes the Chinese.

For the Chinese this was a moment of extraordinary national pride. Here China had been so humiliated for the last 200 years, by the British, by all the Westerners, by the Americans. Ah, we've stood up. We've fought the strongest power in the Western world and we've beaten them. We've pushed them back. It was a very, very powerful experience for the Chinese.

Biewen: *So in the same way, I suppose, that the Americans who feel this way, who look at the Korean War as a success, that we saved South Korea from North Korea, the Chinese would look at it in a mirror image.*

Weathersby: Even more so on the part of the Chinese because they were the underdog. It was David slaying Goliath. To Stalin this was quite a remarkable turn of events. So by the end of 1951 his terrible gut level fear of war with the U.S. seemed to be easing up. Well, geez, if the junior partners, the Chinese, who hardly have anything to fight with, if they're defeating them maybe the Americans are not so fearsome.

So we know from Romanian archives now that he called a meeting of the East European leaders, party and government leaders in January of '51 right after this, at the height of the Chinese advance. And he told them to start preparing, building up their military forces. Now, he did not tell them, build up your military forces because we're going to attack Western Europe and take over France. What he said was, we need to be prepared for an attack on Eastern Europe. And he said, interestingly enough, we have a 3-year window of opportunity. The war did go in fact for 3 years. I don't know how he managed to forecast that so accurately but he said the Americans are going to be tied down in Asia, they're not going to be able to engage in adventures in Europe, so this is our opportunity. We need to devote our resources to building up our military strength. Now that's, as I said, a far cry from saying let's plan to take over powers, but nonetheless it was a clear reaction to a new opportunity that the war in Korea appeared to provide to the Soviet side that maybe we can challenge the Americans. Let's put all of our efforts into it.

Now, as we know, the Americans rallied in the spring of '51 and so they held the line. And the Chinese were not able to completely push the Americans off the peninsula but they did push them back down more or less to the starting point along the 38th parallel, which was quite a stunning accomplishment.
**Topic 7- The Stalemate**

Biewen: *So then we get into; we have... fully two more years of peace negotiations and war. What's going on during that time?*

Weathersby: There are a number of factors that contributed to the war continuing for another two years. One is that both sides dug in during the summer of ’51 and there was a lull in the fighting and when arms negotiations began the Communist side used that, well they quite intentionally used the armistice negotiations as a way to buy time to reinforce their position. And they did that quite effectively by digging in. So the Americans were just militarily not able to [advance], at least not at a level of casualties that they were willing to accept. If it had been worth doing anything necessary to reach the line that would have been another matter, but given the limitations they weren't. So the military situation became rather difficult. Deeply entrenched artillery positions and so forth, it was just difficult to make an advance on the ground. Secondly, on the Soviet side, on the Communist side, Stalin, and we have good documentation on this from the Russian archives, seems to have concluded by the fall of ’51 that the war was now safely a stalemate. So no longer was the Soviet border threatened by an American advance, possible American advance. North Korea was saved. He was going to still have his buffer in North Korea, buffer zone against Americans and Japanese. And moreover the Americans are suffering, they're losing their resources, their relations with their allies are tense because of the war, so this all looks pretty good. Moreover this is a wonderful opportunity to gain intelligence information. Information on military equipment. So he began taking advantage of that quite systematically, to gather up all kinds of equipment. The highest prize was airplanes and they did get a couple of F-86s that were shot down and were then gathered up in whatever pieces and then put on a train and then sent to Moscow and were reverse-engineered and contributed very significantly to the development of Soviet aviation and many other things as well, weaponry. And then it was also a very good opportunity to interrogate American POWs to find out about the organization of the U.S. armed forces. Even domestic policy information, social information, they were getting from the POWs. So Stalin took a very hard line to the armistice and encouraged the Chinese and the North Koreans to maintain a hard line in the negotiations because he told them the Americans have more need to bring the war to an end than we do.

So that's a big part of the picture. Now what happened in March ’53 was that Stalin died suddenly, and as soon as Stalin died the new leadership in Moscow immediately adopted a decision to bring the war to an end. We have those records again from the archives. The decision was formally adopted 2 weeks after Stalin's death, which is remarkable. That means all the drafts went through and were approved and all that, which is really remarkable because the situation was so extremely tense and alarming to all of the leadership in Moscow. Once the tyrant died they didn't know first of all whether all the constituent parts of the Soviet Union would hold together, you know, whether they could maintain their control. They almost lost it in East Germany in the summer of ’53. And, most immediately, who among them would seek to become the next Stalin and start killing off the others. So there was tremendous tension within the collective leadership over what the other ones within that group of mass murderers were going to do to each other. So it was a very difficult time and it appears that they just concluded that it was too costly to keep this mess going in Korea when they've got such a delicate situation going at home. So let's bring an end to this thing in Korea. So they sent instructions to the Chinese and North Koreans to respond positively to the latest American negotiating position. It still, however, took from March to July but that's because the POW issue was such a matter of national pride to the Chinese and North Koreans, especially to the
Chinese. And because the South Koreans were very obstinate. So it took a while still to reach a settlement, but basically when Stalin died then the die was cast to bring the war to an end.
Biewen: After the Chinese came in - backing up to late 1950 - ... what significance is there to the fact that the U.S. decision ultimately was, wait a minute, let's not get into the big one here. Let's cut our losses and go home. In terms of setting a tone for the Cold War and for U.S. policy for the next 50 years.

Weathersby: Well, just as Stalin was afraid of war with the U.S. at that time, the American leadership was also afraid of World War III, a global war with the Soviets. The Soviets may have been devastated by World War II, nonetheless they still were a power and after such an extraordinarily destructive war Truman had a healthy appreciation for what could happen if we got into yet another global war. And so there was a determination to keep the war limited to Korea. I personally am very glad that decision was made. If we had attempted to take the war into China, that would have been a catastrophe. We couldn't defeat the Chinese in North Korea, much less all of China. So it would have been a catastrophe. And also possibly forced the Soviets to get into the war. There was a mutual defense treaty between the PRC [People's Republic of China] and the Soviet Union signed in February of 1950. So the Soviets would have been obligated to come to China's aid if we had attacked China. My hunch is that they would have felt very strong pressure to honor that obligation.

Most people are not aware of the extent of the air war in Korea between the Soviets and the Americans, but that's a very clear indication of just how strong the commitment was in both capitols to avoid a war with each other. The Soviets, even though they made it clear that they were not going to send ground troops to North Korea, eventually had to send planes because China didn't have an air force. North Korea had a small air force but that was destroyed at the beginning of the war. China had no air force at all. So if it was going to enter into North Korea across bridges north of the Yalu, it had to have some protection for those bridges from the air. Stalin resisted sending planes to Korea for the same reason he didn't want to send troops. He didn't want to get into a war with the U.S. But nonetheless the military logic was just inescapable that they had to have some air protection. And so in November, well, October, he sent air units and they started fighting in November, but their orders were to stay over Manchurian territory guarding the bases and guarding the bridges. They were not allowed to fly over any territory held by the U.N. forces, so that if they were shot down their presence wouldn't be obvious. Their planes were marked as Chinese planes and so forth and they were even instructed to speak Korean over the radio. You can imagine how long that lasted.

Biewen: Did they wear Chinese uniforms?

Weathersby: Yes, and wore Chinese uniforms, right. But it became very quickly apparent to the Americans that these were Russian pilots. They could hear them speaking Russian over the radio, but also they knew that China didn't have trained fighter pilots, so these were Soviet pilots with experience in World War II, very highly skilled pilots. Stalin attempted to turn over the air war to the Chinese as quickly as possible, to train Chinese and North Korean pilots, but that took quite a while. He was frustrated with how long it was taking. Towards the end of the war there were more and more Chinese and North Koreans flying the planes, but basically it was a Soviet air war against the U.S. Air Force. But Truman very intentionally kept that a secret and conspired in this fiction that these were Chinese pilots precisely so that there would not be a domestic outcry calling for war against the Soviet Union. So this was a pattern that then was maintained for the rest of the Cold War that we would engage in fighting, sometimes very, very fierce fighting such as in Vietnam, but we would stop short of all-out war with the Soviets for fear of the consequences.
To[pe 9- U.S. Restraint-]

Biewen: It's interesting, Roy Flint talks about the importance of the Korean War in shaping the Cold War, but...he puts more emphasis on the willingness of Truman to move at that point to a more forceful position. And clearly that's half of the story, but the other half is this decision of relative restraint.

Weathersby: Yes, it's both. Certainly we solidified NATO, made it into a real military alliance. Prior to the Korean War it had really been just a paper alliance. We solidified the French position in Indo-China, our position in the Philippines, in Taiwan, established permanent or indefinite bases in Japan and in Germany, tripled defense spending. So there was a massive increase in military strength and in military presence around the world. But at the same time, yes, the pattern was set that we would resist Soviet expansion in other parts of the world, but we would do it in a way short of all-out war with the Soviets. It's worth keeping that in mind as we look at the post-Cold War world because what the country is confronted with now is shaping its policy in an environment where we do not have another power large enough, strong enough to intimidate us militarily, to make us afraid of war with it. So if we are going to have constraints on our war making, the restraints have to come from somewhere else. It's been a long time since we felt constraints for other reasons. So a lot of what is happening right now is a feeling our way, to, are we going to be constrained at all? What will constrain us? Public opinion? Fear of unintended consequences? Perhaps economic constraints might come about very quickly.

You know, what will it be? But this is a, I think it helps us understand how profoundly different our situation is right now to really get a clear handle on how the presence of the Soviets was such a profound limitation on us for a long time.

Biewen: And some would argue that the international community, or maybe the U.N., should be a constraint. That for example in the case of the Iraq war, that there was a significant break in tradition by, not exactly going it alone, but going against the view of the U.N. and our allies. How big a break was that with U.S. foreign policy?

Weathersby: Well, it was a very big break in terms of our relations with our allies, but if we look at it on a broader scale in crude terms we could say, well, U.S. power was constrained by coming up against a power, a rival power big enough to threaten us just as we constrained the Soviets with a rival power big enough to threaten them.

So on the most basic level of power perception, what we have is some within the American leadership concluding, well, we don't have any rival power that can threaten us. Not a conventional military power. We have only terrorists who can threaten us. So therefore we don't need to be constrained in our use of military force by any other country. This is President Bush's approach: if they want to join us, fine, if not we can do it ourselves. That's just a really profoundly different situation and that also did not apply to our country preceding World War II, either. So this is the first time this country has ever been in that situation. Other countries have - China in earlier centuries, the Roman Empire - but this situation is very new for us.

http://www.korea-np.co.jp/pk/141th_issue/0006070.html

U.S. Branded as Chieftain of Aggression and War

Memorandum of DPRK Government on Occasion of 50th Anniversary of Breakout of Korean War

The DPRK government issued a memorandum on May 30 disclosing the real aggressive and war aims sought by the United States in its efforts to falsify the truth of history, on the occasion of the half centenary of the Korean War.

Following is the summary of the memorandum.
What the U.S. really sought in provoking the Korean War (June 25, 1950 - July 27, 1953) was to expand its sphere of military domination to the whole Korean Peninsula, considering it as an advance base for carrying out its anti-communist strategy and Asian strategy.

MacArthur, the then commander-in-chief of the U.S. Far East Command, said he always regarded Korea as a military advance base of tremendous importance. (February 4, 1957, issue of the U.S. newspaper The New York Times) he also stressed that conquest of Korea as a whole would enable the U.S. to cut off the only and one supply line linking Soviet Siberia to the south and control the whole area between Vladivostok and Singapore. (Page 148 of Herschel Meyer “Modern History of the United States”)

After visiting South Korea as a special envoy of the U.S. President to inspect the process of converting it into a military base Wedemeyer, a U.S. Lieutenant General, reported that if Korea’s reunification and independence were allowed, it would constitute great threat to the overall interests of the U.S. It is advisable for the U.S. to expand its military occupation to the whole Korea, he added. (Page 18 of the Japanese book “U.S. Military Strategy In the Far East”)

Pointing out that the U.S. had a vital stake in igniting the Korean War as it was undergoing a serious economic crisis, the memorandum says:

Though the U.S. reaped fabulous profits during World War II, its economy faced a serious recession in 1949.

The Japanese book “Korean War” said in its page 128 that the Korean War was a way out of the U.S. economic crisis.

On the accelerated preparations of the U.S. for the war, the memorandum says:

In May 1949 the then U.S. ambassador to south Korea, Muccio, told “Defense Minister” Sin Song Mo and “Minister of Home Affairs” Kim Hyo Sok of south Korea: as there is the United States behind you, everything will go well. We hope that you will trust us and carry out our recommendations and instructions faithfully. A solution to any problem is the strength. This solution can be provided only by the U.S. strength and you should solve this problem as quickly as possible. (Page 113 “Collection of Documents Proving the Korean War Provoked by the U.S. Imperialists” Pyongyang)

The U.S. and Syngman Rhee of South Korea frantically stepped up arms buildup with a goal to gain an “upper hand of ten to one” over the north’s armed forces.

On July 18, 1949, Rhee, in a letter sent to Chang Myon, south Korean “ambassador” to the U.S., said that south Korea would train and equip 100,000 standing troops, 200,000 reservists and 100,000 policemen, 400,000 in all, for “national defense.”

Johnson, chief of the E.C.A. office in the “ROK,” testified at the U.S. budget committee of the House of Representatives on May 19, 1950 that “100,000 south Korean soldiers equipped with U.S. weapons and trained by the U.S. military advisers group were already ready to go into action at any time.” (Page 40 of the Japanese version of the U.S. book “Who Started the Korean War”)

MacArthur testified that the U.S. amassed all military supplies and weapons in the area along the 38th parallel to attack North Korea on the eve of war. At the senate hearing held from May 3 to 14, 1951 he disclosed that “ROK” army kept supplies and equipment in places near the 38th parallel and it did not build position in its rear. (Austrian paper Volksstimme dated July 16, 1990, page 69 of the Japanese version of the U.S. book “Who Started the Korean War” and page 96 of the Japanese version of the U.S. book “The History of the Korean War”)

The “ROK” army committed a total of 2,617 cases of armed provocations in the whole area along the 38th parallel in the year of 1949.

The U.S. mapped out the operation plan for “northward expedition” and the “NSC-68” strategic plan for a special action to be taken at the time of war.

This plan was worked out and accepted at the joint meeting of the U.S. State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the order of Truman in January 1950 and ratified at the U.S. National
Security Council on April 2 and handed to the south Korean authorities as it was in early 1950 before the outbreak of the Korean War. (The New York Times dated April 13, 1964)
Upon getting everything ready to provoke the war against the north, the U.S. and Syngman Rhee lost no time to put the plan into practice.
On his arrival in South Korea as Truman’s special envoy, Dulles inspected the 38th parallel on June 17, 1950 and came back to Seoul on June 18 where he instructed Syngman Rhee to “start an attack on the north while conducting the counter-propaganda that North Korea invaded the south first.”
He appeared at the South Korean “National Assembly” on June 19 to state “the U.S. was ready to offer all moral and material assistance to South Korea in the fight against communism.” (Page 4 of the Japanese book “Who Is Aggressor”)
MacArthur said at the meeting of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committee held in May 1951 that the north Korean army was deployed very far from the 38th parallel, adding that was the deployment for defense, not for attack, according to a “secret report” of the south Korean “ambassador” to the United States.
Flying corps of the U.S. air force already began military action on June 25, 1950 and indiscriminately bombed the areas of the northern half of Korea from June 26 and the U.S. 7th Fleet launched military operations in the seas off Korea on the same day.
The U.S. played cunning tricks to falsify the truth of its war of aggression and justify its undisguised armed intervention by abusing the name of the United Nations.
It cooked up a “resolution” on branding the DPRK as an “aggressor” at the meeting of the UN Security Council on June 25.
The then U.S. President, Truman, quoting the “resolution” calling for the full-scale involvement of the U.S. forces in the Korean War, said the Security Council asked all the member nations of the UN to render all forms of assistance for implementation of the “resolution.” He admitted that he ordered the U.S. navy and air force to assist and support the “ROK army” under such situation.
(The U.S. newspaper Minneapolis Times July 23, 1950)
The U.S. let the meeting of the UN Security Council adopt on July 7 a “resolution” which called for allowing U.S. forces to go under “UN Forces” helmets and putting troops of its satellite countries under its control.
In fact, such “resolutions” were fabricated in the absence of the representative from the DPRK in violation of Article 32 of the UN Charter, which calls for inviting a party to a dispute under consideration to participate in the discussion relating to the dispute. Moreover, they were passed in the absence of the Soviet representative in breach of Article 27 of the UN Charter, which provides for adoption of any decision on procedural matters, by an affirmative vote of 7 members of the UNSC including the concurring votes of its 5 permanent members.
The U.S. thus shifted the responsibility for the outbreak of the war onto the north under the abused UN name from the outset of the war and employed every possible means and method in the war. It mobilized one third of its land force, one fifth of its air force and most of its Pacific Fleet to the war and even armed forces of 15 satellite states under the name of “UN Forces.”
The U.S. is chiefly to blame for breaking all articles stipulated in the Armistice Agreement, which serve as a prerequisite for ensuring peace and security on the Korean Peninsula.
Article 60 of the AA stipulates that within three months after the AA is signed and becomes effective, a political conference of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc.

On July 28, 1953, the day after the conclusion of the AA, U.S. Secretary of State Dulles openly declared that the U.S. would walk out of the political conference after lapse of 90 days and the U.S.
side, in actuality, deliberately threw obstacles in the process of the DPRK government-proposed preparatory talks held in October that year in Panmunjom for the political conference and unilaterally walked out of the meeting, thus bringing the talks to a rupture. Subsequently it breached the articles of the AA that bans the introduction of military hardware and combat materiel.

At a hearing of the U.S. House Appropriations Committee held in February 1960, the then U.S. Army Chief of Staff, Lemnitzer, confessed that through scores of years of sustained efforts the U.S. succeeded in scrapping Paragraph 13 D of the AA and came to have new type equipment in south Korea.

The U.S. also completely paralyzed the functions of the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission tasked to discuss and solve violation of the AA.

The U.S. troops in South Korea are the root cause of the danger of a new war, the memorandum notes, and goes on:

The United States signed the “Mutual Defense Treaty” with south Korea on August 8, 1953 and shifted the 8th U.S. Army Command and the “UN Command” to south Korea from Japan respectively in July 1955 and July 1957 in a bid to massively beef up offensive forces for a new war against the DPRK.

The U.S. House of Representatives at a meeting held in May 1975 to examine the budget for national defense disclosed that at least 1,000 U.S. nuclear weapons were already deployed in South Korea. Member of the U.S. House of Representatives Ronald Dimlongz admitted at the Congress that the United States introduced at least 1,000 nuclear weapons and deployed 54 planes capable of carrying nuclear bombs in south Korea, according to the reports of “Hapdong News” June 3, 1975 and Jiji on June 20, 1975.

The United States has ceaselessly perpetrated espionage and provocations against the DPRK since the armistice.

In January 1968, the U.S. armed spy ship “Pueblo” was captured while conducting espionage after illegally intruding deep into the territorial waters of the DPRK.

The U.S. belligerent forces worked out many operation plans to attack the DPRK, which have been steadily amended and supplemented.

In a recent year the U.S. worked out even a plan for the second war of aggression on the Korean Peninsula called “Operation Plan 5027-98”, a more perfect one than the previous one.

The U.S. design to provoke a new war of aggression finds a more vivid expression in its moves to knock into shape the “triangular military alliance” grouping the United States, Japan and South Korea.

The DPRK government has made every sincere effort in order to replace the state of armistice by durable peace on the Korean Peninsula from its unshakable peace loving stand, the memorandum notes, and demands the United States immediately stop its moves to start a new war, drawing a proper lesson from its shameful defeat in the last Korean War, and dismantle the “UN Command” and withdraw its forces from south Korea at once as required by the resolution of the 30th UN General Assembly.
RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY SECURITY COUNCIL

The Security Council

Recalling the finding of the General Assembly in its Resolution of 21 October 1949 that the Government of the Republic of Korea is a lawfully established government "having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea was able to observe and consult, and in which the great majority of the people of Korea reside; and that this Government is based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea, and which were observed by the Temporary Commission; and that this is the only such government in Korea";

Mindful of the concern expressed by the General Assembly in its Resolutions of 12 December 1948 and 21 October 1949 of the consequences which might follow unless member states refrained from acts derogatory to the results sought to be achieved by the United Nations in bringing about the complete independence and unity of Korea; and the concern expressed that the situation described by the United Nations Commission on Korea in its report menaces the safety and well-being of the Republic of Korea and of the people of
Korea and might lead to open military conflict there;
Noting with grave concern the armed attack upon
the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea,
Determines that this action constitutes a breach
of the peace,
I. Calls for the immediate cessation of hostilities; and
Calls upon the authorities of North Korea to
withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the thirty-
eighth parallel.
II. Requests the United Nations Commission on
Korea
(a) to communicate its fully considered
recommendations on the situation with
the least possible delay;
(b) to observe the withdrawal of the North
Korean forces to the thirty-eighth parallel; and
(c) to keep the Security Council informed on
the execution of this resolution.
III. Calls upon all members to render every
assistance to the United Nations in the execution of
this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance
to the North Korean authorities.
Extended Bibliography. These sources were provided by Tim Sullivan, a teacher at Mira Loma High School in Sacramento California.

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