THE KOREAN WAR: A THREE-WEEK UNIT

GRADES: 9-12th grade  AUTHOR: Nahyon Lee


TIME REQUIRED: Twelve class days (50 minute periods). The time required can be shortened by assigning the packets for homework and omitting the independent research component of the assignment.

BACKGROUND: The Korean War is used as a case study in modern conflicts by tracing back political, socio-economic, religious, and imperialist roots to better understand how the present situation evolved.

The Korean War (June 25, 1950 – July 27, 1953) was fought between South Korea (with UN, USA) and North Korea (with People’s Republic of China). The war was a result of a division of the Korean peninsula after WWII following Japan’s occupation of Korea since 1910 and Japan’s surrender in 1945. The split of the Korean peninsula at the 38th parallel came out of the discussions between Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill (known as The Big Three) in regards to rebuilding Europe and Asia in the post-war period. The split also reflected the growing tension between USA and the Soviet Union, and the Korean War is considered to be the first armed conflict in the Cold War.

Previous to starting this unit, students have already studied Chinese history and the People’s Republic of China’s conflict with Tibet. They will have also studied communism, Confucianism, Daoism, and other Ancient philosophies in East Asia.

CURRICULUM CONNECTION: This mini-unit would be used at the end of the year in my 9th grade Modern Conflicts course. They will have studied the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Kashmir, and China-Tibet by examining religions from these regions, ancient societies, role of imperialism, and the modern conflict itself. The mini-unit on the Korean War would be used as a May project for students to work independently and make connections between the Korean War/Korean Conflict today with other conflicts that we have studied in the class.

CONNECTON TO STUDENT LIVES: By studying modern day conflicts, students have a better understanding of the world today. When they pick up the newspaper, they know the major hot zones in the world. History is the study of humans – how did we get here.

The Korean War is a piece of US history and continues to be one of the last strongholds of a communist society. US troops still are stationed in South Korea today, and North Korea is growing as a nuclear enemy. With North Korea’s connection to China and the rise of China in the 21st century, our students will need to understand the geopolitics of this region.
OBJECTIVES and STANDARDS
1. Locate North and South Korea, and the DMZ on a map.
   MA Standard 1.1. Learning Standard / Outcome: Concepts and Skills History and Geography: Apply the skills of prekindergarten through grade seven.
   NCSS Standard: Geography Disciplinary Standard:
   guide learners in the use of maps and other geographic representations, tools, and technologies to acquire, process, and report information from a spatial perspective.

2. Explain the causes of the Korean War in 1950.
   MA Standard 1.7. Learning Standard / Outcome: Concepts and Skills History and Geography: Show connections, causal and otherwise, between particular historical events and ideas and larger social, economic, and political trends and developments.
   NCSS Standard: History Disciplinary Standard
   enable learners to develop historical understanding through the avenues of social, political, economic, and cultural history and the history of science and technology.

3. Distinguish the views and goals of the war from the perspectives of a North Korean, South Korean, and American.
   MA Standard 1.7. Learning Standard / Outcome: Concepts and Skills History and Geography: Show connections, causal and otherwise, between particular historical events and ideas and larger social, economic, and political trends and developments.
   NCSS Standard: History Disciplinary Standard
   Guide learners in practicing skills of historical analysis and interpretation, such as compare and contrast, differentiate between historical facts and interpretations, consider multiple perspectives, analyze cause and effect relationships, compare competing historical narratives, recognize the tentative nature of historical interpretations, and hypothesize the influence of the past.

4. Compare the roots of the Korean War with the roots of other modern conflicts we’ve studied in the class.
   MA Standard 1.3. Learning Standard / Outcome: Concepts and Skills History and Geography: Interpret and construct timelines that show how events and eras in various parts of the world are related to one another.
   NCSS Standard: History Disciplinary Standard
   Guide learners in acquiring knowledge of the history and values of diverse civilizations throughout the world, including those of the West, and in comparing patterns of continuity and change in different parts of the world.

5. Identify factors that led to the partition of Korea after WWII.
   MA Standard 1.7. Learning Standard / Outcome: Concepts and Skills History and
Geography: Show connections, causal and otherwise, between particular historical events and ideas and larger social, economic, and political trends and developments.

**NCSS Standard: History Disciplinary Standard**
Guide learners in practicing skills of historical analysis and interpretation, such as compare and contrast, differentiate between historical facts and interpretations, consider multiple perspectives, analyze cause and effect relationships, compare competing historical narratives, recognize the tentative nature of historical interpretations, and hypothesize the influence of the past.

**Common Core Standards**
WHST 1 Write arguments focused on discipline-specific content  
WHST 4 Produce clear and coherent writing in which the development, organization and style are appropriate to task, purpose and audience  
WHST 9 Draw evidence from informational texts to support analysis, reflection and research  
SL 1 Initiate and participate effectively in a range of collaborative discussions  
RH 1 Cite specific textual evidence to support analysis of primary and secondary sources  
RH 2 Determine the central ideas or information of a primary or secondary source  
RH 6 Compare the point of view of two or more authors for how they treat the same or similar topics  
RH 9 Compare and contrast treatments of the same topic in several primary and secondary sources

**MATERIALS REQUIRED:**
- Reading Packet of the Korean War (listed under Resources). Packet will consist of a tertiary source, secondary sources, and primary sources. Packet can be found on the Korean Society’s website.  
- Computer for iMovie  
- Computer for research (or library access)

**INTRODUCTION and EXPLORATION:**
Students will have a chance to read about The Korean War after studying China and her conflict with Tibet, India and her conflict over Kashmir, and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. These are all regions in the world that are considered “hot spots” and all have border disputes. They will have a chance to explore one more “hot spot” in the world and compare/contrast the roots of the conflict and the nature of the conflict.

One way to introduce Korean will be through an exercise called “What do you know?” The teacher will ask students to say what they know about Korea, past and present. Most common answers will be North Korea, DMZ, the Olympics, the Korean War, etc…from the discussion, the teacher will lead the class into the unit.

**PROCEDURE:**
I. DELIVERY OF THE CONTENT:
Introduce Mini-Unit and Timeline of the Mini-Unit. 
Goal of the Mini-Unit is for students to study an additional important conflict in the Modern World, reinforce their skills in information literacy, practice analytical writing, and to work in small groups. The mini-unit consists of several activities listed below.

II. APPLICATION OF THE CONTENT:
The Timeline and Activities (12 days total)

1. Spend 3 class days reading packet independently (material listed under Resources). Packet will consist of tertiary source, secondary sources, and primary sources. Students should actively read all written sources, examine any audio/visual sources assigned, and develop own understanding of the conflict and history. (Day 1-3).

2. After reading their packet, students will spend two days analyzing their reading and writing paragraphs to the following. The questions are broad (same questions we used in other units) to allow for comparison between various modern conflicts. (Day 4)

Write 1 or 2 paragraph responses to two of the following four questions. Teacher assigns questions to students.
- What are the political roots of this conflict?
- What are the religious roots of this conflict?
- What are the socio-economic roots of this conflict?
- What are the imperialist roots of this conflict?

3. After writing, students will be in jigsaw groups and have small group discussions analyzing the roots of the Korean War. Each group will have someone that wrote on each question. They will share their ideas and what they wrote about, and then determine which of the roots was the most significant (30 minutes). They will present their group’s discussion to the class (last 20 minutes). (Day 5)

4. Afterwards, students will spend one class day to write a UN Letter from one of the following perspectives (teacher assigns). Students will write a letter to the United Nations asking for some action. In the letter, students should incorporate events happening in that year; support their call for action with evidence from the War. Students should think about what each group/person would want from the international community. Before writing, teacher should give a ten-minute discussion on the United Nations (who they are, when they were formed, role of Secretary General). (Day 5)

UN Letter Options:
- North Korean Soldier in January 1950 (before the war starts)
- South Korean civilian in July 1950 (immediately after the war starts)
- General MacArthur in March 1951
- President Rhee in July 1953

5. After writing, students will be in jigsaw groups and have small group discussions analyzing the various perspectives. Each group will have someone who wrote each letter
option. Students will read letters to the group (10 minutes). After reading, they should think about other perspectives not represented and discuss what they might want and say to the United Nations, such as children/orphans, landowners from North Korea, women, Chinese leader Mao Tsetung, etc. (15 minutes). Choose one of these voices and write a letter together to read to the class (15 minutes). Read group letter (5 minutes). (Day 6)

6. Last stage of mini-Unit, students will make an iMovie based on the following 4 phases of the Korean War (Roots of the War, Nature of the War, the DMZ and 1953, North and South Relations Today). They will be put into groups of four and students will be assigned one of the four phases of the Korean War. They will base the content of the movie on the materials from the reading packet. In addition, each person from each group will find three additional sources (secondary/primary) to complement their understanding of the material (each student will hand in an annotated bibliography of their three sources). The goal of the iMovie is to make 1) an educational learning tool; 2) have students teach their peers about their subtopic of the Korean war; 3) have students conduct their own research. (If computer access is unavailable, students can do a skit to perform in class on the last day). (Day 7-11)

iMovie expectations:
- Provide general explanation/overview of their subtopic (Roots of the War, Nature of the War, DMZ and 1953, and North/South Relations today).
- Include in their iMovie 15 key terms (people, places, events, dates)
- Should be 3.5 minutes long
- Everyone should speak in the voiceover
- iMovie includes images (images should match what is being discussed in the iMovie)

7. Last day – watch the videos. Each group takes questions after the video. (Or watch skits)

ASSESSMENT:
The mini-unit consists of several different types of learning: independent reading and research, writing from a different point-of-view, analytical writing, group work, visual learning, and group work. They will have not only write and interpret what they have read and learned, but they also have to teach it through the several stages of the mini-unit (from the jigsaws to the iMovie).
I. Roots Paragraph Rubric
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Is strong because:</th>
<th>Needs work because:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Topic Sentence</strong></td>
<td>• Acts as a mini-thesis statement</td>
<td>• states an argument, but needs more development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• states a specific argument (identifies the argument and the reasoning behind it)</td>
<td>• doesn't state a claim or argument</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• states a conclusion or fact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• is too general</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• mini thesis does not match the paragraph topic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Evidence</strong></td>
<td>• includes specific examples from the historical narrative</td>
<td>• has relevant evidence, but needs more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• describes the examples (shows rather than tells)</td>
<td>• doesn't include examples from the historical narrative (need more historical context, dates)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• uses a variety of sources (at least 2)</td>
<td>• mentions events from the narrative but doesn't describe them</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• has quotes and examples that aren't relevant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• relies heavily on 1 source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Analysis</strong></td>
<td>• the relationship between each piece of evidence and the overall argument (topic sentence) is clearly and fully explained</td>
<td>• some pieces of evidence are clearly and fully connected to the argument of the essay but not all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• explanations are overall relevant and well developed</td>
<td>• relationships between the evidence and thesis are briefly but not fully explained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• the &quot;analysis&quot; is simply a restatement of the evidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Concluding Sentence</strong></td>
<td>• Concluding sentence provides closure to the paragraph</td>
<td>• Concluding sentences introduces a new point or idea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Concluding sentence isn't simply a restatement of the thesis</td>
<td>• Concluding sentence simply restates the thesis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Concluding sentence states an idea</td>
<td>• Concluding sentence states a point or fact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mechanics</strong></td>
<td>• citations are MLA In-text</td>
<td>• citations are not in correct MLA form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• everything that needs to be cited is (paraphrases, uncommon knowledge, other people's ideas, direct quotes)</td>
<td>• not everything that needs to be cited is</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• paragraph is proofread</td>
<td>• sentences are awkward/choppy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• writing is fluid, easy to follow</td>
<td>• sentences need to flow more smoothly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• language is sophisticated and significant</td>
<td>• language is too simple or broad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Needs more proofreading</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-write out contractions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-homophones/homonyms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-use stronger adjectives/verbs</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-watch for commas/run-ons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
II. UN Letter Rubric (15 points total)

_____/3 points: Student uses block format (http://businessletterformat.org/)

_____/6 points: Student urges specific action to be taken.

_____/6 points: Student writes from specific perspective & time frame.

Total: _____ / 15 points

III. iMovie Rubric: (20 points total)

5 points: Format Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Is strong because</th>
<th>Needs work because</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• iMovie thoroughly and clearly explains the given conflict.</td>
<td>• iMovie is not thorough and clear about the given conflict; needs more development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• presentation includes 15-20 relevant terms, a relevant timeline</td>
<td>• presentation does not include 15 relevant terms and timeline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• addresses the roots, nature and resolution of the conflict</td>
<td>• does not address the roots, nature and resolution of the conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• iMovie is 3.5 minutes in length and includes a variety of images, video clips and voice over.</td>
<td>• does not meet time requirement and does not include images, video clips and voice over</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• the material needs to be more relevant to topic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5 points: Relevance and Quality of Content

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Is strong because</th>
<th>Needs work because</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Information presented demonstrates a deep understanding of the conflict.</td>
<td>• Information needs to show deeper understanding of conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Visual and oral narratives are connected.</td>
<td>• Visual and oral narratives need to be better connected and explained to the conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Highlighted the major events and important details.</td>
<td>• Didn’t highlight the necessary events and details.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Terms are explained in the appropriate context.</td>
<td>• Terms were not fully explained within the historical narrative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Terms in general need to be better explained.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 5 points: Efficacy & Creativity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Is strong because</th>
<th>Needs work because</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- The presentation is an effective teaching tool.</td>
<td>- Presentation is hard to follow.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Presentation is organized, seamless and interesting.</td>
<td>- Presentation needs to capture the audience more.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Delivery of material is creative and grabs the interest of the audience.</td>
<td>- Transitions between the various sections need to be smoother.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Transitions are smooth between various sections.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### /5 points: Individual Contribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Is strong because</th>
<th>Needs work because</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Student is a positive member of the group who works well with others during the week.</td>
<td>- Student needs to be more proactive, show initiative, and involved in the group process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Student contributes throughout the week.</td>
<td>- Student needs to be positive member of the group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Student should have a verbal and relevant role in the iMovie.</td>
<td>- Student’s role in the iMovie is not relevant or not significant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Student participates in the Q&amp;A Section of iMovie and demonstrates knowledge of conflict.</td>
<td>- Student needs to participate more productively in the Q&amp;A Section of the iMovie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Student has good verbal and non-verbal body language during the presentation.</td>
<td>- In the Q&amp;A section, student demonstrates knowledge of the conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Student needs to work on oral presentation skills more, such as verbal and non-verbal language.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- don’t slouch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- look around classmates when speaking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- speak up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- speed (too slow or too fast)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
RESOURCES:

I. Reading Packet:

Read first the tertiary sources:

Read next the secondary sources:


http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinion/2012/04/137_89323.html

Read the primary sources third:


(article and images found online).
http://www.boston.com/bigpicture/2010/06/remembering_the_korean_war_60.html

Watch the Multimedia Sources last:

KOREAN WAR READING PACKET (for Nahyon Lee's Lesson Plan)

Read first the tertiary sources: (found in The Korea Society website)

Read next the secondary sources: (found in The Korea Society website)


   Han, Dongping. "The war that changed the world: 60th anniversary of Korean War." China Daily, October 18, 2010.


Read the primary sources third:

   "Korea War Shakes the Democratic World." The Associated Press. Los Angeles Times (1923-Current File); June 27, 1950; ProQuest Historical Newspapers Los Angeles Times (1881-1987). (found in The Korea Society website)

   (article and images found online)

Watch the Multimedia Sources last: (found via ABC-Clio database)

TERTIARY SOURCES
KOREA, SOUTH: Invasion by the North, 1950-1953

TYPE OF CONFLICT: Cold War Confrontation; Invasions and Border Disputes

PARTICIPANTS: China; United Nations; United States

the unification of Korea was one of the issues that heightened Soviet-American tensions after 1945. The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 was a defining event in the Cold War. That conflict brought about a fundamental reassessment of American policies with respect to the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC).

Historical Background

At the Cairo conference in November 1943, the United States, Great Britain, and China made plans for Asia after Japan was defeated in World War II. They agreed to strip Japan of all the territory it had acquired since 1894, including Korea. The three nations decided that Korea would become free and independent "in due course." That phrase was used because President Franklin D. Roosevelt wanted Korea governed by a trusteeship. He did not consult with Korean leaders, and thus he was unaware that many of them opposed this idea—they wanted immediate independence once Japan was defeated. At the 1945 Yalta conference, the Soviet Union agreed to the decisions made at the Cairo conference, but no detailed plans were made for a trusteeship. At the Potsdam conference in July 1945, the Allied powers repeated the pledge made in Cairo regarding Japan's territorial possessions.

When Japan was about to surrender, the United States and the Soviet Union hastily agreed to divide Korea along the 38th parallel to accept the surrender of Japanese military forces. At the time, the United States had no troops near Korea, and American officials feared that without an agreement to divide the region, the Soviet Union would deploy its military forces throughout Korea. The 38th parallel was intended as a temporary demarcation line, not a permanent
boundary. When Korea was occupied, however, Soviet military commanders refused to cooperate with their American counterparts until an agreement was reached between Washington and Moscow to establish a provisional government.

**Great Power Negotiations**

In December 1945, Secretary of State James Byrnes traveled to Moscow to determine if the Big Three-Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States-could negotiate some agreements for the postwar era. One month earlier, Ambassador W. Averell Harriman had reported to Washington that Soviet leaders considered Korea similar to Finland, Poland, and Romania, routes that could be used to invade the Soviet Union. He suspected that because the Soviet Union shared a common border with Korea, Moscow might want to retain control over North Korea either directly or indirectly.

During the December 1945 Moscow meeting, the foreign ministers decided to establish a trusteeship for no more than five years. They also established a Soviet-American commission to lay the foundation for a provisional government for a unified Korea. The agreements made in Moscow were general in nature and provided little guidance for the negotiators in Korea. No date was given for holding national elections nor were the powers of the proposed provisional government delineated. There were no discussions about the possibility of extending or shortening the trusteeship period nor were any provisions made for the paralysis that could result if the veto power was abused. Each of the trusteeship powers-China, Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union-had the right of veto. The foreign ministers did not discuss the necessity for a trusteeship nor did they consult with Korean leaders. Those leaders opposed a trusteeship, viewing it as replacing one foreign authority with another. Although China and Great Britain were to be a part of the trusteeship system, neither country played a significant role in the negotiations that took place after the 1945 Moscow meeting. China was engaged in a civil war, and Great Britain was coping with a financial crisis and the dissolution of its empire.

Two groups were given responsibility for resolving Korea's problem: the Soviet-American Conference and the Joint U.S.-Soviet Commission. The former convened in Seoul on January 16, 1946, to discuss such things as the supply of electric power, commodity trading, railroad and motor transportation,
the movement of Korean citizens from one zone to the other, and communication issues. There was a fundamental difference between the Soviet and American approaches to the conference. The United States wanted to remove all barriers between the North and South, whereas the Soviets wanted to improve coordination between the two zones. Representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union held fifteen formal sessions, the last one on February 5, 1946. They reached some minor agreements but none regarding any of the major economic issues. The Soviets refused to permit establishing a combined radio network, would not allow travel across the 38th parallel without prior permission, and would not allow newspapers from the South to be distributed in the Soviet zone. The lack of success convinced some American officials that the Soviets intended to remain in North Korea long enough to establish a pro-Soviet government there.

After the Moscow conference and before the first meeting of the Joint U.S.-Soviet Commission, the Soviet press consistently criticized political leaders in South Korea such as Syngman Rhee and Kim Koo, who they claimed opposed the trusteeship and organized protest demonstrations. The South Korean political leaders were accused of being anti-Soviet, and American military commanders were suspected of permitting and encouraging the demonstrations. In fact, many South Korean leaders opposed both the United States and the Soviet Union because of the trusteeship decision made in Moscow in 1945. The leaders in North Korea had no choice—they could not oppose the policy preferences of the Soviet leaders.

In February 1946, Russian military authorities announced the formation of an all-Korean government in North Korea. It was composed of known Communists and Koreans brought back from the Soviet Union and Manchuria where they had fled to escape Japanese rule. Kim Il Sung returned to Korea and soon emerged as the most important North Korean leader who willingly cooperated with the Soviet military and political leaders.

Unification Efforts

The first session of the Joint U.S.-Soviet Commission on Korea met in Seoul in March 1946. Its primary responsibility was to lay the groundwork for establishing a provisional government. Colonel General Terenti Shytov, the chief Soviet delegate, said the Soviets wanted a friendly Korea so it would not be used as a base for attacking the Soviet Union. The commission remained in session until May and then adjourned. It made no progress in establishing a provisional government.

The most difficult issue confronting the commission was to determine which political and social groups to consult before organizing a provisional government. The United States wanted many groups consulted, while the Soviet Union wanted to consult few. The Soviets insisted that those leaders and groups opposing the trusteeship should not be a part of the consulting process because they were anti-Soviet. American officials rejected this claim. They said the demonstrations against the trusteeship were simply a form of free speech. The United States would not punish demonstrators for exercising a right that should be protected throughout Korea. The Soviets wanted to manipulate the consultations to guarantee that those groups that were friendly toward the Soviet Union would have a preponderant voice. The techniques used in the North were similar to those used to install Communist governments in Eastern Europe after World War II. The Communists in North Korea controlled those agencies responsible for security, fused political parties, and established a popular front government controlled by the Communists.

At a news conference on August 30, 1947, Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson said the United States was willing to have the Joint Commission resume negotiations. Its last meeting had been in May. He said the United States intended to remain in Korea as long as necessary to help create an independent Korea. He wanted the Soviet leaders to know that the United States did not intend to abandon South Korea. The Soviets did not respond to the American initiative.

In 1947, the United States made several efforts to reconvene the commission. Finally, on April 19, Soviet Foreign Minister V.M. Molotov announced his willingness to have the commission again meet. U.S. Secretary of State George C. Marshall welcomed the Soviet decision to resume the talks. In a letter to Molotov, Marshall insisted on the principle of freedom of expression and the need for the commission to consult with a wide range of groups. On the surface it appeared that the two sides agreed on how the Joint Commission should proceed. The commission was ordered by the two countries to report back by July.
or August on progress made or the lack of it. It reconvened in May 1947 in Seoul.

Initially, the negotiations seemed to be going well, but Soviet-American differences on the question of consultations with political and social groups again emerged. On June 27, 1947, the Soviets insisted on excluding those groups that had opposed a trusteeship. The Soviets wanted parties or organizations affiliated with the Representative Democratic Council, a coalition of conservative political groups headed by Syngman Rhee, barred from consultations. The Soviet reversion appeared to violate the understanding between Marshall and Molotov reached in April. The reversion reflected the fact that Communist influence would be diluted if all the non-Communist groups were consulted. The groups in North Korea would do whatever the Soviets wanted them to, but there were many more groups in the South than in the North. At the time, South Korea had a population of approximately 20 million, North Korea about 9 million.

In August 1947, an ad hoc committee on Korea, composed of American policy experts from various government departments, recommended to President Harry Truman that the United States take the Korean issue to the United Nations. They also recommended granting independence to South Korea if the Joint Commission failed to reach an agreement. On August 11, Marshall wrote to Molotov requesting that the Joint Commission issue a report by August 21. Marshall did not want the talks to continue indefinitely.

In August 1947, Foreign Minister Molotov agreed that the Joint Commission should issue a report. By this time, it was evident that the commission was hopelessly divided. Colonel General Terentyi F. Shtykov accused South Korea of carrying out a pogrom against "leftists" with the support of the United States. Major General Albert Brown, head of the American delegation to the commission, angrily denounced the Soviet Union for its accusation. He accused the Soviets of interfering in South Korea's internal politics. On September 8, 1947, the American delegation to the commission reported that the two sides were unable to agree on a joint report. Each side wrote its own report.

The Soviets rejected an American proposal to conduct a plebiscite as part of the process for establishing a provisional government. They labeled the proposal "pure propaganda." The Soviets also rejected an American proposal to convene a four-power conference to try to find a formula for resolving the Korean issue.

In 1947, some policymakers in Washington were beginning to question the value of the American presence in Korea. The Joint Chiefs of Staff thought South Korea was a strategic liability and recommended withdrawing American military forces. South Korea was also a burden because of its many political, social, and economic problems, some of which were the result of partition. Syngman Rhee and many of his followers often opposed American policies and sought to undermine them. He accused the United States of being responsible for the division of Korea and for failing to consult with Korean leaders at those conferences where decisions vital to Korea's future were made. American officials were often frustrated because they were unable to get the various political factions in South Korea to cooperate with each other.

The left-wing and right-wing political factions were polarized, and there was a good deal of fragmentation within each faction. Many Koreans viewed the United States as just another occupying power that denied South Korea the freedom and independence they expected once Japan was defeated.

Other policymakers in Washington did not want to abandon South Korea because of the Soviet-American ideological conflict. They feared that such a policy could produce an adverse reaction throughout Asia. In a report to President Truman, after a trip to Korea in the summer of 1947, General Albert Wedemeyer recommended that the United States maintain its presence in South Korea. He emphasized that political factors could be just as important as military factors in shaping American policies with respect to Asia. President Truman accepted Wedemeyer's recommendations.

The United States decided to take the Korean issue to the United Nations. On September 17, 1947, Secretary of State Marshall, in an address to the General Assembly, called upon the world organization to try to bring about the unification of Korea. On September 23, the General Assembly, over the opposition of the Soviet Union, voted to place the Korean question on its agenda. In November, the General Assembly established the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, which was to oversee elections leading to a provisional government and national unification. The Soviet Union announced it would not cooperate with the commission.
Soviet-American differences regarding Korea contributed to the deterioration of the Soviet-American relationship. In January 1947, the Soviets had conducted a rigged election in Poland, a violation of the Yalta agreements. In March, President Truman appeared before a joint session of Congress to articulate what became the Truman Doctrine, a response to Communist activities in Greece and Turkey. He considered extending the doctrine to Korea but decided not to do so because of the financial costs. The Marshall Plan, announced in June 1947, contributed to the division of Europe and further polarized Soviet-American relations. In October 1947, the Soviets established the Cominform, a Communist Information Bureau, as an instrument for exercising greater control over the Soviet bloc nations in Eastern Europe and Communist political parties. During the first meeting of the Cominform, Andrei Zhdanov, a high-ranking Soviet official and a member of the Politburo, said the world was divided into two camps: the imperialists and the anti-imperialists. All nations were in one camp or the other; nations could not be neutral. By 1947, the question of Korea's unification became enmeshed in the Cold War environment. The division between the United States and the Soviet Union cut across Korea, Austria, Berlin, Germany, and Europe.

Events in 1948 made it apparent that Korea would remain divided. In April, Soviet troops began digging fortifications along the 38th parallel, something they would not have done if they expected Korea to be unified. That same month President Truman approved NSC-8, a National Security Council study of America's relations with Korea. The study recommended that South Korea receive military assistance but that the United States would not be responsible for its defense. South Korea was not a vital American interest. The United States had demobilized its military forces in Korea after World War II. The Joint Chiefs of Staff thought the 45,000 American troops could be more usefully deployed elsewhere.

Korea Divided

In May 1948, elections were held in South Korea under the auspices of the United Nations Temporary Commission. Supporters of Syngman Rhee won a majority of the seats to the National Assembly. In July, South Korea adopted a constitution and the National Assembly elected Syngman Rhee president.

On August 15, 1948, the Republic of Korea (ROK) was formally established. In September, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) was formally established north of the 38th parallel, and Kim Il Sung became premier. In December, the United Nations General Assembly approved a report of the United Nations Temporary Commission recognizing the legality of the South Korean government. That same month the Soviet Union withdrew its military forces from the DPRK.

On January 1, 1949, the United States extended diplomatic recognition to the ROK. In March, President Truman approved NSC-8/2, a National Security Council study that was similar to NSC-8 approved the previous year. The major difference between the two was that the 1949 study called for withdrawal of American occupation forces by June. The troops departed according to schedule, but the departure left South Korea vulnerable.

The ROK did not have a stable political system in 1949, and in many respects, its military could not match that of North Korea. President Rhee was an authoritarian leader who did not welcome opposition. Political forces in South Korea were often polarized and engaged in violent clashes with each other. Demonstrations against the government were ruthlessly suppressed. The division of the country along the 38th parallel resulted in economic hardships for the ROK that would take years to correct.

North Korea's military capabilities were greater than those of the ROK. North Korea had a larger army and was better equipped with tanks, aircraft, and heavy artillery. American policies also weakened South Korea because the amount and type of aid South Korea received was limited. American officials feared that President Rhee might use the aid to begin a war with the North to unify the country.

On January 12, 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson, in a speech to the National Press Club, defined America's defense perimeter in Asia. South Korea was excluded. Neither the Congress nor the Joint Chiefs of Staff showed much interest in defending South Korea. On January 19, Congress rejected a $60 million supplementary aid bill for South Korea.

War Begins

On June 25, 1950, North Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel and invaded South Korea. That decision obviously had the approval of Soviet Marshal Josef
On June 25, 1950, the United Nations Security Council approved an American-sponsored resolution calling for a cease-fire in Korea. The Soviet Union was boycotting the council to protest its failure to seat the People's Republic of China. As a result it could not exercise its right of veto. On June 27, the Security Council approved a resolution requesting members to commit military forces to help repel the aggression. On that same day, President Truman ordered American air and sea forces to come to the assistance of South Korea. On June 30, American ground forces were ordered into action. On July 8, the United Nations Security Council appointed General Douglas MacArthur as commander of the UN forces.

Most of President Truman’s advisers supported the decision to repel the attack. Secretary of State Acheson believed the aggression had to be resisted because of the importance of Korea in relation to Japan. He also feared that American prestige would be severely damaged both in Europe and Asia if nothing was done to check North Korea’s actions.

There was some opposition. Senator Robert A. Taft, a Republican leader in the Senate, opposed the dispatch of American forces without congressional authorization. He was critical of American policies that he thought were responsible for the North Korean attack, including the failure to arm South Korea adequately. He believed there was a connection between the Communist victory in China in 1949 and the decision of North Korea to cross the 38th parallel. Taft was one of those Republicans who blamed the Democrats for "losing" China.

The American response to the aggression was surprising given its past policies. Throughout 1946, American officials did not believe South Korea could be defended if attacked. In September, the Department of State agreed that South Korea was not vital to American interests. A year later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that South Korea was not important enough to keep 45,000 American troops there. In February 1948, they recommended removing the troops. In January 1949, General MacArthur said the United States should not commit troops to defend South Korea if it was attacked by the North. In May 1950, Tom Connally, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, publicly stated that the United States would not defend South Korea if it was attacked by the North.

Despite all these negative decisions, there were indications that fundamental change was occurring
in America's approach to containing the Soviet Union. In April 1950, President Truman had received a draft of NSC-68, another study by the National Security Council. It proposed a number of steps the United States should take to meet the global Communist challenge, including an increase in America's conventional and nuclear capabilities. President Truman was in the process of evaluating the recommendations when the Korean War began. From 1945 to 1950, America was primarily concerned with protecting the free nations of Europe. The Korean War enlarged the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The Communist invasion was initially successful. On June 28, 1950, three days after the invasion began, North Korean troops occupied South Korea's capital, Seoul. Within weeks, North Korean forces had driven the South Korean and U.S. forces to the extreme southeastern tip of the Korean peninsula at Pusan. General MacArthur began a powerful counterattack on September 15, landing a UN force at Inchon, near Seoul, and threatening the supply lines of North Koreans fighting further south on the peninsula. The new UN contingent recaptured Seoul on September 27, then attacked the retreating North Korean forces, driving them across the 38th parallel and deep into North Korea.

In September 1950, President Truman approved NSC-81, a plan for the UN forces to cross the 38th parallel to unify the country. Only South Korean troops, however, were to be used in the northeast provinces bordering the Soviet Union and China. Truman wanted to reassure the Soviet Union and China that the UN forces wanted only to unify Korea. It was expected that American and other UN troops would leave the area north of the 38th parallel as quickly as possible, leaving only South Korean military units as the occupiers.

**Truman and MacArthur**

President Truman decided he should meet with General MacArthur for a briefing to make sure MacArthur understood American aims in Korea. They met in October 1950 on Wake Island. Among other things, Truman wanted to be certain that MacArthur did nothing that would encourage China to enter the war. MacArthur disagreed with the Truman administration's cautious policy toward Taiwan, believing that the Nationalist forces there should receive stronger support. In fact MacArthur had visited Taiwan in August 1950, and afterward, Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek said his talks with MacArthur had laid the foundation for a joint defense and a final victory over the Communists. Later in August, MacArthur issued his own statement urging that Taiwan be turned into a U.S. defense stronghold. Two days later, President Truman ordered him to withdraw the statement. Many of Truman's advisers believed that the Communists had won the civil war in China because of the incompetence and corruption of Chiang's Nationalist regime and warned against getting enmeshed in Chiang's plans to attack mainland China from his refuge on the island of Taiwan.

At Wake Island, MacArthur told Truman that he expected the war to be over by Thanksgiving and that national elections in a reunited Korea could take place as early as January 1951. He doubted that China would enter the war and surmised that if it did, the result would not be massive casualties. He estimated the number of Chinese that might enter the conflict at fewer than 125,000. Meanwhile, officials in China had surmised that the meeting between MacArthur and Truman on Wake Island was to review plans for attacking China.

**China Enters the War**

The initial goal of American policy in June 1950 was to repel the aggression and protect South Korea. When the UN forces reached the 38th parallel, the goal of American policy became unifying the country. The Beijing government warned Washington that China would intervene in the conflict if the UN troops crossed the 38th parallel on October 7. The warning was disregarded. China's leaders could not tolerate the possibility that American troops might be stationed along the border between Korea and China. On October 14, Chinese troops crossed the Yalu River, the border between China and North Korea, to help North Koreans defend their territory.

On October 19, General MacArthur's army captured the northern capital, Pyongyang, and began driving the North Korean and Chinese defenders to the northern reaches of their territory, near the Soviet and Chinese borders. At this point he issued orders removing all restrictions on the use of UN forces north of the border, allowing U.S. troops and those from other countries as well as South Koreans to
enter the provinces adjacent to the international borders. This allegedly violated the instructions he had received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. MacArthur claimed that lifting the restrictions was a military necessity.

China's entry into the war raised a number of questions. The United States had to decide how to respond to the intervention and to predict the reaction of the Soviet Union. China and the Soviet Union had signed a military treaty in February 1950 in which they pledged to come to each other's assistance in case of a military attack. American officials did not want the defense of Korea to lead to World War III. There was also the question of how much of a commitment the United States should make to the war effort, since protecting the free nations of Europe remained America's highest overseas priority.

What the Chinese hoped to achieve by entering the conflict was unclear. Initially, General MacArthur did not believe China was making a major military commitment to defend North Korea. He thought China might only want to create a buffer zone within North Korea so that UN troops would not be stationed along China's border. MacArthur continued to assume, despite the presence of China's troops, that he could win control over all Korea by the end of November. His views radically changed when it became evident that China's goals were much more ambitious. On November 28, 1950, he informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that his forces were insufficient to cope with the massive Chinese intervention. It was estimated that between 200,000 and 300,000 Chinese military troops had crossed over into Korea in about three weeks and that more military units were at the border. MacArthur proposed blockading China, bombing military targets in China, and encouraging Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist army to launch attacks against mainland China.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff thought MacArthur's proposals would dangerously enlarge the war and also sow sharp disagreements between the United States and its allies, who opposed the war and were urging a negotiated settlement. Fear that the war could escalate was fanned by a careless comment made by President Truman at a news conference on November 30. In response to a question, he said the United States would consider using atomic weapons if necessary.

China's military effort proved to be successful on a number of fronts. Their counterattack drove UN forces back south of the 38th parallel and so threatened them that in January 1951, the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered evacuating the whole force. North Korean and Chinese troops captured Seoul for the second time. UN forces launched a series of counterattacks and succeeded in pushing the Communists back across the 38th parallel and recapturing Seoul. At this point, the fighting slowed and became a stand-off, within a few miles of the prewar border. The Truman administration decided to work for an armistice. The UN forces had tried to unify Korea and failed. They would not try again.

China's entry into the war and its initial success exacerbated the differences between President Truman and General MacArthur. The president was unwilling to invade the north a second time to try again to unify Korea. He was willing to end the war along the 38th parallel when it began. MacArthur, on the other hand, believed a greater military effort would not only liberate North Korea but defeat the Chinese army. On March 24, 1951, without authorization, MacArthur issued a warlike call on leaders in China and North Korea to negotiate an end to the hostilities or suffer the consequences. He warned that if the war was carried to the mainland, China's military would be crushed. On April 5, 1951, Representative Joseph Martin, the Republican minority leader in the House of Representatives, read a letter from General MacArthur that was openly critical of President Truman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On April 11, President Truman relieved General MacArthur of his command for insubordination-disobeying orders.

Negotiating an End to the Conflict

In June 1951, Jacob Malik, the Soviet Representative to the United Nations, proposed that cease-fire negotiations begin in Korea, and they got underway in July. In October, the talks were moved to Panmunjom. The two sides agreed on a four-part agenda that included establishing a demarcation line, supervision of a cease-fire agreement, the exchange of prisoners of war (POWs), and recommendations for the future.

In 1952, China, North Korea, and the Soviet Union initiated a "hate America" campaign, charging that the United States was guilty of using biological weapons in Korea and China. The United States was also accused of mistreating prisoners of war that included the use of torture. Chinese officials claimed
that on March 6 three American planes dropped canisters containing biological weapons on China. The Communists rejected efforts to have the International Red Cross investigate the charges.

The hostility between the United States and China was made evident by the lack of progress in the truce negotiations. By 1952, the most important issue blocking a truce was the repatriation of POWs. The United Nations Command (UNC) refused to consider repatriating those prisoners who did not want to return to China or North Korea, while China and North Korea insisted that all prisoners be repatriated. In September 1952, the UNC presented the Communists with three proposals for resolving the prisoner issue and a warning that rejection of the three would end the negotiations. The proposals were rejected, and the United States suspended the talks.

The War Ends

In the meantime, the Korean War became an issue in the 1952 U.S. presidential campaign. In a speech in Detroit in November 1952, General Dwight Eisenhower, the Republican presidential nominee, announced that if elected he would go to Korea to help determine how the war could be ended. He won the election and, in December, visited Korea. He was determined to end the war as quickly as possible.

On February 2, 1953, in his State of the Union address, President Eisenhower said the U.S. Seventh Fleet would no longer shield mainland China from the forces of Chiang Kai-shek. He thus ended the policy put into place by President Truman at the outbreak of the Korean War. The media referred to President Eisenhower’s decision as the “unleashing” of Chiang Kai-shek. This overstated the effect of Eisenhower’s policy—in effect, it permitted the Nationalist forces to carry out attacks against the mainland but offered no assistance. The new policy did not make a Nationalist invasion of the mainland any more probable.

Two factors contributed to the end of the Korean conflict. Soviet Premier Josef Stalin died in March 1953. The Soviet leaders knew there would be a transition period before new leadership could be established, and thus, there was the possibility of political instability. On March 15, 1953, Premier Georgi Malenkov voiced support for a cease-fire agreement. In April, peace talks resumed in Panmunjom. The second factor was the possibility that atomic weapons would be used to facilitate an end to the conflict. In May, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles met with India’s Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and informed him that if the negotiations to end the Korean conflict failed, the United States would increase its military effort. The increased military effort involved bombing bases in Manchuria and using tactical atomic weapons. In February 1953, President Eisenhower organized an ad hoc committee to analyze how nuclear weapons could be used in Korea. On February 11, 1953, he and Secretary of State Dulles discussed the use of nuclear weapons at a meeting with the National Security Council.

On May 23, 1953, Lieutenant General William Harrison presented the North Koreans with America’s last proposal for ending the impasse regarding the repatriation of prisoners of war, the one issue preventing the conclusion of an armistice. The POW issue was finally settled, and an armistice was signed on July 27, 1953.

Besides the death of Stalin and the possible use of atomic weapons, both sides in the Korean conflict recognized that efforts to achieve a total victory would be costly and could lead to World War III.

Consequences

The war had an enormous impact on American foreign policy. In September 1950, President Truman approved NSC-68, one of the most important documents in the Cold War. Its basic thrust was the necessity of containing Communism, not just the Soviet Union. NSC-68 defined the Communist threat in universal terms, and therefore, the United States had to be prepared to make a global response. In that sense, NSC-68 complemented the 1947 Truman Doctrine.

The Korean War also had an impact on American policies with respect to Europe. In 1952, the NATO nations agreed to create a European defense force, to re-arm West Germany, and to end the occupation of that country. The Allied nations wanted to make certain that West Germany did not suffer the same fate as South Korea. Until the Korean War, American troops in West Germany were there as occupation forces. In 1949, when the U.S. Senate was in the process of ratifying the NATO treaty, Secretary of State Dean Acheson told the Senate that the United States had no plans to station forces in Europe. After the invasion of Korea, plans were changed, and U.S. troops
remained in Europe to defend against any attack from the Soviet Union and its allies. The NATO nations set a goal to create fifty divisions by the end of 1952. All these decisions were influenced by the conflict in Korea.

NSC-68 depicted the Communist bloc as being monolithic and controlled by Moscow. After the Communist victory in the Chinese civil war in 1949, Secretary of State Acheson suggested that China and the Soviet Union might clash one day because of conflicting interests. When the Soviets and China collaborated in sponsoring the invasion of South Korea, however, that line of reasoning was abandoned. The idea of a monolithic Communist bloc remained a basic assumption of American foreign policy even after the Soviets and Chinese quietly split and pursued their own foreign policies.

Another result of the Korean conflict was an extension of the containment doctrine to Asia. This influenced subsequent decisions to intervene in the Indochina War and eventually to support South Vietnam against a guerrilla war sponsored by the Communist regime of North Vietnam. In this way, the Korean and Vietnam wars were linked. For all practical purposes, NSC-68 eliminated the idea of peripheral areas that were of little importance. If a Communist victory in one area could lead to a Communist victory elsewhere, it would not make much sense to discriminate between vital and peripheral interests. If, as explained in NSC-68, American policy was to contain Communism and not just the Soviet Union, then helping the French war effort in Indochina had a certain logic. When the French were defeated in 1954, the United States organized the SEATO treaty designed to protect the Indochina states from the Communist threat. In the 1960s, the United States began to play a more active role in Indochina, and this eventually led to a massive American military effort to defeat North Vietnam.

The Korean War also had an impact on relations between China and the United States. Although the Soviet Union and the United States suffered casualties during the Cold War, they were not involved in a "hot" war with each other. American casualties in the Korean War numbered approximately 150,000, and this left a bitter heritage. The Communists returned less than 13,000 prisoners of war, including about 3,000 Americans. U.S. officials estimated that about 11,000 Americans were missing in action in Korea and that many of them had been taken prisoner. Many of these prisoners died in captivity because of maltreatment, and some were subjected to brainwashing.

When China entered the Korean conflict, America's relations with Taiwan also underwent a fundamental change. The Nationalist regime there became a major player in America's efforts to contain the Communist regime on the mainland. The United States provided Taiwan with substantial amounts of military aid, and in 1954, they signed a mutual defense treaty. The leaders in Beijing accused the United States of interfering in China's internal affairs by supporting the Nationalists, much as Western colonial nations had supported compliant regimes in the past.

American officials used support of the Nationalists as a pretext to refuse to extend diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic of China. Relations between the two countries did not begin to thaw until the early 1970s, and full diplomatic relations were not established until 1979, thirty years after the Communists won control of the mainland. The United States also took the lead in keeping the Beijing regime out of the United Nations from 1949 until 1971. During that time, China continued to be represented by the Nationalist government in Taiwan even though its claim to legitimacy has steeply declined over the years. The American goal was to isolate and contain China, and this was in part accomplished by keeping the Beijing regime out of the United Nations.

When NSC-68 was being studied, President Truman had to decide whether the United States should increase its conventional and nuclear military capabilities, including the building of the hydrogen bomb. The outbreak of hostilities in Korea helped convince him that America's military capabilities, both conventional and nuclear, needed strengthening.

Finally, the Korean War seemed to confirm that part of NSC-68 that cast doubt about the utility of negotiating with the Communists. The results of the Yalta and Potsdam conferences were controversial, and negotiating with the Soviet Union after World War II often proved frustrating. When the Korean truce negotiations began in July 1951, the UNC assumed an agreement would be reached in no more than a few months. The negotiations dragged on for two years. This experience, combined with the negotiations with the Soviet Union after 1945 to establish a provisional government in Korea, seemed to confirm
the futility of using diplomacy as a means of resolving outstanding issues.

Korea remained divided long after the conflict between the North and South ended in 1953. Austria was united in 1955, Vietnam in 1975, Germany in 1990. More than half a century after the Korean conflict ended, Korea was still divided, and the relationship between North and South remained unstable and difficult.

Kenneth L. Hill

See also: Cold War Confrontations; Invasions and Border Disputes; China: Chinese Civil War, 1927-1949.

Bibliography


LEAD: Today marks the 40th anniversary of Kim II Sung's attack on South Korea, after which the cold war turned hot for Americans.

Today marks the 40th anniversary of Kim II Sung's attack on South Korea, after which the cold war turned hot for Americans.

Within a week American air, sea and ground forces had been committed. Over the next three years, in a conflict that came to engage us with China too, almost six million Americans served and 54,000 died. Harry Truman's quick to fight against the North Koreans belongs in our national memory.

There were American mistakes before and after that fight, but I share the prevailing American judgment, both at the time and in later years, that the was right.

South Korea was kept out of the hands of a ferocious totalitarian. More important, there was a timely reinforcement of anti-Communist strength, especially in Europe. This would have been much less likely if North Korea had been allowed a quick and uncontested success. Truman's prompt response to the attack helped to make a reality of the American-led defense of the West that had been only a matter of political alliance and secret planning papers before June 25.

We often forget that without the Korean War, General Eisenhower might never have been called from the presidency of Columbia University to be NATO's first commander. And the cold war we now call won might well have been lost long since.

It is traditional and correct to salute Harry Truman for the courage and speed of this basic But it is well also to remember his Administration's mistakes. There was a failure to make plain ahead of time that such aggression would indeed be resisted. There was also a mistaken assumption, when the aggression came, that it must be the product of Stalin's own master plan for worldwide Communist conquest.

We later learned from Khrushchev's memoirs that, far from initiating the attack, Stalin only slowly consented to Kim II Sung's overconfident plan for a campaign that would be over before the Americans could react. Khrushchev's version has been reinforced by other Soviet witnesses in the years of glasnost.

Thus, along with the needed stimulus to allied defenses, there came a mistaken intensification of the belief that all Communist actions everywhere were part of a single, implacably aggressive, worldwide war against freedom itself.

The defense of the free world was indeed strengthened by Truman's basic choice to fight in Korea. But by misunderstanding the causes of that war, our Government also strengthened men like Joseph McCarthy. Even more important, this view of the Communist menace as monolithic played a major role in our progressive overcommitment in Vietnam. However, as one who had a part in much later and larger decisions about Vietnam, I have no intention of suggesting that it was all the fault of earlier Administrations.

I believe that there were other mistakes: that it was right to decide to fight, but wrong not to share with a ready and willing Congress; that it was right to fire Gen. Douglas MacArthur, but wrong not to control him or fire him sooner; that it was right to go somewhat beyond the 38th Parallel, but wrong to approach the Yalu River in the face of Chinese warnings; that it was right not to use the bomb, but wrong not to be steadily clear about that choice.
Many South Koreans blame Truman for more—allowing their country to be divided in the first place, or for failing to impose its unification later. Both criticisms neglect the realities of power on the spot, but they have a claim on our attention.

Yet on this anniversary, it is wrong to focus on particular criticisms. The Korean War, like all wars, remains a treasury of choices for historians to review, and we shall be debating its lessons for generations. What deserves our respectful attention is that Harry Truman’s basic decision with its human cost, especially to us and to the South Koreans, was right.

Despite all their differences, South Koreans and Americans have remained friends. As the waning of the cold war brings near the prospect of constructive change in North Korea, that friendship can have great impact on the prospect for peace and freedom in a newly united Korea.

By McGeorge Bundy; McGeorge Bundy was special assistant for national security to President John F. Kennedy.

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China marks anniversary of participation in Korean War

(Xinhua)
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BEIJING- Chinese President Hu Jintao and Vice President Xi Jinping on Monday met with veterans and heroes of the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the volunteer army entering the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to help in the war to resist US aggression.

President Hu Jintao greets veterans of the Chinese People's Volunteers at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on Monday before a seminar to mark the 60th anniversary of the entry of the Chinese army into the Korean War (1950-1953). [Photo/Xinhua]

Hu is commander-in-chief of China's armed forces, while Xi has been newly appointed vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) of the Communist Party of China.

In his address on behalf of the CPC Central Committee and the CMC, Xi said that the Chinese movement 60 years ago was "a great and just war for safeguarding peace and resisting aggression."

"It was also a great victory gained by the united combat forces of China's and the DPRK's civilians and soldiers, and a great victory in the pursuit of world peace and human progress," Xi said.

Xi said the Chinese people would never forget the great contribution and sacrifice made by the nation's founders and, in particular, the people who made history during a war that saw the weak defeating the strong.

The Chinese people will never forget the friendship established in battle with the DPRK's people and army, he said. Xi also acknowledged the former Soviet Union's government and people who provided help to the volunteer army.

Chinese ground forces, under the CPV, entered the Korean Peninsula on Oct 19, 1950, to defend their own territory and to help the Korean People's Army (KPA) against Syngman Rhee's troops and multinational forces assembled in the name of the United Nations.

The CPV launched its first battle on Oct 25 against a battalion of Syngman Rhee's troops. In 1951, the CPC Central Committee decided to commemorate the war every year on that date.

Xi said being peace-loving is a tradition of the Chinese nation and its participation in the war 60 years ago was a historical decision made by the CPC Central Committee and the late Chairman Mao Zedong based on serious national security threats and a request from the DPRK's Korean Workers' Party and government.

He added that the heroism and international spirit demonstrated by them will always be treasured by the Chinese people. Xi said.

CMC vice chairman Xu Caihou and other CMC chairman Guo Boxiong, leading a senior military delegation, also attended the symposium. CMC vice chairman, who was visiting the DPRK on Monday for the...
The war that changed the world: 60th anniversary of Korean War
By Han Dongping (chinadaily.com.cn)
Updated: 2010-10-18 09:46

This year is the 60th anniversary of the Korean War. For most people today, that brutal contest of human wills, with millions of casualties on both sides, which brought humanity to the edge of a nuclear blast, is too distant to worth mentioning anymore. But for the Chinese who have enjoyed one of the longest spans of peace, the Korean War should always be remembered, and the sacrifices the Chinese people made to defend their motherland and the contribution they made to world peace in the harshest conditions should never be forgotten. For the American people, the war should be equally worth remembering, in the words of General Clark, who signed the first document of cease-fire without victory.

In 1972, President Nixon came to China and said to the then-Chinese leader Mao Zedong, "Mr. Chairman, you have changed the world." For the president of the most powerful nation in the world to acknowledge that a leader of a poor Third World country had changed the world, the world must have really changed.

The Americans realized the world had changed in 1950, when the Chinese leaders decided to enter the Korean War to resist the most powerful nation in the world in defense of their motherland and in support of a friendly neighbor. The Chinese had claimed that the world had changed the year before when the People's Republic was founded. But the Western powers, particularly the United States, refused to recognize that the world had changed for them and for the Chinese. When General MacArthur was asked what if the Chinese intervened in the war, his answer was quick and resolute, "It would be the biggest manslaughter in human history." General MacArthur was not wrong. Before the founding of the People's Republic, the Chinese military almost every encounter it had with foreign powers for a little over one hundred years. With the stigma of the sick man of the East, nobody was willing to take the Chinese seriously. General MacArthur and other world leaders were not willing to accept the fact that the world had changed until they were shown what their opponents could do to them.

Before the founding of the People's Republic of China, the rule of the game in the world was that the powerful would do whatever they pleased, and the weak had to put up with whatever they had to put up with to survive. In the words of former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, they will deal with Western countries according to international law, but they will deal with Third World countries with preemptive strikes. They would bomb a Third World country first before they argue why they bombed it. If it turned out that the reason for bombing was unfounded, they would tell you that it was collateral damage. One cannot blame the Western world for what they did to the Third World country. They have been able to get away with that for so long that it has become an intrinsic part of the powerful nations. In order to change that existing culture of the world, the Third World countries have to be willing to fight to defend what is theirs. If you are not willing to fight to defend what is yours, the powerful will take it as consent for them to take it from you. If one desires peace, the best guarantee is one's willingness and readiness to fight against the aggressors.

Some Chinese, in an effort to improve relations with the United States, want to forget the Korean War altogether. They do not recognize the significance of the Korean War for China, the United State and for the whole world. The significance of the Korean War is that it laid the foundation for the Sino-US relations. Without that contest in the Korean War, the US would have continued to refuse to take China seriously, and would not have given the People's Republic of China the respect it deserved. Without due respect, there would be no solid foundation for China and the US to build a mutually beneficial relationship.

Some people in China today argue that China's entry into the Korean War was unwarranted because the US goal at the time was not to invade China. These people are both ignorant and native. Yes, Truman's initial order to MacArthur and the United Nations force was to repel the North Koreans back to the 38th parallel. But with his initial success, General MacArthur readjusted his goal to wiping out North Korea completely. By the time Chinese volunteers entered the war in October 1950, General MacArthur had ignored several Chinese warnings, and the American and South Korean forces had advanced to the Chinese borders. General MacArthur began to talk about his goal of reversing the results of the Chinese Civil War and of introducing Chiang Kai-shek's forces into the Korean conflicts. The old Chinese saying, Delong wangshu, (after getting the Long territory, Shu became the next target) accurately describes human behavior. Many people read too much into the fact that General MacArthur was dismissed by Truman in the end. He was dismissed because the Chinese volunteers had inflicted huge casualties on the United Nations forces. If the Chinese did not enter the war at that time, the world we live in today would have been very different indeed.
When China entered the Korean War, General MacArthur demanded authorization to use 30 nuclear bombs on the Chinese Northeast to create a radioactive wall so that Chinese would no longer be able to continue the war. Many people would like to label MacArthur as crazy. The truth of the matter is that he was not crazy at all. He was very normal, just as Truman was normal. Truman did not hesitate to use nuclear bombs against Japan. The Truman administration designed 10 plans to use nuclear weapons to attack the Soviet Union before the Soviet Union developed its nuclear bombs in 1949. China was saved from a nuclear disaster not because of American good sense. It was saved because of its fear of the Soviet retaliation on China's behalf. Later, the US offered the French the use of nuclear bombs in Dien Bien Phu, which was rejected by the French.

During my mother's childhood, her family suffered from air raids twice and was robbed three times. As I grew up, listening to my mother's childhood stories of these bombings and robberies, in my childish mind these kinds of things would not happen again. Today, as I study world history and politics, I feel almost certain that these kinds of things can happen again to China if the Chinese people get complacent, and forget the hard-won lessons of the Korean War. China is a peace-loving nation. But it does not matter how much you desire peace, you can never relax your willingness to defend yourself. Without the willingness and readiness to defend yourself, you do not deserve peace.
Chinese intervention in Korean War

By Kim Yun-sik

The People's Republic of China was only a year old when Mao Zedong made the decision to enter the Korean War. Mao was the only person with the power to choose every aspect of China's involvement and overcome any obstacle falling in his way. Policy decisions and their implementation were strictly controlled and supervised by Mao himself.

Politicians in Beijing felt that deploying Chinese troops to Korea may have serious consequences, including provoking the United States into an open conflict with China. Mao would not entertain objections to his plan and used his wisdom, leadership skills and authority to overcome objections. He emphasized the impact that the decision to enter the Korean War would have on maintaining and even enhancing the momentum of the Chinese communist revolution.

The Sino-Soviet Alliance Treaty was signed in February of 1950 during Mao's visit to the Soviet Union. The signing symbolized a significant level of cooperation and a major commitment on the part of the Soviet Union to supply military equipment to China. It was agreed that in return for Chinese intervention in the Korean War, Stalin would provide both air support and ground equipment. The Kremlin then gave Mao the green light to go through North Korea and invade South Korea.

Korean communists entered the Chinese Civil War in 1946 and exited in 1949. The Koreans gave Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) in Manchuria substantial support which allowed them to maintain a favorable position during a confrontation with the Chinese Nationalist forces in the summer of 1949. Because of this historical solidarity, the Chinese Communist Party agreed to send between 50,000 and 70,000 Korean CCF soldiers and their weapons to Korea to fight for communism.

Chinese hostility toward the United States was amplified when the U.S. 7th Fleet was deployed to the Taiwan Strait immediately after the Korean War broke out. Mao was aware of the possibility of U.S.-China confrontations on three fronts. The first was Vietnam, the second Taiwan and the third Korea. Korea was a candidate because of its geographic proximity to Russia where China and the Soviets could fight side by side.

There were people who opposed this idea because they were concerned that the U.S. would be able to enter the mouth of the Yalu River. A second concern was that the U.S. might bomb Manchuria or Shanghai. In early July 1950, Chinese leaders decided to protect the northeast region of the Sino-Korea boundary and 10 divisions were ordered to assemble on the border.

At the same time, Mao issued an order to mobilize the Chinese People's Volunteer Army and the 3rd and 4th Field Armies to enter Korea. Gen. Peng Dehuai was appointed commander of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army. Peng opted to dispatch 600,000 troops to Korea.
The 3rd Field Army was commanded by Gen. Chen Yi who oversaw the move into Korea with small battles in October with a major offensive occurring in November. The 4th Field Army was commanded by Gen. Lim Piao. The 4th Field Army had crossed the Yalu in Oct. 19, 1950, and went into hiding in the mountains.

The First Phase Chinese Offensive was launched on Oct. 25, 1950. The 1st ROK Division at Unsan encountered the CCF 39th Field Army, and on Oct. 27, the Sixth ROK Division had been badly beaten by the CCF near the Yalu. A week later, the CCF attacked the 8th U.S. Army at Unsan and forced it to withdraw across the Chongchon River.

The Second Phase Offensive began on the evening of Nov. 25 on the 8th Army front. Gen. Lim Piao’s CCF 13th Army Group consisting of 18 divisions first struck at the weakest elements of the ROK II Corps, breaking up the division within hours.

On Dec. 11, the 1st Marine and 7th Divisions withdrew to the perimeters of the Hungnam bridgehead. On Dec. 15, the 8th Army and ROK Army withdrew to below the 38th Parallel and on Christmas Eve the X Corps evacuated from the Hungnam beachhead entirely.


In late January, an instruction was sent to Peng in which Mao bore all military burden on the Korean crisis and he argued that Chinese forces should hold their present position to deal with U.S. forces. Mao even argued that Chinese troops should push the combat line even further south, advancing to the 37th or 36th parallel. This was completely wrong and misjudged.

From Feb. 11 to 17, CCF’s fourth offensive was launched into the U.S. 2nd Division sector and the 23rd Regiment heavily engaged and fought off attacks from five CCF divisions at Chipyongni. On Feb. 21, Gen. Matthew Ridgway ordered the IX and X Corps to begin Operation Killer, a general advance north across the east Han to trap and kill all enemy units. On Feb. 28, enemy resistance south of the Han collapsed. On March 7, Operation Ripper began advancing and crossing the Han with two full strength U.S. corps in the central and eastern zones against the enemy occupying Seoul. On March 14, Seoul was retaken by the 8th Army, which again reached the 38th parallel on April 6.

In the Korean War, the People’s Republic of China paid a high price for today’s China and its communist revolution. It lost 183,000 soldiers, including Mao’s son, Mao Anying who was a lieutenant in the Soviet Army and was very much admired by Stalin, killed on a battlefield in Korea on Nov. 25, 1950. Peng did not tell Mao of his son’s death for weeks for fear of Mao’s reaction. After the war Peng became defense minister but he was purged for standing up to Mao. He died a gruesome death in 1974.

Let’s review the Cold War phenomena in East Asia. China had a great impact on the Cold War. Why did the Cold War end? Did it end with President Nixon’s visit to China in 1972 or with the U.S. defeat in Vietnam in 1975? Did the Cold War end with the death of Mao and the downfall of the Gang of Four in 1976? Did it end with the rise of Deng Xiaoping in 1978 and the promulgation of his new economic policies? Suffice it to say that Deng’s economic reform, reversing Mao’s policies which began the transition from a planned economy to a mixed economy, adopted elements of capitalism after Mao’s death.

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PRIMARY SOURCES
NEW KOREAN PLAN IS DRAFTED BY U.S.

By W. J. LAWRENCE

WASHINGTON, Jan. 11-11: A new economic and political policies, to reorient and re-establish the Korean economy, now divided artificially into two parts by the 38th parallel, will be proposed by American Military Government representatives at conferences next week with Soviet occupation authorities, it was learned today.

American representatives of Lieut. Gen. John R. Hodge will present two types of proposals, one group designed to meet emergency needs and the other group constituting a long-range program looking toward rehabilitation of the country and its return to a status where it is not only self-supporting but has surpluses available for export.

High on the list of American emergency needs are requests for a minimum of 240,000 tons of coal and 1,050 tons of steel to be shipped to the American-occupied southern zone from the Russian-occupied zone north of Latitude 38 degrees. The American zone on its part is prepared to ship to the Russian-occupied zone a considerable quantity of surplus rice.

The amount of rice to be available in the first quarter of 1950 was estimated at 4,000,000 to 5,000,000 bushels last November but experts are inclined to reduce this estimate radically on the basis of current indicated conditions.

Transit Resumption Sought

The Americans also are anxious for full resumption of railroad traffic between the two occupied zones and for renewal of coastwise shipping as soon as the traffic lanes are cleared of mines that were sown by B-29s in their campaign to choke off Japanese shipping. Both steps contemplate free movement of Korean citizens and goods between the two zones.

It is proposed also that telephone, telegraphic and postal service, now sporadic and undependable because of the artificial division of the country, should be integrated and started anew.

Korea is faced with a serious inflation problem, which is mounting steadily because of differences between the American and Russian policies. In the United States zone, the Japanese-printed Bank of Chosen notes still are legal tender, while the Russians are using occupation roubles. A unified finance policy and standard currency is required if the country is to be re-established as a single economic unit, but it is not believed here that much progress can be made in this direction until settlements are reached on the more basic political question of how the country is to be administered. As a stop-gap measure, pending the formation of the Korean provisional government contemplated in the Moscow communique of the Big Three Foreign Ministers, it is believed that General Hodges will propose retention of the Japanese-created bureaucratic machinery that administered Korea efficiently, if not profitably for the Koreans, for thirty-five years.
Korea War Shakes Critical World
Consensus Fears Outbreak May Become Spark for New Conflict

A shudder of apprehension ran through the western world yesterday that the conflict which erupted in Korea Sunday between Communist and anti-Communist forces might be the spark that would set off a new world war.

(Wll!) heads of states conferred anxiously with their staffs on the invasion of American supported South Korea by the Communist forces of the Russian-backed North, the press of the \(\text{U}5\text{S.}\) democratic nations reflected a fear that something far more grave is in the offing.

The Independent Conservative London Evening Star's dard summed up this anxiety by saying editorially: "This is not just a war between two rival governments of the Far East. It is a struggle between a Russia and an American satellite Korea must not become a fifth point in the expanding conflict."

London's Conservative Daily Mail saw the new conflict as "the latest move in Moscow's plan to dominate Asia."

Not Just Cyl'II War

The Times of London, noting that both American and Russian technicians remained in Korea after occupation troops were withdrawn, said this "invites the fighting with a meaningly wider threat that of civil war..."

The Manchester Guardian said the invasion "is a classic example of the type of incident which endangers world peace."

When the U.S. is 010\text{-}certainly the two cump's."

Both in France and Germany the view was expressed that the Korea war is a warning of what could happen in Europe if western occupation troops were withdrawn. In Italy the conservative newspaper Il Tempo pinned the blame for the war on Russia, saying, "The Slavic giant continues its dangerous tactics of striking against one point and then another in its immense belt whenever it encounters a point of minor resistance."

Reds See PI evasion

The Communist press in Western countries followed the party line rigidly, saying the attack was provoked by the United States. Across the Iron Curtain the Communist press hailed in the line that the war was begun by the American-backed South Korea government.

In Britain Prime Minister Attlee called in his top Foreign Office aides to consider reports from the war zone. Attlee and the Foreign Office aides hastened to the London clinic to confer with contrary Estevan Ernest Bevin, the Foreign Secretary, but with an admixture.

A well-informed Dutch 'buddy' summed up the general feeling after an emergency meeting of the key Cabinet member: "The eyes of the world at e on Washington r'at the r than on Seoul," IJ said. "It is up to the United States to take a hand in Korea or we will ever lose the world."

In Paris Foreign Minister

Robert Schuman-a caretaker in the Schuman cabinet lost in a vote of confidence Saturday, talked with his IIr. eastern advisers.

Jules Moch, leader of the Socialist Party which precipitated the Cabinet crisis, is in France, re-mailing the Spanish affair "is something more serious than our own crisis. Every effort should be made to localize the conflict."

Ra saa's reaction was to distribute belatedly a report by Tass, the official s.w. agency, that South Koreans invaded Communist North Korea-not the nth y around. The Tass report, based on two communiques of the North Korean Communists, is at variance with every other report.

The Communist communiques said the South Korean force now is at least three points, advancing from a half mile to six kilometers. But there were thrown back by "guard detachments"-police-across the 38th parallel which is a border for the two u's."

Yass Account Hints

The Communist press of Eastern Europe immediately distributed the Tass accounts.

Moscow's Pravda handled the story in routine fashion, publishing the North Korean communiqué on page three along with three telegrams from Western press agencies with New York, London and Paris date lines.

In Tokyo a spokesman for Foreign Minister MacArthur said munitions and materiel including 10 fighter planes were being readied for shipment, with naval and air escort to South Korea.

In an area close to the troubled zone there was some alarm: P. C. Spender, Australian \text{U}inister of External Affairs, said the attack may be a prelude to invasion of Formosa, last strong hold of Nationalist China.

Chiang Message Sent

But from Taipei Nationalist China's Chiang Kai-shek sent a message to President Syngman Rhee expressing confidence that South Korea would win its battle and saying that his government is discussing with other governments "appropriate measures to cope with the situation."

India's Prime Minisur Jawaharlal Nehru was hurling back to New Delhi from a tour of Southeast Asia and his Foreign Affairs Ministry declined to comment until it heard from Its foreign minister on the U.N. commission in Korea.

A spokesman for the Indonesia government said it would be useless for that young republic to take sides in a conflict "that primarily concerns two big powers in the cold war."

Commanders at U.S. naval air base in the Philippines declined comment on whether it would take extra precautions.