September 2016

US-Korea Relations: Tests, Distress, Defection, Election
Stephen E. Noerper

The United States and South Korea entered the summer months with growing concern over North Korean missile capabilities. North Korea conducted a hobbled submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) test in May, yet closed out August with a more successful launch reaching some 300nm, raising alarm for US and ROK strategists. May’s rare DPRK Workers’ Party Congress – North Korea’s first since 1980 – signaled solididarity in Kim Jong Un’s reign, replacing the National Defense Commission with a new State Affairs Commission, and appointing Ri Yong Ho as foreign minister – both developments worth watching. Mid-summer, the US sanctioned Kim Jong Un and 10 other individuals and entities for human rights violations, and the US and ROK agreed to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system against North Korea. Angered, the DPRK severed the New York channel, its only official line of communication with Washington. Closure of the channel, coupled with the earlier severing of inter-Korean links, raises concerns about communication in the event of further provocations or crisis. The US and South Korea joined together in military exercise Ulchi Freedom Guardian, involving more than 25,000 US and 50,000 ROK troops. In response, Pyongyang threatened to turn Seoul and Washington into a “heap of ashes through a Koreanstyle preemptive nuclear strike.” Finally, South Korean officials and analysts privately expressed growing concern over the course of the US presidential campaign and suggestions by Republican candidate Donald Trump that allies should bear a greater cost or see US troop withdrawal, and that South Korea and Japan consider nuclear weapons development as a counter to North Korea.

DPRK Workers’ Party Congress

May saw the convening of the DPRK’s Seventh Workers’ Party Congress, signaling Kim Jong Un’s firm grip on power. In addressing the assembly, he characterized the DPRK as a responsible nuclear weapons state, a classification rejected by Washington and Seoul. In what some analysts considered a mark of potential restraint, Kim Jong Un vowed that the DPRK would opt for using nuclear weapons only when its sovereignty is violated. The North Korea leader announced a new five-year economic program, but refrained from suggesting real reforms. Foreign media covering the congress met heavy controls, and only a select few witnessed a small portion of the final proceedings. There were no meetings with the senior-most leadership, one journalist was expelled, and most of the press corps saw only local sites and projects.

A new State Affairs Commission (SAC) was named the “highest guiding organ” of the state (with Kim Jong Un as chair), replacing the National Defense Commission favored by Kim’s father. In foreign affairs, Foreign Minister Ri Su Yong was named Workers’ Party of Korea vice chairman for international relations, and Ri Yong Ho, a sophisticate and skilled negotiator on nuclear issues, was named foreign minister. Both Ri Su Yong and Ri Yong Ho serve on the new State Affairs Commission. A participant in a Washington DC review of the party congress suggested that the ties of both to the senior-most leadership could imply that DPRK agreements going forward might bear new weight. Ri Yong Ho emerged at the ASEAN Regional Forum Foreign Ministers Meeting in Laos to intense media attention and received a boost from Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, signaling a possible warming of Sino-DPRK ties (Ri Su Yong also visited Beijing).

DPRK missile tests and THAAD

However, internal DPRK recalibrations failed to signal positive developments for South Korea or the United States. North Korea spent the summer months testing its missile technology, both short- and intermediate-range, and stoking concerns over enhancement of its submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) capabilities. Earlier tests had seen mishap and spin, but the DPRK marked real improvement over the short period reviewed. Whereas an early May SLBM traveled less than a couple hundred meters, on Aug. 24, a KN-11 missile traveled a remarkable 500km into Japan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) waters. That followed an Aug. 3 Rodong test, with a missile landing only 155nm off Japan’s coast in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) – the closest a missile has come to Japan since 1998, raising alarm and strong condemnation from Prime Minister Abe Shinzo.

In sum, the DPRK has launched more than 20 missiles to date in 2016, a serious acceleration that raises tensions in the region. The provocations have led to greater US-ROK cooperation, especially through an agreement to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system to South Korea and closer trilateral consultation with Japan. After earlier to and fro, the ROK moved with newfound determination to work with the US on the THAAD deployment, announcing on July 8 its intention to deploy the system. Seoul followed the general announcement by naming Seoungju on July 13 as the site for deployment, which met condemnation and protest by some local residents concerned about rumored health threats posed by the THAAD radar system and the environmental impact. In ensuing weeks, opposition lawmakers also raised concerns about the decision to deploy the system.

China, Russia, and North Korea voiced opposition to the THAAD deployment as well. The US sought to offer assurances to China, with the head of the US Army determined to convey to his PLA counterpart in Beijing the defensive aspects of the new system. China rebutted assurances from Washington and Seoul and warned that the perceived imbalance caused by THAAD would raise regional tensions. In early August, President Park Geun-hye rebuked critics at home and abroad and underscored South Korean determination to see through the THAAD deployment. In early September, she offered assurances in an interview with Russian news service Sputnik News that THAAD was not aimed at Russia, or any other third party

Despite firm commitment on the part of ROK and US defense authorities, opposition to THAAD remains a political reality. The controversy will spill into the 2017 ROK presidential elections and poses immediate challenges for ROK diplomacy, particularly with China. For the United States, installation of the system in Korea is a stated strategic priority, but brings other challenges. Chinese consternation has increased, especially when coupled with tensions over the South and East China Seas.

Naming Kim Jong Un

In early July, the US State and Treasury Departments made an unprecedented announcement in naming North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and 10 other DPRK State Security Department individuals and affiliates “ultimately responsible” for the DPRK’s “notorious” human rights abuses. The immediate impact was to freeze assets and deny business with the named designees, consistent with steps taken earlier this year by Congress and the president to tighten sanctions on North Korea. The announcement met stark pushback from Pyongyang; it condemned the move as an act of war, launched a missile (which exploded on firing), and closed its only official means of communicating with Washington, DC – the New York channel, which involves personnel at the DPRK Mission to the United Nations. In its July 11 response, North Korea cautioned that relations with the US will be under the “wartime law” of the DPRK, noting its applicability to detained US citizens, two of whom remain imprisoned in North Korea.

The DPRK reaction to the naming of its leader was similar to that exhibited following the 2014 release of the United Nations Commission of Inquiry (COI) Report, which urged referral of DPRK senior leaders to the International Criminal Court (ICC), and before that the 2005 cut-off of North Korean funds through Banco Delta Asia (BDA). US and South Korean officials and human rights organizations hailed the US move, which stemmed from the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016.

The DPRK now engages with the US only at the unofficial level. However, the communications cutoff comes at a time when North Korea is advancing its nuclear and missile technology. In mid-August, the DPRK informed Kyodo News that it is harvesting plutonium from spent fuel rods, while continuing production of highly enriched uranium “on schedule.”

Ulchi Freedom Guardian

The second scheduled major exercise of the year between ROK and US forces, Ulchi Freedom Guardian, began the third week of August. Primarily a computer simulation aimed at the defense of the South in the event of an invasion from the North, the exercise engaged more than 75,000 troops, two-thirds from the ROK and one-third from the US. The US advised the DPRK through Panmunjom of the defensive nature of the exercises, but the DPRK condemned the exercises as offensive and threatened to reduce Seoul and Washington to ash heaps.

More seriously, the DPRK fired its latest SLBM on Aug. 24, a successful launch it hailed as its “greatest success and victory.” Some US and ROK strategists were quick to caution against the significance without a greater DPRK submarine capability, but at least one group in Seoul suggested in late August that the North Koreans are intent and fast-tracking development of a US-Korea Relations 42 September 2016 larger class of submarines. Ju-min Park and James Pearson of Reuters acknowledge the consensus that the DPRK “remains years away from developing a missile system or submarine which could threaten its sworn enemy, the United States,” but that does not account for security assurances afforded South Korea and Japan that could draw in the US to regional conflict. Jeffrey Lewis of the Middlebury Institute notes the tremendous challenge of finding even a small number of subs armed with missiles and the “enormous investment in North Korea’s missile production infrastructure consistent with the propaganda offensive and spike in missile testing.”

Defection

Seoul announced in mid-August the high-profile defection of Thae Yong Ho, the second-highest diplomat at the DPRK Mission to the UK. The defection followed that of 13 North Korean restaurant workers to South Korea in early April. Less reported though have been the recent defection of other officials, including at least one senior military and one DPRK fund manager, as well as a number of diplomats, including the number three in Moscow and a diplomat posted in Bulgaria. Thae’s defection is notable, as he could provide useful information about the DPRK Mission to the UK, which handles it European affairs, as well as his primary tasks of (ironically) tracking defectors from North Korea and responding to human rights criticisms. There were reports that he had been called home after significant time in European assignments. Pyongyang quickly condemned Thae as a traitor and in typical fashion accused him of embezzlement and other improprieties.

In the aftermath, President Park Geun-hye suggested rifts among senior elites are a sign of fragmentation in Pyongyang. US and ROK analysts are divided in seeing the defection along these lines or as a more isolated incident facilitated by Thae’s having his immediate family with him. South Korean media reported on fears that the DPRK could attempt to assassinate defectors, as well as a possible acceleration of a “reign of terror” on the part of Pyongyang in response.

Election

One certainty in US-Korea relations was the growing concern expressed by observers in Seoul over the US presidential campaign and the candidates’ positions toward Korea and Asia. Officials privately sought advice from colleagues, scholars, and analysts as to the seriousness of Republican candidate Donald Trump’s calls for allies to pay more for US security guarantees or face the US going home. Trump’s statements have created a degree of consternation among South Korean officials and policy observers not seen since Jimmy Carter’s call for a US troop withdrawal from the Korean Peninsula in the late 1970s. Trump also had suggested South Korea and Japan develop nuclear weapons to counter those of North Korea, raising concerns in the nonproliferation community and leading to repeated private assurances to Americans that those were options that neither the Korean nor Japanese polities would accept.

South Koreans see more dependability in Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton’s stands on Korea and Asia as she is generally viewed as one of the architects of the Obama rebalance toward Asia. Clinton advisor Wendy Sherman’s May 3 address to CSIS was seen though by many Koreans as a harder line by stepping up sanctions on the DPRK until it accepts an Iranstyle negotiation. US-Korea Relations 43 September 2016 In sum, Koreans were as confused as their US counterparts over the 2016 US presidential campaigns and the implications of a Trump victory. All ears will be on discussions of foreign policy in the three US presidential candidate debates. The 2017 South Korean presidential campaign will see a step up in its foreign policy and security focus, depending on the result of the US elections, as well as North Korean provocations. A possible DPRK fifth or sixth nuclear test or further missile tests – as well as potential mishap or political intrigue – could present the outgoing or incoming United States and South Korean administrations with serious challenges.

 Pacific Forum CSIS Comparative Connections
(Link to Full Report)

May 2016

US-Korea Relations: Fire, Ire, and Exercises
Stephen E. Noerper

US and South Korean concerns spiked in early 2016 as North Korea demonstrated worrying advances in nuclear weapon and missile technology. Despite a rather placid New Year address, Kim Jong Un raised international alarm with the DPRK’s fourth nuclear test on Jan. 6. A month and a day later, North Korea launched a three-stage rocket, a direct violation of a UN missile ban. In the US, Congress passed more rigorous sanctions legislation, seeking to stem financial flows and punish second-party facilitators. On March 3, UN Security Council Resolution 2270 calling for tougher sanctions passed unanimously. Seoul added its own unilateral sanctions on March 8. Meanwhile, Kim Jong Un’s display of a nuclear device and reentry technology, failed intermediate-range missile tests, and a successful submarine-launched ballistic missile test added to growing concerns. ROK President Park Geun-hye called for additional multilateral efforts, such as enhanced five-nation coordination. While North Korea is pushing back hard, some observers suggest its provocations and rhetoric may be as much for domestic as foreign consumption in the lead-up to the highly anticipated Party Congress in May, a first in 36 years.

Test, launches, and threats

Seismic activity signaled the DPRK’s fourth nuclear test early on Jan. 6, a test the North’s media deemed a “complete success” and labeled a “hydrogen bomb.” International experts downplayed the likelihood of a true thermonuclear device based on the relatively low yield of the explosion. However the likelihood of elements of such a device, the stream of invectives, and ensuing displays signaled improvements in, or at the very least aspirations toward, miniaturization and delivery of a thermonuclear device. Analysts in the US and South Korea remain divided on the extent of North Korea’s advances, with Monterey’s Jeffrey Lewis asserting that its technological advances have been consistently underestimated. Detractors doubt the efficacy of reentry technology without an actual long-range missile test.

Tensions heightened as North Korea railed against the upcoming US and ROK military exercises. Key Resolve and Foal Eagle engaged more than 300,000 ROK troops and 17,000 US forces, the largest exercise between the two allies to date. The allies tested Operations Concept 5015 (OPCON 5015), which was signed in June 2015 and included preemptive strikes on the DPRK. North Korea condemned the exercises as provocative and explicitly aimed at “decapitating” Pyongyang’s leadership. Some US observers applauded the increased intensity given the expanding DPRK threat, while others expressed concern that the advance signaling about the expansion inflamed DPRK concern. The DPRK responded with a barrage of shortrange missile tests alongside its heated rhetoric.

South Korea offered an assessment that North Korea had the ability to deliver up to a 1,000- pound nuclear warhead atop its Rodong missile, putting South Korea and most of Japan within range. Despite the public announcement, many US analysts felt that it signaled no real technological advance, although they expressed concern about the understandable fear registered among its allies. (At the Security Council and in private, Chinese and Russian analysts also expressed growing concerns about the DPRK Rodong delivery threat, as well as the proximity of the January nuclear test to the Chinese and Russian borders.)

On April 15, a road-mobile intermediate-range missile test dramatically failed – a setback for North Korea’s Kim Jong Un on the anniversary of his grandfather’s birth, the DPRK’s most important holiday. Seoul and Washington were quick to point out that the failed tests pose a threat by showing DPRK intentions and providing valuable lessons learned. They also warned that following this failure, Kim might be more determined to seek success by conducting a fifth nuclear test. A late April submarine-launched ballistic missile test by the DPRK was hailed as an “eye opening” success by Kim, raising international ire at the UN, despite the missile going a mere 30km. The display was reportedly one of “cold launch,” technology, signaling a vertical launch capability from a submarine. Amid the continued tests and launches, North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Su Yong, in New York for the Paris climate accords signing in late April, offered a halt to DPRK nuclear testing in exchange for cessation of US-ROK military exercises. Though dismissed by President Obama and most US and ROK analysts, some suggested it represented a potential opening that might be considered.

Park’s about face

South Korean President Park Geun-hye was quick to denounce the January test with several statements. On Jan. 13, she addressed the nation, noting the serious nature of the fourth nuclear test and calling for a strengthening of ROK-US combined defense capabilities to include enhanced missile deterrence against the DPRK. At a Jan. 19 Cabinet meeting and a meeting of her national security team on Jan. 22, Park demanded a tightening of sanctions and five-party talks. The ROK military resumed loudspeaker broadcasts (silent since the August 2015 flare-up at the DMZ) and leaflet drops across the zone. Deeply angered, President Park delivered a stern address on the floor of the ROK National Assembly on Feb. 16. She explained her break from the prior policy of engaging North Korea and the decision to shut-down the Kaesong Industrial Complex. By late spring, most US and South Korean analysts saw trustpolitik as dead, with little likelihood of a reboot without serious gestures by the North.

Another result of the February satellite launch, which saw first-stage debris fall off South Korea and second-stage debris off the Philippines, was a shift forward by Park on South Korea’s acceptance of the deployment of the US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system on the peninsula. With Park first broaching the subject in her national address, ROK Defense Minister Han Min-koo described THAAD as militarily necessary in late January. At the recommendation of UNC/CFC/USFK Commander Gen. Curtis Scaparrotti, the US and ROK issued an announcement calling for a joint evaluation of a THAAD deployment and stating that the focus would be the DPRK, not China.

Despite China’s ambassador to the ROK warning of dire consequences and a delay for UN sanctions negotiations, a senior military working group met in early March to outline system deployment considerations. In addition to Chinese opposition, US and ROK officials would face an array of challenges in deploying the system, including cost and domestic opposition. Defense News reports a single THAAD unit of six mobile launchers, 49 interceptors, fire control and communications, and the AN/TPY-2 radar runs $1.6 billion, making the division of costs between the allies a question. Yonhap notes that several Korean cities oppose being deployment sites.

Park’s move on THAAD is significant. She had courted Beijing, meeting frequently with Chinese President Xi Jinping, and attending the early September Beijing commemoration of the end of World War II. The South Korean establishment hedged accordingly on THAAD, claiming a squeeze between the US and China. Rising anxiety about the North changed that equation fundamentally, leading Park to disregard Xi’s concerns. Adding fuel to the fire, Xi reportedly waited a month after the DPRK nuclear test to take Park’s call, unusual given the perception of a warm relationship between the two, who had met numerous times since assuming their respective presidencies in 2012.

All options on the table

Washington also condemned the latest DPRK action. Congress underscored its displeasure with the Senate voting 96-0 in support of House Resolution 757 , the North Korea Sanctions Policy and Enhancement Act of 2016. The measures provided for a tightening of the financial noose and secondary sanctions, with an eye to nuclear, missile, human rights, and cyber security threats. President Obama signed the bill into law mid-February, and on March 18 issued Executive Order 13722 , Blocking Property of the Government of North Korea and the Workers Party of Korea, and Prohibiting Certain Transactions with Respect to North Korea.

US military leaders underscored their resolve. US Pacific Command’s Adm. Harry Harris, alongside UNC/CFC/USFK Commander Gen. Scaparrotti, testified in late February before the Senate and House Armed Services Committees that all options were on the table, including, in direct response to a Senate query, striking DPRK nuclear facilities. They noted support for THAAD deployment and other increases in capabilities. Their testimony, alongside US-ROK exercises, reflected an uptick in threat assessment, driven home in April by the Hill testimony of the incoming US commander in Korea, Gen. Vincent Brooks. He condemned the DPRK threat as real, immediate and advancing, with a focus on DPRK technological enhancements.

Electoral sway

Domestic politics in both South Korea and the US took their own turns, raising some questions about national security positions. In South Korea, President Park and the ruling Saenuri party were dealt a serious blow in the April National Assembly elections, which left the conservative party without a parliamentary majority for the first time since 2000. Saenuri secured only 122 seats in contrast to the opposition Minjoo Party’s 123 seats and the opposition breakaway People’s Party, led by tech titan Ahn Cheol-soo, a surprising 38 seats. Though voter concerns appeared to be primarily economic, focusing on jobs, household debt, and an economic morass associated with China’s slowdown, observers suggested that some voters were signaling concern that the shift away from engagement with the North, especially with the shuttering of Kaesong, was too much.

New York Times  Seoul bureau chief Choe Sang-hun suggested in the election aftermath that President Park might turn now toward primarily foreign and security policy areas, given likely gridlock on economic reform with a split Parliament. He pointed to her interest in President Obama’s legacy strides with Myanmar and Cuba. However, most US analysts feel the personal, degrading diatribe against Park by the DPRK during her tenure and the National Assembly floor speech effectively closes off any political space for a meeting with Kim Jong Un. Talk of an inter-Korean leaders meeting has been a flirtation popular with South Korea’s presidents concerned with a late-term legacy. Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken, in Seoul in April, invoked Iran, Myanmar, and Cuba when addressing the benefits of negotiation over conflict in dealing with North Korea. The battle over the 2017 ROK presidential elections meanwhile is accelerating. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and People’s Party head Ahn Cheol-soo appear to be possible candidates in the wake of the April National Assembly elections.

By way of US electoral politics and national security concerns, South Korean and US media reacted with puzzlement and alarm over leading Republican contender Donald Trump’s comments on April 2 that Seoul (alongside Tokyo and Berlin) would need to increase burdensharing for US forces. Implying a free ride for South Korea – quickly disputed publicly by US Ambassador to Korea Mark Lippert – Trump also suggested that South Korea and Japan should pursue their own nuclear weapons development as a counter to the threat from North Korea, raising the dangerous specter of an arms race in East Asia. The topsy-turvy nature of the US presidential primary campaign season is unsettling to many South Korean observers of the US political process, fueling quiet thoughts of developing more autonomous capabilities and questions about US long-term commitment.

December 29, 2015

The Honorable Ahn Ho-young
Ambassador to the United States
Embassy of the Republic of Korea in the United States of America
2450 Massachusetts Avenue N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20008

Dear Ambassador Ahn,

On behalf of The Korea Society, we would like to congratulate President Park Geun-hye and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe for reaching a landmark agreement resolving the comfort women issue in this 50th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic ties between the Republic of Korea and Japan.

We note that this powerful agreement achieved through the strong leadership of President Park Geun-hye and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, supported by their respective foreign ministers, will help remove one of the most difficult historical issues between Korea and Japan.

The Korea Society believes that the historic agreement holds many future benefits for the United States’ two most important allies in Asia. We note that Minister of Foreign Affairs Yun Byung-se has stated that the agreement will enable the Republic of Korea and Japan to open a new chapter in their bilateral relations. In doing so, we also see that greater cooperation between the two major democracies in Northeast Asia will help ensure stability and prosperity in the region.

Sincerely yours,

Ambassador Thomas Hubbard                                                   Thomas Byrne
Chairman of the Board of Directors                                            President

cc: Consul General Kim Gheewhan