Dr. Stephen Noerper, Korea Society senior director and Columbia University adjunct professor, opened by underscoring points made the day prior relative to the dangers of propaganda, trust deficit, and a lack of clear communication channels, which he felt appropriate in analyzing the growing threat posed by North Korea and problems confronting the United States, Russia, and Japan. Whereas the day prior's analysis by way of Ukraine had led to guideposts if not a roadmap, the security challenge in Northeast Asia was more complex and dangerous, without an obvious path to solutions ahead. Noerper described the current impasse as contributing to the highest level of tensions on the Korean Peninsula in over two decades, but more pronounced now given North Korea's rapid technological advances in missile and nuclear development. Professor Noerper reminded the group that despite other panelists suggestions of faults among regional players, at its core, the current crisis derives from North Korean intent to advance on the path of missile and nuclear development. This should be of paramount concern to Russia, Japan and the United States, a common threat implying common cause. In 2016, North Korea conducted fourth and fifth nuclear tests, a satellite test, engine tests, twenty-four missile tests, including SLBMs, a display of a miniaturized warhead, and in 2017, a Kim Jong Un's New Year proclamation of an impending ICBM test, a February 12 missile test with solid fuel and a mobile launcher capability, and the week prior's launch of four missiles, coupled with Kim Jang Nam's assassination and the specter of VX reminding the international community of North Korea's CBW threat. Noerper suggested that political flux in the region only added to uncertainty, hampering solutions. To that end, he cited political discord in South Korea, the oddities of transition in Washington,DC and President Trump's blaming China for not doing enough by way of reigning in North Korea, consolidation in Beijing ahead of the Party Congress and shifts in the standing committee and politburo and China's pushback of the American president's assertion.
Noerper explored the troubling juxtaposition of North Korea's claim for a strategic deterrent and Kim Jong Un's pursuit of nuclear development as an essential part of his byungjin doctrine promoting weapons and economic development, which North Korea sees in light of its quest for regime legitimacy and survivability. Meanwhile, China is seeking a mediation role, but has been rebuffed by the United States, which insists on denuclearization prior to negotiation and does not want to hear of a downgrade of military exercises with South Korea. China and Russia feel the US stridency is unwarranted, but have joined in UN sanctions, with China cosponsoring recent measures, and both joining unanimous condemnation of the most recent missile test round. Privately, Russian and Chinese analysts express concern about North Korean advances, safety, and potential outflows of refugees in the event of instability. The international community also has expressed concern about North Korean human rights violations given the UN Commission of Inquiry report.
The US, Japan and South Korea are enhancing trilateral cooperation and coordination, and there is an irony in North Korea's threat pushing them together. There is also a sad irony in North Korea missile development pulling the United States toward China by way of THAAD deployment. Noerper agreed with a recommendation the day prior at close that THAAD presents an opportunity for US-South Korea-China dialogue, but sees its underpinning as fundamental as a response to DPRK missile and nuclear advances. Second, he accepts the strategic concerns voiced the day prior in discussion by way of Russia and China, but sees the debate as as much political, with China fearing containment, given the South China Sea, Taiwan, Tibet and Northwest China. For Russia, he suggested echoes of the debate over NATO expansion and radar placement in Eastern Europe; for South Korea, THAAD is a sovereignty issue, all the more peaked by the political crisis. For Japan and the US, the North Korean challenge is all the greater given the North Korea tests into Japanese EEZ water. Propaganda, the trust deficit, and a lack of communication channels with the closure of the New York channels between the DPRK and US and hotlines between North and South Korea. Dr. Noerper also raised the specter of a Northeast Asia arms race if THAAD elicits Chinese enhancements followed in turn by Japanese or South Korean pushes for more autonomous capabilities--if they occur, unintended consequences of THAAD deployment.
Where does that leave us, Professor Noerper posited. He suggested 1) a need to move toward advance consultations prior to systems deployment. US explanations have fallen on deaf Chinese ears after-the-fact. Better coordination should be a goal in the first Trump-Xi meeting; 2) a need to understand better the foreign policies and domestic determinants in Northeast Asia at this time of political fragility and rising tensions; 3) that we must get North Korea to the negotiation table and open communications channels to avoid the dangers of mishap, accident or miscalculation; 4) in the spirit of the prior day's closing assertion, that Asia Pacific issues figure more prominently and regularly in discussions of Russia-US relations and that we draw in Russia on Northeast Asia issues; Russia can play a role in educating North Korea on doctrinal issues or on nonproliferation of fissile material, for example. Professor Noerper suggested that these are seminal issues not only for Northeast Asia, but in war and peace today. Arguing from hard core realism, he suggests that we must stem North Korean developments, enhancing both Northeast Asia stability and improving bilateral relations (eg US-Russia, Japan-Russia), and that in an era of transactional politics, these moves afford real takeaway, saving money and lives--a real bottom line.
Moscow RIAC Summary
with
Stephen Noerper
Korea Society Fellow, Patron, and Corporate members,
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Images
{gallery}How I Became a North Korean{/gallery}