THE KOREA SOCIETY

1. North Korea Is Shifting Toward Routinized Force Development with a Projected Arsenal Expansion by 2034

Laderman noted that by the end of 2034, North Korea could produce between 23–47 strategic warheads using plutonium and 173–228 tactical warheads using highly enriched uranium. North Korea's ambitious goals point to a posture that could exceed defensive needs. A number of factors, both technical and strategic, will affect the overall production. While uranium supplies remain plentiful for tactical weapons, plutonium remains highly prized for strategic miniaturization and sophisticated designs like multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs).

2. Remote Monitoring Has Advanced Through New Technology, but Weaponization Remains a Distinct "Black Box"

Advances in open-source intelligence (OSINT) have fundamentally transformed how we monitor North Korea's nuclear capabilities, yet a critical verification gap remains. While commercial satellite technologies can now easily bypass weather and camouflage—using advanced radar to pierce cloud cover, thermal imagery to detect active reactor operations, and AI to map vehicle traffic patterns—this transparency stops short of the final weaponization phase. The resulting intelligence picture is highly uneven: the international community can track large, fixed infrastructures, but the actual assembly of nuclear warheads remains entirely opaque. Because the regime effectively utilizes nondescript buildings and extensive underground mountain tunnels, advanced satellite sweeps have failed to locate a single definitive site for plutonium or uranium pit production. Despite better visibility through open source tools overall, Pyongyang's most valuable strategic assets remain successfully hidden from foreign observation.

3. To Take Advantage of Open Source Monitoring Tools, a Future Arms Control Policy Could Prioritize Plutonium Over Uranium

Laderman highlighted a core policy dilemma: some of the most strategically valuable assets to eliminate are the hardest to remotely verify. Because on-the-ground international inspections have not occurred in nearly two decades, any realistic opening salvo for an arms control agreement or selective freeze must rely on remote observation. According to Laderman, policymakers could therefore focus initial negotiation priorities on freezing plutonium production rather than highly enriched uranium (HEU). While HEU enrichment efficiency and locations are easily hidden, plutonium relies on distinct, fixed reactor profiles and reprocessing infrastructure, making it the most practical, monitorable, and strategically impactful target for containment.