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Category: Inter-Korean Relations

Rapid Reaction:
An Olive Branch for North Korea?

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Join The Korea Society for a rapid reaction discussion exploring recent shifts in Korean Peninsula security and diplomacy. Featuring Ambassador (ret.) Joseph Yun, this program will examine President Donald Trump’s decision to modify joint military exercises with South Korea and his revelation of ongoing communication with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. The program is moderated by policy director Jonathan Corrado.

The session will draw lessons from past negotiation cycles, assess how the geopolitical climate has evolved since Trump and Kim last met, dissect the implications of North Korea’s new “hostile states” policy, examine South Korea’s shifting role as a diplomatic pacemaker, and explore how the surrounding geopolitical situation—such as the expanding Russia-North Korea alliance and The Iran War—is reshaping dynamics in Northeast Asia. Ambassador Yun will also share insights from his multi-decade career managing Korean Peninsula relations.

This program is made possible by the generous support of our individual and corporate members and the Korea Foundation.

About the Speaker

Speaker

Joseph “Joe” Yun

Ambassador (ret.) Joseph “Joe” Yun most recently served as Chargé d’Affaires ad interim at the United States Mission in the Republic of Korea. His previous diplomatic assignments include serving as U.S. Special Presidential Envoy to negotiate amendments to the Compact of Free Association (COFA), which governs the relationship between the United States and the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Palau. The negotiations concluded in October 2023 and were approved by Congress and enacted in March 2024.

Amb. Yun’s other senior diplomatic assignments include serving as U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Policy (2016-18), U.S. Ambassador to Malaysia (2013-16), and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (2011-2013). His earlier Foreign Service overseas assignments were in Hong Kong, Medan, Paris, Bangkok, and Seoul.

Outside the U.S. government, Amb. Yun has been Senior Advisor with The Asia Group, a DC-based strategic consulting firm, and served at the U.S. Institute of Peace, an independent and non-partisan federal institute working on peace and reconciliation issues throughout the globe. He holds a M. Phil. degree from the London School of Economics and a B.S. from the University of Wales.



Assessing North Korea’s
Developing Nuclear Program

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Program Brief

Assessing North Korea’s Developing Nuclear Program

In our discussion assessing the latest developments of North Korea’s nuclear program, Open Nuclear Network (ONN) Senior Analyst Sarah Laderman challenged conventional wisdoms regarding the DPRK’s nuclear capabilities and described how the Kim Regime balances its fissile material supply against strategic weaponization demands.

This program was made possible by the generous support of the Korea Foundation and The Korea Society’s individual and corporate members.

Event Date: Thursday, May 7, 2026

Host Organizations: The Korea Society

Speakers:

• Sarah Laderman, Senior Analyst, Open Nuclear Network, a PAX sapiens programme

• In conversation with Jonathan Corrado, Policy Director, The Korea Society

Key Takeaways

1. North Korea Is Shifting Toward Routinized Force Development with a Projected Arsenal Expansion by 2034

Laderman noted that by the end of 2034, North Korea could produce between 23–47 strategic warheads using plutonium and 173–228 tactical warheads using highly enriched uranium. North Korea’s ambitious goals point to a posture that could exceed defensive needs. A number of factors, both technical and strategic, will affect the overall production. While uranium supplies remain plentiful for tactical weapons, plutonium remains highly prized for strategic miniaturization and sophisticated designs like multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs).

2. Remote Monitoring Has Advanced Through New Technology, but Weaponization Remains a Distinct “Black Box”

Advances in open-source intelligence (OSINT) have fundamentally transformed how we monitor North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, yet a critical verification gap remains. While commercial satellite technologies can now easily bypass weather and camouflage—using advanced radar to pierce cloud cover, thermal imagery to detect active reactor operations, and AI to map vehicle traffic patterns—this transparency stops short of the final weaponization phase. The resulting intelligence picture is highly uneven: the international community can track large, fixed infrastructures, but the actual assembly of nuclear warheads remains entirely opaque. Because the regime effectively utilizes nondescript buildings and extensive underground mountain tunnels, advanced satellite sweeps have failed to locate a single definitive site for plutonium or uranium pit production. Despite better visibility through open source tools overall, Pyongyang’s most valuable strategic assets remain successfully hidden from foreign observation.

3. To Take Advantage of Open Source Monitoring Tools, a Future Arms Control Policy Could Prioritize Plutonium Over Uranium

Laderman highlighted a core policy dilemma: some of the most strategically valuable assets to eliminate are the hardest to remotely verify. Because on-the-ground international inspections have not occurred in nearly two decades, any realistic opening salvo for an arms control agreement or selective freeze must rely on remote observation. According to Laderman, policymakers could therefore focus initial negotiation priorities on freezing plutonium production rather than highly enriched uranium (HEU). While HEU enrichment efficiency and locations are easily hidden, plutonium relies on distinct, fixed reactor profiles and reprocessing infrastructure, making it the most practical, monitorable, and strategically impactful target for containment.

About the Speaker:

Sarah Laderman is a Senior Analyst for Open Nuclear Network, a PAX sapiens programme, in Vienna, Austria, where she focuses on open-source and technical analyses of nuclear programmes. She is currently focused on the DPRK’s nuclear weaponisation capabilities. She has previously worked at the International Atomic Energy Agency, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and the US Department of Defense. Sarah received her MSc in Nuclear Engineering and Masters in Public Policy from the University of California, Berkeley, and her BSc in Nuclear Science and Engineering and Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. She is currently a doctoral candidate in Political Science at the University of Vienna.

Privileged but Powerless:

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Program Brief

Privileged but Powerless

Dr. Jieun Baek described the complex psychological drivers impacting North Korea’s 100,000 political elites in a discussion of her new book, Privileged but Powerless: How North Korean Elite Grievances Reveal the Regime’s Greatest Weakness. Mobilizing hundreds of hours of interviews with high-level escapees, Dr. Baek argued that the elites’ performative loyalty is born out of fear, obscuring a critical vulnerability within the regime’s core support base. Ultimately, the very officials who seem most invested in preserving North Korea’s status quo may become its most dangerous disruptors—driven not by ideology, but by simmering resentment and vanishing alternatives.

This program was hosted by the Korea Society as part of the Kim Koo Professional Series.

Event Date: Thursday, May 7, 2026

Host Organizations: The Korea Society

Speakers:

• Jieun Baek, adjunct faculty, Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford; nonresident senior fellow, Atlantic Council; author of Privileged but Powerless

• In conversation with Jonathan Corrado, Policy Director, The Korea Society

Key Takeaways

1. Performative Loyalty as a Mask for Survival

Dr. Baek explained that North Korea’s elite face severe cognitive dissonance, masking deep internal doubts with outward performative loyalty. This hyper-vigilant behavior represents an extreme case of preference falsification, where the most outwardly compliant individuals are actually masking a volatile vulnerability born of fear and self-preservation. To handle the immense mental burden of maintaining this cognitive dissonance, some embrace escapist vices. Additionally, because expressing anger toward Kim Jong-un is fatal, elites psychologically cope with systemic failures by shifting the blame downward, venting their frustrations onto mid-ranking managers instead.

2. The Continuum of Action

According to Dr. Baek, when confronted with their grievances, North Korean political elites operate along a strict behavioral continuum ranging from passive compliance to radical change. The most common and rational choice for individual self-preservation is to simply do nothing and maintain the status quo, which can be accompanied by small acts of adjustment that introduce micro-variations into their daily lives while they maintain their required performative loyalty. For those who decide the pressure is completely intolerable, exit via defection provides a definitive escape, a phenomenon that has increased under Kim Jong-un’s regime. The most distant and difficult choice on the spectrum is to push for reform by attempting to lobby for incremental policy or economic changes from within, though this option remains the furthest from practical reality.

3. Structural Barriers to Collective Action and Individual Survival Tactics

Dr. Baek addressed why covert coups or mass uprisings fail to materialize, pointing to the regime’s engineering of total social atomization, which creates a pervasive culture of mutual distrust where elites never know who is incentivized to report on them. Because collective action is functionally impossible, she noted that the most rational choice for an elite member is to maintain the status quo or intentionally aim for a middle-ground professional tier. This “sweet spot” position is successful enough to provide foreign currency and market luxuries for their families, but quiet enough to avoid shining too brightly and attracting unwanted attention from ambitious rivals.

The book is available for purchase here

About the Speaker:

Jieun Baek is an adjunct faculty member at the University of Oxford’s Blavatnik School of Government and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. She is the author of North Korea’s Hidden Revolution and Privileged but Powerless, and researches elite discontent and regime instability in authoritarian states, particularly North Korea and Burma.

Korean Messiah

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Program Brief

Korean Messiah

In the launch event for Korean Messiah, Wall Street Journal China Bureau Chief Jonathan Cheng challenged conventional thinking around North Korea and described the surprising, enduring influence of American Presbyterian Christianity on Kim Il Sung’s cult of personality.

This program was hosted in collaboration with The Center for Korean Research at the Weatherhead East Asian Institute at Columbia University.

Event Date: Monday, April 13, 2026

Host Organizations: The Korea Society; The Center for Korean Research at the Weatherhead East Asian Institute at Columbia University

Speakers:

• Jonathan Cheng, China Bureau Chief, The Wall Street Journal; author of Korean Messiah

• Barbara Demick, author of Nothing to Envy: Ordinary Lives in North Korea (discussant)

• Moderated by Jonathan Corrado, Policy Director, The Korea Society

Key Takeaways

1. Pyongyang’s Religious History as the “Jerusalem of the East”

Cheng revealed that before Pyongyang became the capital of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), it was the epicenter of Christian missionary activity in Asia. Kim Il Sung was born and raised in a deeply religious environment, even serving as a Sunday school teacher and an organist in the church.

2. Kim Il Sung Utilized Elements of His Religious Upbringing to Build His Personality Cult

Cheng argued that although Kim Il Sung eventually became hostile toward organized religion, he was fundamentally shaped by his childhood in the church. The regime effectively repurposed Christian mythology, supernatural narratives, and organizational structures—such as mass study halls—to establish a personality cult that portrays the Kim family as messianic, divine figures to whom the population must show absolute devotion.

3. Historical Insights into the North Korean Regime’s “Otherness”

Both Cheng and author Barbara Demick, who joined for the conversation, emphasized that North Korea is often viewed as a hermetically sealed, incomprehensible “other.” However, by examining the historical roots—including the influence of American missionaries and the movement of people in Manchuria—the book demonstrates that the North Korean state is not a vacuum. It is a product of its history and global influences, highlighting the importance of understanding these origins to grasp the reality of life for the 25 million people living there today.

This program is co-hosted by The Center for Korean Research at the Weatherhead East Asian Institute at Columbia University.

About the Speakers:

Photo credit: Gilles Sabrie
Jonathan Cheng is the China bureau chief for The Wall Street Journal, and was previously the Korea bureau chief, running coverage of the Korean peninsula, including politics and society in both North and South Korea. A native of Toronto, he lives in Beijing. He has traveled to North Korea twice.
Barbara Demick is author of Nothing to Envy: Ordinary Lives in North Korea and Logavina Street: Life and Death in a Sarajevo Neighborhood and the recently released Eat the Buddha: Life and Death in a Tibetan Town, published by Random House in July 2020. She was bureau chief for the Los Angeles Times in Beijing and Seoul, and previously reported from the Middle East and Balkans for the Philadelphia Inquirer.

America’s Taiwan Dilemma:

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Program Brief

America’s Taiwan Dilemma

During a discussion regarding his newest book, America’s Taiwan Dilemma: Allies’ Reactions and the Stakes for US Reputation, Mark Christopher argued that Washington policymakers often project their own assumptions onto allies. For instance, U.S. officials believe that allies demand a military defense of Taiwan to preserve America’s reputation. However, through interviews with over 100 regional experts, Christopher challenged this narrative by detailing how South Korea, Japan, and Australia actually perceive Taiwan conflict risks and the reliability of US security commitments.

This program was hosted by the Korea Society as part of the Kim Koo Professional Series.

Event Date: Thursday, April 23, 2026

Host Organizations: The Korea Society

Speakers:

• Mark Christopher, independent risk consultant; nonresident fellow, Taiwan Security Monitor; author of America’s Taiwan Dilemma

• Moderated by Jonathan Corrado, Policy Director, The Korea Society

Key Takeaways

1. Reliability Matters More Than Reputation

Christopher observed that while U.S. policymakers prioritize defending Taiwan to preserve a “reputation” for resolve, regional allies focus primarily on “reliability.” He defines reputation as a backward-looking assessment of past actions, whereas reliability is a forward-looking measure based on current military capability. Allies fear that if a U.S. intervention in Taiwan exhausts American military resources or political will, Washington may become unable to fulfill specific treaty obligations to Japan or South Korea. U.S. involvement in Taiwan may actually weaken alliance reliability if it leaves the U.S. military less capable of providing protection elsewhere.

2. Regional “Realpolitik” and the Lack of Alternatives

Christopher’s research suggests that if China initiates a conflict, America’s allies will likely be pushed closer to the United States regardless of the immediate outcome. Interviewees described a stark power reality: allied nations like Japan and Korea do not wish to acquiesce to Chinese regional hegemony, but lack the individual capability to hold off China. Without a viable alternative, allies are left with no realistic choice but to maintain and strengthen the U.S. alliance, even if a Taiwan contingency results in anger or mistrust toward Washington.

3. South Korea’s Unique “Shrimp among Whales” Dilemma

Unlike Japan or Australia, South Korea does not view Taiwan as a core national security imperative because it faces the existential threat of North Korea. Experts in Seoul expressed concern that a Taiwan conflict would invite North Korean aggression or trigger Chinese economic and military retaliation on the Peninsula. Consequently, Seoul will likely “thread the needle,” seeking to maintain its alliance with the U.S. while avoiding direct combat operations in Taiwan to ensure its long-term coexistence with its permanent neighbor in close geographical proximity, China.

The book is available for sale here

Use the coupon code SAVE20 for a 20% discount on print editions.

About the Speaker:

Mark A. Christopher is an independent risk consultant and a nonresident fellow at the Taiwan Security Monitor. He holds a bachelor’s degree from the Georgetown School of Foreign Service and an MPA from the Princeton School of Public and International Affairs. He previously studied at Peking University, Nanjing University, and Taiwan National Chengchi University. His writing has appeared in Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, the Jamestown Foundation’s China Brief, Defense One, and the Wall Street Journal.