North Korea

Northeast Asia Regional Review

Friday, June 14, 2013 | 10:00 AM
- About the Speaker Title: Northeast Asia Regional Review
- About the Speaker: 2013-06-14 10:00:00
- Event Name: NCAFP Members & The Korea Society FREE
- Event Time: https://docs.google.com/a/koreasociety.org/spreadsheet/viewform?formkey=dE1qUkFoT2daOHoxeHFrd3FCamgyc3c6MA#gid=0
- Event Content: itms://itunes.apple.com/us/podcast/challenges-to-building-stability/id210903888?i=161235062
- Event Link: Donald S. Zagoria is Senior Vice President at the National Committee on American Foreign Policy. The Forum runs four major track II dialogues on regional security issues in the Asia-Pacific. Prior to joining the NCAFP, Professor Zagoria was a consultant during the Carter Administration to both the National Security Council and the East Asian Bureau of the State Department. He has also worked for the RAND Corporation and taught courses on United States foreign policy and the international relations of East Asia at Hunter College for many years. Professor Zagoria is also actively associated with the East Asian Institute of Columbia University, has been a member of several Columbia University study groups and is actively involved with the Asia Society and the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. He has written or edited four books and more than 300 articles on relations among the great powers in the Asia-Pacific region. Professor Zagoria earned his BA at Rutgers University and his M.A. and Ph.D. at Columbia University.   Evans J.R. Revere is senior director with the Albright Stonebridge Group, providing strategic advice to clients with a specific focus on Korea, China, and Japan. From 2007-2010, Revere served as President and CEO of The Korea Society. Fluent in Chinese, Korean, and Japanese, Revere retired from the Foreign Service in 2007 after a distinguished career as one of the U.S. Department of State's top Asia experts. He won numerous awards during his career, which included service as the principal deputy assistant secretary and acting assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and deputy chief of mission and charge d'affaires of the U.S. Embassy in Seoul. Revere has extensive experience in negotiations with North Korea. Revere graduated with honors from Princeton University with a degree in East Asian Studies. He is a veteran of the U.S. Air Force and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.   The Honorable Winston Lord currently serves as Co-Chairman of the International Rescue Committee. For three decades, Ambassador Lord has been at the center of U.S.-China relations. As Special Assistant to the National Security Advisor, he accompanied Henry Kissinger on his secret visit to China and President Nixon on his historic opening in the early 1970’s, as well as subsequent trips by President Ford and Dr. Kissinger. From 1985-1989, he served as Ambassador to Beijing under President Reagan and Bush. From 1993-1997, he was Assistant Secretary of State in charge of all East Asian policy, including China, under President Clinton. Lord’s other key government assignments were as the State Department Director of Policy Planning 1973-1977, and in the Defense and State Departments in the 1960’s. In between governmental posts, Ambassador Lord has headed a variety of private organizations related to international affairs-as President of the Council on Foreign Relations 1977-85, as well as Chairman of the National Endowment for Democracy and Chairman of the Carnegie Endowment National Commission on America and the New World in the early 1990s. Ambassador Lord earned a B.A. from Yale (magna cum laude) and an M.A. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (first in the class). He has received several honorary degrees, the State Department’s Distinguished Honor Award and the Defense Department’s Outstanding Performance Award.  Of Interest:   <a href="http://csis.org/files/publication/Pac1338A.pdf">Sunnylands: The Obama-Xi Summit</a> by Stephen Noerper, Senior Vice President of The Korea Society 
- Podcast URL: Northeast Asia Regional Review with Donald S. Zagoria, Senior Vice President, National Committee on American Foreign Policy Evans Revere, Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution Ambassador Winston Lord, Co-chairman, International Rescue Committee Ambassador Mark Minton, President, The Korea Society (Moderator)   AMBASSADOR MINTON: (Moderator) Good morning everyone, and welcome to The Korea Society. I'm President Mark Minton. On May 16, the National Committee on American Foreign Policy and The Korea Society jointly sponsored a quadrilateral meeting of distinguished academics and former government officials from the United States, China, the Republic of Korea and Japan. I believe that was an especially fruitful session. We discussed many of the problems in Northeast Asia and also the relationship between and among the countries involved. For us, at least, it was a suitable introduction to the rather rapid pace of high-level diplomacy that has subsequently taken place. Just a short time ago we had a Republic of Korea-United States summit in Washington, D.C. Madam Park Geun-hye, the President of the Republic of Korea, had her first meeting with President Obama. Shortly after that was the China-U.S. summit in California. On the 27th of this month will be the Republic of Korea-China summit in Beijing. I'm sure all of you in this distinguished audience were hopeful, as we were, that there would be a North-South Korean engagement last week to try to repair a very frayed relationship. If this had taken place, it would have been the first meaningful, high-level interaction of cabinet ministers between North and South Korea in six years. Unfortunately, but not surprisingly, that meeting did not take place. It was canceled because of a disagreement over protocol. Regardless, all of these events have made this an especially fruitful time to take a closer look at relationships in Northeast Asia and some of the issues that the participant countries and international community are attempting to resolve. We have gathered together today a distinguished panel to discuss some of these issues. Ambassador Winston Lord needs no introduction. He is a former ambassador to China, former director of the policy planning staff at the State Department, former assistant secretary of state for East Asian Pacific Affairs, and accompanied Nixon and Kissinger to China. Ambassador Lord will focus on the recent China-U.S. summit. Dr. Donald S. Zagoria, senior vice president of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, is a frequent contributor to our programs here at The Korea Society and a most distinguished East Asian specialist. He's taught at Hunter College and Columbia University, along with being a consultant to the National Security Council and State Department on Northeast Asian issues. Finally, we have an old friend, Evans Revere. Evans had a long and distinguished diplomatic career which focused on China, Japan and Korea. He's former director of the Office of Korean Affairs in the State Department, former principal deputy assistant secretary for East Asia and was also, for quite some time, acting assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. He is currently a senior director with the Albright Stonebridge Group in Washington. He served prior as president of The Korea Society.   I would like to start by asking Dr. Zagoria to provide a regional overview based on these recent high-level meetings--a very productive Track II quadrilateral meeting.   DONALD ZAGORIA: I would like to take this opportunity to thank The Korea Society for co-hosting that meeting along with today. Now, we have arranged this meeting in such a way that my two colleagues, Win Lord and Evans Revere, will be doing the difficult work. The two biggest problems in Asian security today have to do with the rise of China and North Korea. I will begin with a regional overview. Madam Park, the new President of South Korea, has aptly characterized the present regional situation in East Asia as the "Asian Paradox." My understanding is that while visiting the White House, she lectured to President Obama for some time on the nature of this paradox. That paradox represents the fact that we're talking about a region that is booming economically. We have the first, second and third largest economies in the world (the United States, China and Japan), along with South Korea (now the fifteenth largest economy in the world), in addition to several emerging new powers (such as Indonesia, India, and several countries in Southeast Asia). This has generated an extraordinarily dynamic economic situation. That's the good news—the booming economies. The bad news (and this is the other side of the paradox) is the geopolitical tensions in the region. I'll just take a moment to enumerate those as they're very numerous and very worrisome. First there is the inevitable friction between the rising power China and the dominant power the United States—what Graham Allison of Harvard has called the "Thucydides Trap.” The Thucydides Trap (all of you historians will understand immediately) has to do with the origins of the Peloponnesian War and the explanation by Thucydides that the war was largely caused by the rise of Sparta and the fear this caused in Athens at the time. Accompanying this structural problem in U.S.-China relations are specific issues that I'm sure Ambassador Lord will go into, including the recent cyber attack issue along with a host of economic issues. Taiwan remains an issue. North Korea remains an issue. That is number one—what might be called the strategic drift that many people worry about when it comes to U.S.-China relations. Hopefully the recent summit has set in motion a process to address that. The second major source of tension in the region is North Korea, which I'm sure Evans will tell, you in great detail, is determined to remain an unrestrained nuclear power, developing both nuclear weapons and missiles to carry them. In addition, North Korea has recently stated it is no longer interested in denuclearization and no longer even accepts the principle of denuclearization that it agreed to in earlier meetings in 2005 and 2007. This declaration has the potential to not just threaten North Korea's neighbors, but also to disrupt the entire anti-proliferation regime that has so carefully been crafted by us in recent years. The third problem is the lingering tension between Japan and South Korea. Territorial issues and different historical factors have been a source of particular concern to the United States, because those two countries are our allies and we would like to see greater trilateral security cooperation. That remains on hold as long as these tensions persist. Fourth are territorial and maritime issues in the South China and East China seas that involve both China and Japan. This is one set of frictions. China and several Southeast Asian countries (Vietnam and the Philippines particularly) is another set of frictions. Then there is what many have come to call an "assertive China," determined to protect what it refers to as its "core interests." I would add to this list an absence of any formal regional security architectures (such as NATO in Europe) plus growing nationalisms throughout the region. This is a very dangerous and volatile mix. Those of us with a sense of history point to the fact that we don't want to see Asia repeat the experience of twentieth century Europe—when a combination of power rivalries, rival nationalisms and territorial disputes led to two disruptive world wars. We're still living with the consequences of that. I have a long list here about how to resolve the paradox, but let me make a couple of very quick points. First, there is a real success story in Asia, and that's the Taiwan-China relationship. If we were convening this meeting ten or fifteen years ago, Taiwan would have been one of the top flash points in the region. How was that worked out? To put it shortly and sweetly, there was a political accommodation between pragmatic leaders on the mainland and in Taiwan (and particularly since Ma Ying-jeou was elected president in 2008). These leaders were determined to bridge the gap between them. Many of the most fundamental problems are still there, but they have managed to ease tensions significantly: signing sixteen agreements, including an economic agreement. This is the type of political accommodation process I urge the United States, China, Japan, Korea and the rest of Southeast Asia to address.   MARK MINTON: Thank you, Dr. Zagoria. Ambassador Lord?   AMBASSADOR LORD: I can sum up the U.S-China summit with a historical anecdote. During the mid-1970s, Dr. Kissinger met with Zhou Enlai (I was at that meeting). Kissinger asked Zhou Enlai how he would describe the impact of the French Revolution, and he responded that it was too soon to tell. Now, if we can't understand the impact of the French Revolution after 200 years, it would be hard to understand the impact of a summit held only two weeks ago. That is my basic point and I could stop right here. It is, in fact, too early to tell. We'll have to see how relations unfold over the coming months and years, beginning this July with strategic and economic dialogues. Officials on both sides are spinning the summit outcome, and I think we should guard against either euphoria or cynicism. As to the so-called expert commentators in the media, I recall the old saying: "Those who know what really happened aren't talking, and those who are talking don't really know what happened." In all seriousness, let's not make premature judgments either by way of cynicism or euphoria. I believe all of us on this panel were happy this meeting took place. The National Committee along with Evans, Don, and I have called for precisely this kind of informal, shirt-sleeve remote location for these summits. We want to talk strategically, and get rid of the entourages, the scripts and the talking points. I was disappointed that the meeting only lasted fifty minutes. The rest of the time they sat across the table from each other which I believe defeats the purpose. And fifty minutes with interpreters means only twenty-five minutes of discussion. That really was disappointing to me. I am pleased that Xi has invited Obama back for a similar type of informal meeting within the next six months or so, at a date not specified. In addition, they will meet again at various regional and international conferences. In the meantime, I'm sure they will stay in constant touch by phone. I believe there are two central purposes for this kind of meeting: personal chemistry and strategic intentions. The importance of personal chemistry should not be exaggerated. Obviously nations act on the basis of national interest regardless of whether the leaders like each other or not, but it's not unimportant either. They're not going to establish mutual trust. They will hopefully establish mutual comprehension or credibility. Should there be a crisis, then they can get on the phone and make sure that some macho ship commanders aren't getting us into World War III. Or if there is a logjam on negotiations, they can hopefully make the kind of breakthrough that their subordinates are unable to accomplish. Although I would not dismiss the value of personal chemistry, it's impossible to tell how this went. They're not going to spin it and say they love each other. That wouldn't be credible. They're not going to make it appear as if Obama landed two jabs and Xi a couple of upper cuts. That wouldn't be much of a spin, either. It seems like they got along pretty well. In any event, personal relations are necessary, but insufficient. You also need a sense for each other's strategic goals and red lines. Here, again, it's tough to judge. I would like to know how Xi responded when Obama asked him what he means by the renaissance of the Chinese Dream, and whether that is a deserved natural historical impulse given China's size and growth, or whether it is something nationalistic and worrisome; what Mr. Xi means by resetting great power relations and what Mr. Xi means about avoiding the Thucydides Trap.   And I'd like to know what Obama said when Xi presumably asked him if he wanted to accept the rise of China or, in fact, wanted to try to keep China down. And what Obama meant by this rebalancing towards Asia. Is that containment? Again, on balance, let's not be prematurely cynical. I hope they had the kind of discussions which could more constructively frame future discussions on other issues and help make progress against this kind of strategic backdrop. In the remaining time I have, let me quickly go through specific issues. The one concrete outcome (and they weren't looking for concrete outcomes) was an agreement on a certain aspect of climate change. I think this is helpful as the issue of energy and the environment is a major area of mutual interest—particularly with the increase in energy production by the United States and China's concerns about pollution. We can build positive momentum in our relationship and work towards resolving the world's climate problem. North Korea I'll leave to Evans Revere except to say that the conventional wisdom is that progress was made. I'll be very interested to hear Evans's view. I have felt for some time that China is part of the problem and not the solution. They've made some tactical adjustments. Leaning on North Korea has led them back to talks with the South Koreans (there is a current logjam on that) and led them to back off from their bellicosity. They are frustrated with North Korea and it's hurting some of China's own interests. I think it's a tactical shift, not a fundamental one. They're still too worried about instability, regime collapse, and a unified Korea on their border with American troops. I don't think this act will be a strategic shift. They're a safety net for North Korea and they let the pressure off North Korea. On cyber warfare, the conventional wisdom is the other way around—that no progress was made. Here I would guard against the conventional wisdom. You can't expect the Chinese to get up and say, "Mea culpa." We now have a working group set up and both sides are willing to at least talk about the fact there is a problem. I wouldn't rule out future progress on that. This is a difficult and extremely complex issue. We don't have time to go into it now, but I may have some time during the Q&A session to distinguish what we're doing from what the Chinese are doing. We're totally different societies. Mr. Snowden (who is currently in Hong Kong) is a traitor. He is not only hurting our national security on terrorism, but he's hurting our ability to lean on China. They will use this as propaganda to cloud over the issues of who's doing what to whom.   Maritime disputes presumably have come up. There are two kinds of maritime problems. The first are bilateral ones we have with the Chinese (particularly whether we can operate within the 200 mile economic zone). International law says we can, and China doesn't like that. The good news is that the Chinese are now patrolling our economic zone, and that may help us lower the tension on this issue. The other maritime problem is the one Don mentioned—the East and South China seas. The Chinese are being aggressive. Xi was in charge of this policy even before he became president. It seems to me to fit his general nationalistic bent. I'm very concerned about an accident drawing us into a conflict there. We have treaty commitments, of course, with both Japan and the Philippines. As to Taiwan, the good news is that it wasn't talked about much in the meeting and, as Don said, this would have been a major issue in the past. Things are in pretty good shape. The Chinese have spun to their audience that they were as tough on arms sales as they were on maritime disputes. We expect that kind of spin. We should touch on economics. The cyber war has become a huge issue. I'm glad Obama was able to lay out concrete evidence of China's involvement. Other equally disturbing issues include intellectual property theft, but there are some positive signs we can get into. We should encourage Chinese foreign investment, relax some of our export controls and promote the development of technology consistent with transparency and security. One issue that was barely addressed, if at all, was human rights and democracy. This is a glaring omission and it has been this way for four and a half years under Obama. Just as the summit ended, the Chinese sentenced the brother-in-law of imprisoned Nobel Prize winner Liu Xiaobo to eleven years. His wife, Liu Xia, is currently under house arrest. This serves as a symbol of the increasing repression taking place. Xi shows no signs of political reform and indeed is cracking down harder. He's even praising Mao and railing against Western values. This is a concern because we can't allow this to dominate our agenda with China, but it can't be ignored, either. Obama's been ignoring addressing the issue because it's in our national interest to have a more open China. We can't be arrogant. The resolution must come from the Chinese, but addressing it serves security and other interests while reflecting our values and encouraging Chinese reform. It's in China's own self-interest. Until this problem shows some progress (and I see no evidence of this in coming years) there's going to be a ceiling on our relationship and that will complicate all concrete issues I've discussed. Thank you.   MARK MINTON: Thank you, Ambassador Lord. Evans Revere?   EVANS REVERE: Thank you. It's good to be back. I've been asked to talk a bit about the Korean Peninsula. When you discuss the situation on the Peninsula there's always a mixture of good news and bad news. I'll start with the good news, which Mark has already alluded to, and that is that President Park had an excellent visit to Washington, D.C. a few weeks back. I had the pleasure and honor of participating in a number of the events connected with the visit, and I came away deeply impressed with the way the visit was managed on the U.S. side as well as the Korean side. I was particularly impressed by the way President Park managed her speeches, her remarks, and her various interactions both on the substantive front but also on the symbolic front. I think this was a real step forward in U.S.-ROK relations. I was very comforted to see that the chemistry between the two presidents was extremely good. Just in advance of her visit to Washington, I did an interview with a reporter who asked me what I felt would the most important thing to come out of this summit meeting between the two presidents—whether that be coordination on Korea or Japan or China. I said, "The most important thing is the personal relationship that the two presidents will form or not form, as the case may be." I came away from this summit very impressed at the way the two presidents connected. There's clearly a tremendous sense of admiration between the two. There's one photograph, in particular, that was on the front page of the New York Times showing the two presidents seated next to each other in the Oval Office. That photograph really said it all about the level of connectivity between the two. President Park's remarks were uniformly excellent. Her speech to the Joint Session of Congress, if you have not seen it, is really a must-read. It's very eloquent with a very thoughtful set of remarks. It's very clear she is a leader: a woman of tremendous vision and foresight. Both her vision for the bilateral relationship, relations with North Korea and for the region at large came through very clearly in that set of remarks and others that she delivered. Overall, I think the visit certainly reinforced the considerable strength of the U.S.-ROK alliance and got the relationship between the two countries and the two presidents off to a very good start. She came across personally as a very calm and thoughtful leader and someone who was unusually able to mix both firmness and vision. In her visit, the issue of relations with the North came up, as we all expected it would, and she emphasized her effort to try to reestablish dialogue with North Korea under the rubric of her trustpolitik effort to reach out to the North. That, as I think Mark alluded to, had inspired some hope that relations with North Korea would get back on a more positive track. Those hopes, unfortunately, have been quickly and somewhat predictably dashed, I would say. As we've also seen, in recent weeks (and this gets into the bad news area of the Korean Peninsula) the North Koreans are making increasingly personal remarks about President Park and the ROK. That's never a good sign. Earlier in Madam Park's term, the North Koreans greeted the new ROK president, the second term of the Obama administration, the new Chinese leader and the new Japanese leader with an almost unprecedented outburst of rhetoric and threats. Some of these threats were general, some of them rather specific; but all of them much more severe than almost anything we've ever heard coming out of Pyongyang. This is saying a lot for those of you who have been following the rhetoric over the years. Among the various threats that North Korea made were very specific threats to use their nuclear weapons, specifically against the United States. I was reminded, as things began to calm down, that perhaps one of the most important takeaways of this very rough patch we've been through with North Korea is remembering that North Korea is the only country in the world that has vocally and repeatedly threatened to use nuclear weapons. That's a very dubious distinction and it's a very disturbing one. The good news is that a combination of U.S.-ROK coordination and firmness helped calm the troubled waters that North Korea was stirring up in recent months, and there has been, indeed, a calming of the rhetoric. We're not hearing the almost daily breast-beating threats coming out of Pyongyang. I think there are several reasons why things have calmed down, including the fact that the U.S. and ROK were working in lockstep and very clear and firm about how they would respond to a physical provocation as opposed to a rhetorical provocation from North Korea. Another reason I believe things have calmed down includes the fact that North Korea, by the very nature of its economy which is always shaky at best, cannot physically sustain the level of military mobilization that it engaged in earlier this year. This is a country of 23 million people with a military of over 1 million people under arms. Its very shaky economic foundation makes it unable to keep up the level of military mobilization it had to maintain during the height of this crisis. In addition, when late April and early May come around every year, one of the most important tasks of North Korean soldiers is to go out into the fields and help the farmers. If they don't, the North Korean people are going to eat even less than they normally do in September, October and November. This was another incentive for the North Koreans to begin to ratchet down the rhetoric and ratchet down the temperature, if you will, on the Korean Peninsula. There's another very practical reason, as well. With the freezing of the Kaesong Industrial Project and the withdrawal of South Korean managers and North Korean workers, the North Koreans had to forego a pretty substantial income stream that comes out of the Kaesong project. Some estimates put the number as high as $90-100 million dollars a year earned by North Korea from that facility at Kaesong. Shutting it down not only put 53,000 North Koreans out of work, but 200,000 plus family members with no income to sustain themselves. That was another incentive bringing the North Koreans down to earth and back to reality. Of course, the North Koreans are also concerned about alienating China, a major source of aid and sustenance. China, I think, has been quietly and in its own way pressuring the North Koreans—urging them to get back to the table and urging them to reduce the level of tensions on the Korean Peninsula. I think the Chinese efforts behind the scenes have been helpful. Building on a point that Ambassador Lord mentioned a little bit earlier, I would tend to agree with him. I think that the Chinese shift—in terms of being willing to put more pressure on North Korea and be more critical privately and publicly of North Korea—is more tactical than it is strategic. At the end of the day, I do not believe that the fundamental Chinese strategic calculus on the Korean peninsula has changed. China sees the continued existence of North Korea—even a problematic and troublesome North Korea—as better than a North Korea that goes out of business. We can talk about that more during the Q&A period. As I said before, the good news is there has been a calm coming over a very troubling situation on the Korean peninsula. As you've seen in recent weeks, North Korea has reached out to Japan. There were some discussions by a representative of the prime minister who traveled (secretly he thought) to Pyongyang only to be filmed by the AP and others who were on the tarmac when he arrived. Nothing much seems to have come out of those discussions, but I would not be surprised to see them continue at some point in the coming months. The abductee issue is a very sensitive one in Japan. I think the Japanese are likely to come back to the table at some point to try to continue those discussions. We've also seen the visit to Beijing of senior North Korean representative Vice Marshal Choe Ryong Hae, one of the core inner circle members of the elite in Pyongyang. Choe traveled to China for various reasons, one of which may have been to try to secure Chinese acceptance of a visit by Kim Jong-un to Beijing. That visit has been rumored for quite some time, but doesn't seem to be in the cards anytime soon. This tells you something about Chinese receptivity to North Korea these days. If you look at some of the photographs that came out of the visit of Vice Marshal Choe to Beijing, you see some very interesting body language suggesting that both sides were rather uncomfortable with each other. The fact that a very senior North Korean military officer made a point of wearing his uniform and hat in meetings with every single one of his Chinese counterparts, but when he was ushered into the presence of the Chinese leader took hat and uniform off and wore his civilian clothes, apparently at Chinese insistence, was a very nice touch by Beijing, I thought. The North Koreans have also reached out in an effort to try to restart the Kaesong project and to have dialogue and other issues with South Korea. I think that's rather predictable for the reasons that I've mentioned. As a rule, after a period of ramping up tensions, the North Koreans always like to reengage with their various adversaries (including the South, the Japanese and the United States) in an effort to see what they can do to be rewarded for ramping down tensions. And so, here we are, right on schedule seeing this happen again; except we obviously had a bump in the road over a protocol issue the other day. Anybody in this room who's ever negotiated with the North Koreans (as I have for more hours than I care to remember) knows that protocol issues are a critical component of North Korean strategy at every meeting, and I think the ROK did the right thing by refusing to play the game this time. Will the North Koreans reach out to us in the way that they've reached out to the other players? That's a big question. The stumbling block to any resumption of U.S.-DPRK talks is the fact that the North Korean position (stated privately to me and others in this room as well as publicly) is that there is no longer a basis for a denuclearization discussion. The North Korean position is that they are over that. They are not going to talk about getting rid of their nuclear weapons any longer. Denuclearization is no longer their goal and even the principle of denuclearization is something that the North Koreans have recently become unwilling to commit themselves to. And since the United States position is that we're prepared to talk with the North Koreans as long as the discussion deals with denuclearization, you see we have a problem here. The North Koreans may want to talk about a peace treaty or a peace regime or removal of U.S. troops from the Korean Peninsula, but they do not want to talk about denuclearization. This is, indeed, a problem.   One of the more interesting things to come out of the U.S.-China summit is that both countries reaffirmed the fact that they are committed to denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and that they are committed to the resumption of dialogue about denuclearization—which puts the United States and China somewhat at odds with the current stated North Korean position. So, we have an issue here. How that's going to be resolved is perhaps something we can discuss during the Q&A period. I would like to say just a couple of words about another issue that Don Zagoria alluded to earlier, and that is the troubling relationship between Tokyo and Seoul. I continue to be very concerned with the fact that the two major allies of the United States in that region are at loggerheads and continue to be at loggerheads over historical, territorial and other issues. This is very troubling. It's a very unhelpful situation. It's a situation that I don't think, at the end of the day, is in the interests of either of those two countries and it's not in the interest of the United States either. We cannot defend the Republic of Korea without the use of our bases and the cooperation of our Japanese allies. For that matter, we cannot defend Japan without the cooperation of our Korean friends. It is, therefore, in everybody's interest to try to put some of these differences behind us and get back on the same page, and I'm hoping that can happen. The current situation between Tokyo and Seoul, I think, only works to the advantage of North Korea, and one can well imagine how Beijing views the fact that America's two strongest and closest allies in Northeast Asia are more often at each other's throats than they are on the same page. This is not a good situation. Let me just close by saying there's a mixture of good news and bad news on the China issue. I'd like to again stress the fact that I think China's shift is an interesting tactical one, but at the end of the day I don't think it's a strategic one. I do believe that some of the Chinese rhetoric and some of the specific actions have assisted in nudging North Korea back in a more helpful direction. But at the end of the day, we have a major problem before us—that all of the countries in the region seem to be willing to talk to North Korea; but North Korea is saying we'll talk to anybody as long as the subject is not denuclearization. That is fundamentally an unacceptable position, and so have a major issue before us.   MARK MINTON: I mentioned that in a few days there will be a Republic of Korea-China summit in Beijing. I wonder if perhaps Ambassador Lord and Evans Revere could talk to the symbolic and substantive importance of this summit. There are a number of interesting things about it. For the first time, we have two new leaders of the Republic of Korea and China involved in a summit. It's also a tradition to have the United States be the first summit held with a new Korean leader and the second being held with Japan. In this case Japan is being bypassed, if I can put it that way, and the second summit is with China. It's also interesting that the Chinese leadership will be meeting with President Park before a summit between the relatively new North Korean leader and new Chinese leader. In the background, of course, we know that China in recent years has acquired, because of North Korean belligerence and intransigence towards its other neighbors, perhaps the highest degree of exclusive leverage outside of Pyongyang that it's ever had. And, of course, China has, for a number of years, been the Republic of Korea's number one trading partner. So, there's a lot of importance attached to this summit. I wonder if you could, Ambassador Lord, maybe speak to the Chinese side's expectations and Evans to the Korean side's expectations, please.   AMBASSADOR LORD: First, a quick segue. You mentioned Japan. There's some concern by Japan that while Abe was invited to have a one-day working affair with President Obama, Chinese President Xi had a two-day informal summit meeting in California. That was followed up, as you pointed out, by South Korea having their second summit with China and not with Japan. Japan already has an inferiority complex about its decline in the world, which Abe is trying to reverse. I think we have to pay close attention to our relations with Japan, because they're absolutely crucial; and I share Evans's concern about the South Korean-Japanese tensions. This is a really serious problem. I think that point has to be kept in mind. Now, with respect to China hosting this summit, they're going to straddle as they always have. As you just mentioned, they have tremendous economic interests with South Korea. As Evans and I have both said, they're not going to walk away from North Korea. The rhetoric may be more balanced, but they provide to North Korea something like 90 percent of the energy and 50 percent of the food. Even as they've been saying they're going to follow UN sanctions against North Korea, which they've promised before, they continue to dilute and undercut those sanctions. They're building a bridge across the North Korean border, and that's going to continue. They're still worried, as I said earlier, about a unified Korea with potential American troops. Having said that, the Chinese are increasingly frustrated with North Korea. First, there is the real danger of war breaking out. In past crises and also in the most recent ones, we have advised China to remind their North Korean friends that not only will there be a response if there's a military action like there was a couple of years ago, but it will be a disproportionate response. Secondly, there's some talk in both Japan and South Korea of a need to have their own nuclear weapons. I don't believe it, frankly. Nevertheless, it ought to make the Chinese a little nervous. This is clearly not in China's interest, but it's fueled by North Korea's posture. Thirdly, the American rebalancing is about much more than an increase in our military presence in Asia and it's not all directed at China. It's because Asia is the most important region for us. There are many diplomatic regional institutions and economic dimensions beyond the military. Having said that, North Korean provocations are fueling response in the region (as well as China's assertiveness) and a buildup of alliances and exercises and exchanges. This can't be in China's interest, either. So for all these reasons, North Korea is undercutting China's national interest. That's another reason it will be somewhat more balanced than it has been in the past. I think they will give a friendly reception to Park, but I don't think you're going to see any major change in their posture.   MARK MINTON: Evans?   EVANS REVERE: I second everything Ambassador Lord just said. Mark asked me to speak about expectations of the upcoming ROK-China summit. Let me give you an American take on things—that it's going to be fascinating from a number of perspectives to see a Korean President in Beijing speaking to the Chinese leadership in fluent Chinese. In addition to her excellent English, she also speaks Chinese very well. I'll be interested to see how the Chinese react to that. Beyond that there are, all around, new leaders we're dealing with here. President Park's predecessor, President Lee, had a proper but occasionally difficult relationship with the Chinese. I think one of the greatest steps forward in Chinese-ROK relations has already taken place, and this invitation was offered and accepted. I think the bilateral relationship between Beijing and Seoul is already in a better place, and I think that's a good thing. In going to Beijing, I think President Park has an opportunity to take advantage of the ongoing tactical shift by China with respect to the Korean Peninsula, and to use this opportunity to try to get China to engage in some new and expanded thinking about the future of the Korean Peninsula. I think it's very important that the Chinese leadership begin to do what many Chinese scholars are already doing, which is looking at the end game on the Korean Peninsula and getting the Chinese leadership to understand that North Korea is, at the end of the day, not a sustainable entity. The Chinese leadership needs to begin thinking about what the future of that Peninsula will look like when the day finally comes that North Korea, one way or the other, leaves the scene. The President of the ROK needs to make the case in Beijing that North Korea is increasingly a strategic liability for China. The level of tensions that North Korea creates, its determination to keep and even expand its nuclear weapons and missile capabilities, the very troublesome behavior that we've seen from North Korea in recent months, its threat to use nuclear weapons and all of those things necessarily require a very strong and very clear response by the United States, the ROK and others in the region. Part of that response is a military response, which is certainly not in China's interest. A fundamental point that I think needs to be made by President Park is a point that I believe President Obama has made to the Chinese—that the North Koreans are not their friends. On paper they may be an ally of China's, but they are not doing China or China's security environment any good. I'm fairly confident that President Park will make those points. There is a growing economic people-to-people social relationship between the ROK and China. If you look at the trade numbers and the mutual exchange of visitors and delegations, there's a tremendously lively relationship right now between the PRC and the ROK. That's a good thing. And another collateral message that needs to be conveyed to the Chinese by President Park is that this is the future. This is what the Korean Peninsula's relationship with China could look like in a much broader and more significant way. I think that would be a message that would be reassuring to Beijing.   At the end of the day, I think the President of the ROK needs to plant the seed in the mind of the Chinese leadership that there is a different future for the Korean Peninsula: one that would contribute in a significant way to peace and stability in Northeast Asia, and contribute to China's own strategic interests in Northeast Asia. I hope, from an American's perspective that, that message is conveyed.   MARK MINTON: Dr. Zagoria, do you have any final thoughts?   DONALD ZAGORIA: I just want to make one point about China's role in the Korean Peninsula. Now, this China-South Korea summit is taking place before a China-North Korea summit. That message will not be lost in Pyongyang. Moreover, there have been other messages that have been sent by the Chinese recently. Foreign Minister Wang Yi has said they can't accept troublemakers on their doorstep. Although he didn't mention Pyongyang by name, I think the point came across quite clearly as to whom who he was referring. When Vice Marshal Choe was in Beijing, the Chinese kept saying “denuclearization, denuclearization, denuclearization.” Vice Marshal Choe did not repeat those words. Now we have the China-South Korea summit. My point is that yes, it's true that the Chinese are not ready to throw North Korea under the bus, but I don't expect China to throw North Korea under the bus. China, however (and this is a very important point) is adopting a more balanced policy between North Korea and South Korea. A DPRK delegation was recently in Beijing, and now there's going to be a summit with the ROK President. A more balanced policy between the North and the South, to the extent that China adopts it, is good for peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula. It suggests to both Koreas that China has an important stake in peace and stability in the Peninsula, as do we. I don't think this should be lost in the shuffle.
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Following on the historic Obama-Xi summit in California, in anticipation of the late June Xi-Park summit, and in marking the 60th anniversary of the end of the Korean War, The Korea Society hosts several prominent voices on Asia. The National Committee on American Foreign Policy's Don Zagoria, Evans Revere, Ambassador Winston Lord and The Korea Society President, Ambassador Mark Minton (Moderator), address Northeast Asia relations today. The speakers share perspectives on the recent China-U.S. summit and... Read More
June Summits

Saturday, June 8, 2013 | 12:00 PM
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On June 7 and 8, U.S. President Barack Obama and China’s President Xi Jinping met in Southern California to discuss bilateral and regional issues, including cooperation on dealing with North Korea. In late June, Xi welcomes Korean President Park Geun-hye to Beijing for a PRC-ROK summit. In recent months, The Korea Society has hosted a number of relevant programs in New York City and nationally. June 14 featured a discussion on regional relations with experts Don Zagoria, Evans Revere, Winston Lord... Read More
Shifting Balance, Forcing Change

Thursday, May 23, 2013 | 5:00 PM
- About the Speaker Title: Shifting Balance, Forcing Change
- About the Speaker: 2013-05-23 17:30:00
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- Event Content: https://itunes.apple.com/us/podcast/shifting-balance-forcing-change/id210903888?i=159959773
- Event Link: Walter L. "Skip" Sharp is a retired<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Army"> United States Army</a> four-star<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_(United_States)"> general</a>, who last served as the Commander,<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Command_(Korea)"> United Nations Command</a>, Commander, ROK-US Combined Forces Command and Commander,<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Forces_Korea"> U.S. Forces Korea</a> from June 3, 2008 to July 14, 2011. He previously served as the<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Director_of_the_Joint_Staff"> Director of the Joint Staff</a> from 2005 to June 2008. He retired from the Army in July 2011. General Sharp was born in<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Morgantown,_West_Virginia"> Morgantown, West Virginia</a> while his father was fighting in the<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_War"> Korean War</a>. As a child he moved among many cavalry posts until he went to the<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Military_Academy"> United States Military Academy</a> in 1970. General Sharp graduated from West Point in 1974 and was commissioned an Armor officer. He has earned a Master of Science degree in Operations Research and System Analysis from<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rensselaer_Polytechnic_Institute"> Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute</a> and is a graduate of the Armor Basic Course, the Field Artillery Advanced Course, the Command and General Staff College, and the Army War College. General Sharp’s command positions include Armor Company Commander with 1st Battalion, 67th Armor, 2nd Armored Division, Fort Hood, Texas; Squadron Commander 1st Squadron, 7th U.S. Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood Texas; Regimental Commander 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Polk, Louisiana; Assistant Division Commander for Maneuver<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2nd_Infantry_Division_(United_States)"> 2nd Infantry Division</a>, Camp Red Cloud, South Korea; and Division Commander,<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/3rd_Infantry_Division_(United_States)"> 3rd Infantry Division</a>, Fort Stewart, Georgia. He commanded troops in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti, and SFOR’s Multinational Division (North) in Bosnia. General Sharp has served in the Directorate of Combat Developments at<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fort_Knox,_Kentucky"> Fort Knox, Kentucky</a>, the Armor/Anti-Armor Special Task Force, and the Armored System Modernization Office at the Pentagon. He had four assignments at the Pentagon on the Joint Staff. He was the Deputy Director, J5 for Western Hemisphere/Global Transnational Issues; the Vice Director, J8 for Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment; the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, J5; and the Director of the Joint Staff.
- Podcast URL: Shifting Balance, Forcing Change with General (Ret.) Walter “Skip” Sharp, former Commander, UNC/CFC/USFK Moderated by Dr. Stephen Noerper, Senior Vice President, The Korea Society DR. STEPHEN NOERPER: Welcome to The Korea Society and welcome to Studio Korea. I’m Stephen Noerper, senior vice president of The Korea Society. Our special guest today is Gen. Walter "Skip" Sharp. General Sharp who most recently served as commander of the United Nations Command, commander of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command and commander of U.S. Forces Korea. He now serves as a senior analyst, observer and wise counsel. We are delighted to have him at The Korea Society. General, welcome. I would like to start our discussion by talking about some of the changes occurring in Northeast Asia. We have new administrations in Seoul, Tokyo and Beijing and a second Obama administration in Washington. What do you make of the political shifts taking place and how they will impact Northeast Asia, especially North Korean challenges?   GENERAL WALTER "SKIP" SHARP:   First of all, I wish to thank you and The Korea Society for inviting me here to talk about some of the very important issues facing Northeast Asia today. I believe the U.S.-Northeast Asia relationship is reaching an inflection point, and how things shape up over the next year or two will most likely affect our relationship over the long term. As you pointed out, new leaders have been elected throughout the region, and these leaders bring with them a fresher set of global goals and strategies for their respective countries. President Xi talks about "the Chinese dream." Prime Minister Abe talks about having "a normal country," with a new constitution and renaming Japan's self-defense force as a military force. President Park talks about "trust politik" and the "Asian paradox”— where Northeast Asian countries are economically interdependent yet at the same time trying to overcome long-term regional animosities. President Obama is dealing with changes in the top leadership of his administration. As you pointed out, we are pivoting towards Asia; but the long-term goal for all countries is still a work in progress. Then there is Kim Jong Un; a young and inexperienced leader threatening the United States and its allies with rhetoric about developing ballistic missiles and a nuclear weapons capability. If we are to have any success reshaping interactions and overcoming the many problems North Korea brings to the table; the United States, the Republic of Korea, China and Japan will need to change its policy to one that moves forward—one that addresses human rights, freedom, democracy and hopefully making a change in the most dangerous element, which is North Korea.   STEPHEN NOERPER: You mention the state of tremendous flux and need for cooperation in the face of some very large problems. Could you share with us your thoughts on the challenges North Korea poses— in particular over the course of the last six months—and how those challenges play out relative to Kim Jong Un's consolidation of leadership?   WALTER SHARP: There are many parts to this equation. North Korea has the fourth largest military in the world. It has the largest artillery force in the world. Seventy percent of their military is deployed along the Demilitarized Zone. It has over 800 ballistic missiles. There was the sinking of the Cheonan in 2010 that killed several sailors and the attack on Yeonpyeongdo that killed both Marines and civilians. North Korea has conducted three successful nuclear tests. The Taepodong missile put a satellite into space. Kim Jong Un has abrogated the armistice and threatened the United States by saying he wants to become a nuclear weapon-capable power. Although I believe many of these provocations are being made for reasons similar to those of his father; the rhetoric is much louder and his actions far more dangerous than in the past. Why do I believe he is doing this? To get the attention of a variety of audiences. First off, he wants to convince both the Republic of Korea and the United States that North Korea is so strong that we shouldn't even consider challenging him. Each cycle of provocation is then followed by a request for food and other types of aid. Presidents Lee, Obama and Park have all maintained a strong position, refusing to give aid simply because bad actions by North Korea have temporarily stopped. They insist North Korea clearly shows a move towards denuclearization along with a cessation of all provocative acts. We've been very consistent with this stand for the last five or six years. I believe Kim Jong Un has determined that if he is going to continue provocative actions, they will have to be stronger than in the past. I am convinced they will not work. The other external audience is China. Kim Jong Un is very concerned about the relationship between North Korea and China. After the recent missile launch and nuclear test, China has been much more forceful in telling North Korea to change its ways, and I believe they could do even more. They could cut off all fuel aid going into North Korea. They have severed some of their banking relationship. Kim Jong Un has to give serious thought as to how the audience in China will respond to his behavior going forward. Kim Jong Un should be concerned about North Korea's population—its people. In the past, these provocations have always been a means to convince the people of North Korea that they have enemies out there—including the United States and the Republic of Korea—and that in order to face that enemy, North Korea has to have a military-first policy and the people have to makes sacrifices in order to maintain that strong military. The provocative acts have demonstrated to North Korea's population that they do have a strong military. They can sink a ship or attack an island. Despite those acts, information from the outside world is slowly getting to the population of North Korea through CDs and cell phones. At this point, it's a very minimal amount of information; but I think one of Kim Jong Un's greatest fears is that his people will start to learn more about human rights and freedom. That brings us back to his belief that stronger provocations are necessary in order to coalesce the people of North Korea and to try to maintain control over them. I believe these challenges combined point to a future in the next several years of even stronger and much more dangerous provocations. It is our job to make sure that, that escalation is controlled.   STEPHEN NOERPER: North Korea sent Vice Marshall Choe as an emissary or envoy on behalf of Kim Jong Un. He received a polite but restrained response. Chinese analysts and others are suggesting that North Korea has overstepped its bounds with China. Do you have any thoughts on how that will play out? Does this indicate a change in China's desire to provide continued support to North Korea?   WALTER SHARP: Our hope is that Vice Marshall Choe was told that North Korea has to move towards a path of denuclearization, stop these provocative acts and that there will be even stronger sanctions to come if that isn't the course North Korea wishes to take. I believe cutting off financial resources from the Bank of China made a huge difference, along with China's unwillingness to talk to the leadership of North Korea. We hope that's what he hears when he visits China. My hope is that the United States, the Republic of Korea, Japan, and China start discussions seeking ways to bring about reunification. President Park is talking about reunification far more [than past South Korean leaders]. Hopefully a dialogue can be started that might help answer questions such as where U.S. troops would be stationed on the Peninsula, how refugees would be taken care of, and how North Korean mineral rights and property rights would be accounted for. My hope is that China will realize that reunification could not only protect their vital national interests but also enhance them. It could remove the nuclear threat from their doorstep. It could also, if done correctly, lessen their concern about having to deal with thousands upon thousands of incoming refugees from North Korea. I advocate the start of a discussion focused around what the end state of a reunified Peninsula would look like more than in broad terms but really define some of the specifics. If we could develop a clearer vision about the goals and benefits to reunification, we would have a better chance of reaching that end state than we have had in the past.   STEPHEN NOERPER: That's very compelling in its forward-leaning approach—that we move beyond crisis management. That is the mode we've been in in direct response to therhetoric coming from North Korea. What aspects do you see that would drive China, Japan, Korea and the United States to interact with each other?   WALTER SHARP: What we've been doing in the past is pushing for gradual change in North Korea but focusing almost entirely on stability. The longer-term focus on stability with hope of gradual change, unfortunately, has given Kim Jong Il and now Kim Jong Un the time to develop nuclear capability and ballistic missile capability. It has allowed them to continue to threaten, attack and kill South Koreans, particularly in 2010. From that perspective, time has been on the side of North Korea. I've come to believe that it's time to force a change in North Korea, and I think more and more countries are beginning to understand this. We cannot allow what is referred to as the status quo to continue. The status quo is not a level playing field because of the increasingly dangerous capabilities North Korea has to do harm to others. We need to start taking the idea of reunification seriously. It's also time to educate and inform the people of North Korea. I'm not talking about propaganda. I'm talking about educating the population about what freedom is, about what human rights are, and about how much of the world believes in these principles. I recently reviewed the thirty articles of the UN Convention of 1948 that defined human rights. I had a hard time finding even one article that I believe North Korea is observing. There are estimates of over 200,000 prisoners in labor camps. Twenty-five percent of North Korean children have stunted growth because of malnutrition. Well over half the population has no idea where their next meal will come from. These human rights violations are something that really must be dealt with. The United States, the Republic of Korea and China should develop policies and strategies that will enable us to educate the people of North Korea about freedom and human rights. The military and the leadership need to be educated, as well. This will require much thought and dialogue about the future of a united Korea, including what happens to the military after reunification. It's time to start these talks so that both the people and the military of North Korea understand their options. In order to have the opportunity to talk about reunification, we need to start getting information to the people of North Korea. From a military perspective, I believe in the [Combined] Counter-Provocation Plan. I'm convinced it will give both Presidents Obama and Park several strong options should Kim Jong Un decide to make another attack similar to that of 2010. Should North Korea perform a similar aggressive action as they did in 2010 (or even launch another ballistic missile) I advocate that the UN consider a Chapter VII, Article 42 resolution allowing a military force to stop a country from violating a resolution by the Security Council. I believe that combining these elements together will start to force a change in North Korea. We need to continue to try to convince Kim Jong Un that there is another way—that should he stop these actions, the world is ready to help him. Unfortunately, I don't believe he's going to take that option. I do not think we should let another decade pass with only the "hope" that this will change. We need to alter our strategy in order to force change.   STEPHEN NOERPER: In conclusion, I'd like to talk about your role as honorary chairman of the 60th Anniversary of the Korean War Committee and ask you to say a few words about the 60th anniversary of the armistice and end of the Korean War. I'd also like to hear your thoughts on the U.S.-Korea alliance and the enduring nature of our shared sacrifice.   WALTER SHARP: A couple of years ago, Congress directed the Department of Defense to create a standing committee whose purpose was to honor Korean War veterans for the 60th anniversary of the end of the Korean War. I was selected as the honorary chairman for that committee and am very grateful to have the opportunity to be a part of this. The first thing the committee looks to do is honor all of the Korean War veterans, thanking them for their service and their sacrifice to our country. A second goal of the committee is to educate the citizens of the United States (as well as the rest of the world) on the positive impact those sacrifices had for Korea, and to demonstrate how far Korea has been able to come not just economically, but in terms of human rights, democracy and education. None of these things would have happened if it had not been for the sacrifice of our veterans sixty years ago. The committee, along with a great many supporters, has been going around the country speaking at reunions. There's a wiki site that discusses the history of the Korean War. We're about to have a display commemorated that will be part of the Pentagon Tour. It will document the progress and sacrifices made. There will be many major events, with the final one taking place here in the United States on July 27 of this year—sixty years after the signing of the armistice. The event will be held at the Korean War Memorial on the National Mall in Washington, DC. I invite all Korean War veterans and their family members to join us. We expect between 10,000 and 12,000 veterans, and we'll have some great speakers. The legacy of Korean War veterans is the ROK-U.S. alliance. From a military perspective, we have a unique relationship that enables us to work well together as military partners. Nowhere else does the United States have as close a military alliance combined against a threat like North Korea as we do with South Korea. Economically, we now have the Free Trade Agreement. Socially, a huge number of students from the Republic of Korea attend school in the United States. It is a truly great alliance as well as a very important alliance in a very important region of the world.   STEPHEN NOERPER: Those are very wise and wonderful words and we here, at The Korea Society, are very grateful. The Korea Society dates back fifty-six years and was founded by five veterans of the Korean War. I would like to take this opportunity to invite our studio audience, kisteners and viewers for a special commemoration on July 23. We will be transforming our studio into a 1953 set with a vintage radio and the like. We will have veterans present; many will be boarding buses the next day for the events in Washington leading up to July 27. I would ike to thank our viewers watching this live stream program as well as those who access our programs through YouTube. Please subscribe to our YouTube channel and visit us at koreasociety.org. Thank you, General Sharp, for sharing your time with us today. [End]
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- Summit External URL: <img src="images/icons/2013/studio_korea-logo.jpg" width="238" height="142" alt="studio korea-logo" /> Be part of a live audience for special recording sessions. Delve into the day’s headlines, dialogue with special guests from policy, finance, research, academe, international organizations, and the media, and determine new trends, priorities, and approaches in and toward East Asia and the Korean Peninsula.
General (Ret.) Walter “Skip” Sharp calls for enhanced international cooperation and coordination to shift the strategic balance in Northeast Asia and force change in North Korea. As Honorary Chair of the 60th Anniversary of the Korean War Commemoration Committee, he reflects on shared sacrifice and upcoming observances to commemorate the end of the War. {youtubegalleryid=7,4} Thursday, May 23, 2013 5:00 PM | Registration5:30 PM | Discussion with General Walter L. Sharp, former Commander of U.S.... Read More
Joint Declaration in Commemoration of the 60th Anniversary of the Alliance

Tuesday, May 7, 2013 | 3:00 PM
- Event Content: https://itunes.apple.com/podcast/the-korea-society/id210903888
- Event Link: For Immediate Release May 07, 2013     Joint Declaration in Commemoration of the 60th Anniversary of the Alliance between the Republic of Korea and the United States of America   For six decades, the U.S.-ROK Alliance has served as an anchor for stability, security, and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula, in the Asia-Pacific region, and increasingly around the world.  President Barack Obama of the United States of America and President Park Geun-hye of the Republic of Korea, meeting in Washington, D.C. onMay 7, 2013, present this Joint Declaration in celebration of sixty years of bilateral partnership and shared prosperity.  The two leaders affirm that the Alliance is well-placed to address the opportunities and challenges of the future. The U.S.-ROK Alliance, forged in the Korean War and founded on the 1953 United States-Republic of Korea Mutual Defense Treaty, has evolved into a comprehensive strategic alliance with deep cooperation extending beyond security to also encompass the political, economic, cultural, and people-to-people realms.  The freedom, friendship, and shared prosperity we enjoy today rest upon our shared values of liberty, democracy, and a market economy. Building on the past sixty years of stability on the Korean Peninsula, we continue to strengthen and adapt our Alliance to serve as a linchpin of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific and to meet the security challenges of the 21st century.  The United States remains firmly committed to the defense of the Republic of Korea, including through extended deterrence and the full range of U.S. military capabilities, both conventional and nuclear. This year also marks another milestone for our two nations - the first anniversary of the entry into force of the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA).  This agreement embodies the positive evolution of our partnership and demonstrates how deeply the United States and the Republic of Korea are committed to a shared future of growth and prosperity.  We are pleased to note the positive results of the KORUS FTA, including increased trade and investment between our two countries, and recognize its potential for expanding bilateral cooperation and business opportunities, including in the energy sector.  Our two countries will fully implement the KORUS FTA to ensure that the agreement serves as an economic growth engine in both our countries. We are pleased with the significant progress made in realizing the 2009 Joint Vision for the Alliance of the United States of America and the Republic of Korea, which lays out a blueprint for the future development of our strategic Alliance.  We pledge to continue to build a better and more secure future for all Korean people, working on the basis of the Joint Vision to foster enduring peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and its peaceful reunification based on the principles of denuclearization, democracy and a free market economy.  In this context, the United States and the Republic of Korea will continue to work through the Alliance to bring North Korea in to compliance with its international obligations and promote peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula, including through the trust-building process initiated by President Park. We share the deep concern that North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missiles programs and its repeated provocations pose grave threats to the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia.  Both the United States and the Republic of Korea are determined to achieve the peaceful denuclearization of North Korea and are working with other Six-Party Talks partners and the international community to insist that North Korea adheres to its international obligations and commitments.  While we invite North Korea to take the path that leads out of isolation and to join the community of nations as a responsible member, we are resolved to continue to defend our citizens against North Korea's provocations by strengthening our comprehensive, interoperable, and combined defense capabilities, to include shared efforts to counter the missile threat posed by North Korea and integrated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems.  Because both the United States and the Republic of Korea share a deep concern for the well-being of the North Korean people, we encourage North Korea to invest in, and improve, the conditions for its citizens and to respect their basic human rights. The peace and prosperity of both our nations are inextricably linked to regional and global security and economic growth.  Based on the solid U.S.-ROK Alliance, we are prepared to address our common challenges and seek ways to build an era of peace and cooperation in Northeast Asia.  The U.S.-ROK Alliance is an increasingly global partnership, and the United States welcomes the Republic of Korea's leadership and active engagement on the world stage, including in international fora.  We will strengthen our efforts to address global challenges such as climate change and to promote clean energy, energy security, human rights, humanitarian assistance, development assistance cooperation, counter-terrorism, peaceful uses of nuclear energy, nuclear safety, non-proliferation, cybersecurity, and counter-piracy. Our sixty years of partnership and shared prosperity have demonstrated that the strength of our Alliance stems from the close relationships between our peoples.  The large Korean-American community in the United States not only serves as a significant link between our two countries, but also makes countless contributions to the strength and vitality of American society.  We pledge to continue programs and efforts to build even closer ties between our societies, including cooperation among business, civic, academic, and other institutions. As allies and Asia-Pacific nations, we look forward to shaping together the future of Asia for generations to come.
- Custom HTML field content: THE OFFICIAL JOINT DECLARATION
- Custom HTML field 2 title: STEPHEN NOERPER: Welcome to Studio Korea First Take, a rapid reaction report, and welcome to The Korea Society. I am Stephen Noerper, senior vice president. For reflections on the historic May summit between Presidents Park Geun-hye and Barack Obama, we are joined by Scott Snyder, senior fellow for Korea studies and director of the program on US-Korea policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. Welcome, Scott. I'm delighted to have you back.   SCOTT SNYDER: Good to be here, Steve.   STEPHEN NOERPER: Scott, your thoughts on the meeting between Presidents Park and Obama and the atmospherics conveyed.   SCOTT SNYDER: Well, this was the first in-person meeting for both presidents. I thought that both of them worked hard to project messages of assurance to each other on the basis of close cooperation and shared common interests. President Obama, I think, indicated clearly the US security and defense commitments to South Korea. He also cited in his remarks that President Park is a cool and seasoned crisis manager who has [already] shown her strong leadership qualities in office.   STEPHEN NOERPER: And how does the Joint Declaration between the two [countries] hold up against the 2009 Joint Statement?   SCOTT SNYDER: This is the 60th anniversary of the US-Korea alliance [and] this Joint Declaration was released in that context. It draws on many elements of the June, 2009 Joint Vision that was released when President Lee visited President Obama, but there are a couple of differences. One is that the challenge of dealing with North Korea was elevated in the statement. [Secondly], this statement is much more focused on the Peninsula than on global cooperation; although global cooperation is included in the statement as a shared objective. A third aspect is that it talks about President Park's own desire to build trust with North Korea; but it clearly places that trust-building process in the context of the objective of trying to bring North Korea into compliance with its international obligations. I think it's a strong statement. It very much shows that this is a comprehensive strategic alliance. It shows a measure of progress compared to where we were in 2009; but I think it's much more focused on the joint sense of purpose in trying to respond to the challenge posed by North Korea.   STEPHEN NOERPER: Scott, what do you think will be the reaction in Pyongyang?   SCOTT SNYDER: I think that both presidents delivered a strong and stern message that the leadership in Pyongyang [will probably not enjoy hearing]. At the same time, the North Koreans do tend to view public statements of this sort as propaganda. They also have propaganda that they release. I think that with regards to their ongoing efforts to evaluate Park Geun-hye, [the missing element] is probably that we don't see yet (and perhaps won't see for a period of time) whether or not, or how, the South Korean government positions itself in terms of any private messages that it tries to deliver to North Korea; and whether North Korea can find a way to respond. Certainly President Park's approach seems a little bit more open in terms of trying to engage North Korea, but it also has a lot of elements of commonality with the approach of President Lee. It's going to be very interesting to see whether North Korea is willing to pick up on the positive elements, or whether they move into a more confrontational approach as they try to manage the inter-Korean relationship.   STEPHEN NOERPER: Scott Snyder of the Council on Foreign Relations. Thank you.  
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Joint Press Conference with President Barack Obama and Republic of Korea President Park Geun-hye

Tuesday, May 7, 2013 | 3:00 PM
- Event Content: https://itunes.apple.com/podcast/the-korea-society/id210903888
- Event Link: PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA: Good afternoon, everybody. Please have a seat. Let me begin by saying it is a great pleasure to welcome President Park and our friends from the Republic of Korea. Madam President, we are greatly honored that you've chosen the United States as your first foreign visit. This of course reflects the deep friendship between our peoples and the great alliance between our nations, which is marking another milestone. I'm told that in Korea, a 60th birthday is a special celebration of life and longevity, "Hwangab." (Laughter.) Well, this year we're marking the 60th anniversary of the defense treaty between our nations. Yesterday President Park visited Arlington National Cemetery and our memorial to our Korean War veterans. Tonight she's hosting a dinner to pay tribute to the generation of American veterans who have served in the defense of South Korea. And tomorrow she'll address a joint session of Congress -- an honor that is reserved for our closest of friends. And in this sense, this visit also reflects South Korea's extraordinary progress over these six decades. From the ashes of war to one of the world's largest economies, from a recipient of foreign aid to a donor that now helps other nations develop. And of course, around the world people are being swept up by Korean culture, the Korean wave. And as I've mentioned to President Park, my daughters have taught me a pretty good "Gangnam Style." (Laughter.) President Park, in your first months in office, South Korea's faced threats and provocations that would test any nation, yet you've displayed calm and steady resolve that has defined your life. Like people around the world, those of us in the United States have also been inspired by your example as the first female president of South Korea. And today I've come to appreciate the leadership qualities for which you are known -- your focus and discipline and straightforwardness. And I very much thank you for the progress that we've already made together. Today we agreed to continue the implementation of our historic trade agreement, which is already yielding benefits for both our countries. On our side, we're selling more exports to Korea, more manufactured goods, more services, more agricultural products. Even as we have a long way to go, our automobile exports are up nearly 50 percent. And our big three -- Ford, Chrysler and GM -- are selling more cars in Korea. And as President Park and I agreed to make sure that we continue to fully implement this agreement, we believe that it's going to make both of our economies more competitive, it will boost U.S. exports by some $10 billion in support of tens of thousands of American jobs, and obviously it'll be creating jobs in Korea as they are able to continue to do extraordinary work in expanding their economy and moving it further and further up the value chain. We agreed to continue the clean energy partnerships that help us to enhance our energy security and address climate change. Given the importance of a peaceful nuclear energy industry to South Korea, we recently agreed to extend the existing civilian nuclear agreement between our two countries, but we also emphasized in our discussions the need to continue to work diligently towards a new agreement. As I told the president, I believe that we can find a way to support South Korea's energy and commercial needs, even as we uphold our mutual commitments to prevent nuclear proliferation. We agreed to continuing modernizing our security alliance. Guided by our joint vision, we're investing in the shared capabilities and technologies and missile defenses that allow our forces to operate and succeed together. We are on-track for South Korea to assume operational control for the alliance in 2015, and we're determined to be fully prepared for any challenge or threat to our security. And obviously, that includes the threat from North Korea. If Pyongyang thought its recent threats would drive a wedge between South Korea and the United States or somehow garner the north international respect, today is further evidence that North Korea has failed again. President Park and South Koreans have stood firm with confidence and resolve. The United States and the Republic of Korea are as united as ever, and faced with new international sanctions, North Korea is more isolated than ever. In short, the days when North Korea could create a crisis and elicit concessions -- those days are over. Our two nations are prepared to engage with North Korea diplomatically and, over time, build trust. But as always, and as President Park has made clear, the burden is on Pyongyang to take meaningful steps to abide by its commitments and obligations, particularly the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. And we discussed that Pyongyang should take notice of events in countries like Burma, which, as it reforms, is seeing more trade and investment and diplomatic ties with the world, including the United States and South Korea. For our part, we'll continue to coordinate closely with South Korea and with Japan. And I want to make clear that the United States is fully prepared and capable of defending ourselves and our allies with the full range of capabilities available, including the deterrence provided by our conventional and nuclear forces. As I said in Seoul last year, the commitment of the United States to the security of the Republic of Korea will never waver. More broadly, we agreed to continue expanding our cooperation globally. In Afghanistan, where our troops serve together and where South Korea is a major donor of development assistance, we're on track to complete the transition to Afghan-led operations by the end of next year. We discussed Syria, where both our nations are working to strengthen the opposition and plan for a Syria without Bashir Assad. And I'm pleased that our two nations and our Peace Corps have agreed to expand our efforts to promote development around the world. Finally, we're expanding the already-strong ties between our young people. As an engineer by training, President Park knows the importance of education. Madam President, you've said, and I'm quoting you: We live in an age where a single individual can raise the value of an entire nation. I could not agree more, so I'm pleased that we're renewing exchange programs that bring our students together. And as we pursue common-sense immigration reform here in the United States, we want to make it easier for foreign entrepreneurs and foreign graduate students from countries like Korea to stay and contribute to our country, just as so many Korean-Americans already do. So again, thank you, President Park, for making the United States your first foreign trip. In your inaugural address, you celebrated the can-do spirit of the Korean people. That is a spirit that we share. And after our meeting today, I'm confident that if our two nations continue to stand together there's nothing that we cannot do together. So, Madam President, welcome to the United States.   PRESIDENT PARK GEUN-HYE: (Through interpreter.) Let me start by thanking President Obama for his invitation and his gracious hospitality. During my meeting with the president today, I was able to have a heart-to-heart talk with him on a wide range of common interests. I found that the two of us have a broad common view about the vision and roles that should guide the Korea-U.S. alliance as it moves forward. And I was delighted to see this. First of all, the president and I share the view that the Korea- U.S. alliance has been faithfully carrying out its role as a bulwark of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia and that the alliance should continue to serve as a linchpin for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Asia. In this regard, I believe it is significant that the joint declaration on the 60th anniversary of our alliance we adopted spells out the direction that our comprehensive strategic alliance should take. Next, the president and I reaffirmed that we will by no means tolerate North Korea's threats and provocations, which have recently been escalating further, and that such actions would only deepen North Korea's isolation. The president and I noted that it is important that we continue to strengthen our deterrence against North Korea's nuclear and conventional weapons threats and shared the view that in this respect, the transition of wartime operational control should also proceed in a way that strengthens our combined defense capabilities and preparations be made -- (inaudible) -- as well. We also shared the view that realizing President Obama's vision of a world without nuclear weapons should start in the Korean Peninsula, and he stated that we could continue to strongly urge North Korea, in close concert with the other members of the six-party talks and the international community, to faithfully abide by its international obligations under the September 19th joint statement and the relevant Security Council resolutions. Korea and the U.S. will work jointly to induce North Korea to make the right choice through multifaceted efforts, including the implementation of the Korean Peninsula trust-building process that I spelled out and take this opportunity to once again send a clear message: North Korea will not be able to survive if it only clings to developing its nuclear weapons at the expense of its people's happiness. Concurrently pursuing nuclear arsenals and economic development can by no means succeed. This is the shared view of the other members of the six-party talks and the international community. However, should North Korea choose the path to becoming a responsible member of the community of nations, we are willing to provide assistance together with the international community. We also had meaningful discussions on the economy and ways to engage in substantive cooperation. The president and I welcome the fact that the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, which went into effect one year ago, is contributing to our shared prosperity. We also said we will make efforts to enable our people to better feel the benefits of our free trade agreement for them. I highlighted the importance of securing high-skilled U.S. work visas for Korean citizens and asked for executive branch support, to the extent possible, to see to it that the relevant legislation is passed in the U.S. Congress. Moreover, we arrived at the view that the Korea-U.S. Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation Agreement should be revised into an advanced and mutually beneficial successor agreement. We said we would do our best to conclude our negotiations as soon as possible. The president and I also had in-depth discussions on ways to enhance our global partnership. First, we noted together that Northeast Asia needs to move beyond (conflict and divisions ?) and open a new era of peace and cooperation, and that there would be synergy between President Obama's policy of rebalancing to Asia and my initiative for peace and cooperation in Northeast Asia as we pursue peace and development in the region. We share the view about playing the role of co-architects to flesh out this vision. Furthermore, we decided that the Korea-U.S. alliance should deal not just with challenges relating to the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia but confronting the broader international community. I and very delighted that I was able to build personal trust with President Obama through our summit meeting today and to have laid a framework for cooperation. Thank you.   PRESIDENT OBAMA: All right. We've got a couple of questions from each -- each side. So we'll start with Stephen Collinson of AFP. Q: Thank you, Mr. President. Does the United States have a core national security interest in stopping the slaughter in Syria, or merely a strong moral desire to see the violence end? And at what point does the cost of not intervening in a more direct way than you have done so far outweigh the cost of doing so? And if I may ask President Park, President Obama's critics have warned that failing to act on perceived violations of U.S. red lines in Syria could embolden U.S. enemies elsewhere, including in North Korea. Are you convinced that Kim Jong Un has taken the U.S. and South Korean warnings seriously? And do you see the withdrawal of two missiles from a test site as a sign that he's willing to de-escalate the situation?   PRESIDENT OBAMA: Well, Stephen, I think that we have both a moral obligation and a national security interest in, A, ending the slaughter in Syria but, B, also ensuring that we've got a stable Syria that is representative of all the Syrian people and is not creating chaos for its neighbors. And that's why, for the last two years, we have been active in trying to ensure that Bashar Assad exits the stage and that we can begin a political transition process. That's the reason why we have invested so much in humanitarian aid; that's the reason why we are so invested in helping the opposition and why we've mobilized the international community to isolate Syria. That's why we are now providing nonlethal assistance to the opposition, and that's why we're going to continue to do the work that we need to do. And in terms of the costs and the benefits, I think there'd be severe costs in doing nothing. That's why we're not doing nothing. That's why we are actively invested in the process. If what you're asking is, are there continuing re-evaluations about what we do, what actions we take in conjunction with other international partners to optimize the day when -- or to hasten the day when we can see a better situation in Syria -- we've been doing that all along and will continue to do that. I think that understandably, there's a desire for easy answers. That's not the situation there, and my job is to constantly measure our very real and legitimate humanitarian and national security interests in Syria, but measuring those against my bottom line, which is, what's in the best interests of America's security, and making sure that I'm making decisions not based on a hope and a prayer but on hard-headed analysis in terms of what will actually make us safer and stabilize the region. I would note, not to answer the question that you lobbed over to President Park, that you suggested even in your question a perceived crossing of a red line. The operative word there, I guess, Steven (sp), is perceived. And what I've said is that we have evidence that there has been the use of chemical weapons inside of Syria. But I don't make decisions based on perceived. And I can't organize international coalitions around perceived. We've tried that in the past, by the way, and it didn't work out well. So we want to make sure that, you know, we have the best analysis possible. We want to make sure that we are acting deliberately. But I would just point out that there have been several instances during the course of my presidency where I said I was going to do something, and it ended up getting done. And there were times when there were folks on the sidelines wondering why hasn't it happened yet and what's going on and why didn't it go on tomorrow. And -- but in the end, whether it's bin Laden or Gadhafi, if we say we're taking a position, I would think at this point, the international community has a pretty good sense that we typically follow through on our commitments. With regard to actions towards Syria, what kind of message would that communicate to North Korea? That was the question. And recently North Korea seems to be de- escalating its threats and provocations. What seems to be behind that? You asked these two questions. In fact, North Korea is isolated at the moment. So it's hard to find anyone that could really actually fathom the situation in North Korea. But it's actually -- they're also very unpredictable. And whether the Syrian situation would have an impact is hard to say, for sure. Why is North Korea appearing to de-escalate its threats and provocations? There is no knowing for sure, but what is clear and what I believe for sure is that the international community, with regard to North Korea's bad behavior and its provocations -- (inaudible) -- one choice: a firm message -- and consistently send a firm message that they will not (stand ?) and that North Korea's actions in breach of international norms will be met with so-and-so sanctions and measures by the international community. At the same time, if it goes along the right way, there will be a so-and-so reward. So if we consistently send that message to North Korea, I feel that North Korea will be left with no choice but to change. But instead of just hoping to see North Korea change, the international community must also consistently send that message with one voice to compel them communicate to them that they have no choice but to change and to shape an environment where they are left with no choice but to make the strategic decision to change. And I think that's the effective and important way.   Q: (Through interpreter.) My question goes to President Park. You just mentioned that North Korea -- in order to induce North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons, what is most important is the concerted action of the international community. With regard to this, during your meeting with President Obama today, what was said and the views that you shared? And with regard to with Russia and China, the role that they're playing in terms of getting North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons, how do you feel about that? My next question is for President Obama. Regarding the young leader of North Korea, Kim Jong Un, I would appreciate your views about leader of North Korea. And if you were to send a message to him today, what kind of message would you send to him?   PRESIDENT PARK: With regard to the North Korea issue, we and the United States, as well as the international community -- the ultimate objective that all of us should be adopting is for North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons and to induce them to become a responsible member of the International community. It serves the interest of peace on the Korean Peninsula and the world, and it also serves the interest of North Korea's own (development in the ?) world. That is my view. And so in order to encourage North Korea to walk that path and change -- (inaudible) -- we have to work in concert. And in this regard, China's role, China's influence can be extensive. So China taking part in these endeavors is important, and we shared views on that. With regard to China and Russia's stance, I believe that China and Russia must make -- (inaudible) -- share the need for a denuclearized Korean Peninsula and are cooperating closely to engage North Korea to take the right path, In the case of China, with regard to North Korea's missile fire and nuclear testing, China has taken active part in adopting U.N. Security Council resolutions and is faithfully implementing those resolutions. And with regards to Russia, Russia is also firmly committed to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. And with regard to the adoption of U.N. Security Council resolutions on North Korea, it has been very active in supporting them, and they've also sent a very -- and they've also worked very hard to include a stern message to North Korea in the joint statement of the G-8 foreign ministers' meeting. Such constructive efforts on the part of China and Russia are vital to sending a unified message to North Korea that their nuclear weapons will not stand and encouraging and urging North Korea to make the right decision.   PRESIDENT OBAMA: Obviously I don't know Kim Jong Un personally. I haven't had a conversation with him, can't really give you an opinion about his personal characteristics. What we do know is the actions that he's taken that have been provocative and seemed to pursue a dead end. And I want to emphasize President Park and myself very much share the view that we are going to maintain a strong deterrent capability, that we're not going to reward provocative behavior, but we remain open to the prospect of North Korea taking a peaceful path of denuclearization, abiding by international commitments, rejoining the international community and seeing a gradual progression in which both security and prosperity for the people of North Korea can be achieved. You know, if what North Korea has been doing has not resulted in a strong, prosperous nation, then now's a good time for Kim Jong Un to evaluate that history and take a different path. And I think that should he choose to take a different path, not only President Park and myself would welcome it, but the international community as a whole would welcome it. And I think that China and Russia and Japan and other key players that have been participants in six-party talks have made that clear. But there's going to have to be changes in behavior. You know, we have an expression in English. You know, don't -- don't -- don't worry about what I say, watch what I do. And we're -- so far, at least, we haven't seen actions on the part of the North Koreans that would indicate they're prepared to -- to move in a different direction. Christi Parsons.   Q: ...(first part on non-relevant topic...DOD's sexual assault crisis) And if I may, President Park, I would ask you, yesterday you said that if North Korea does not change its behavior, we will make them pay. I wondered if you could elaborate on that comment a little bit. Thank you.   PRESIDENT OBAMA: (long FIRM answer to a military sexual assault question) PRESIDENT PARK: (Through interpreter.) Regarding North Korea's provocations and bad behavior, we will make them pay. With regard to that, for instance, what I meant was that if they engage in military provocation and harm the lives of our people and the safety of our people, then naturally, as president who gives the top priority to ensuring the safety of our people, it is something that we cannot just pass over. So if North Korea engages in provocation, I will fully trust the judgment of our military. So if our military makes a judgment which they feel is the right thing, that they should act accordingly. And this is the instruction that I had made. And North Korea has to pay a price when it comes not only with regard to provocations but also with regard to the recent Kaesong industrial complex issue, where based on agreements between the two sides, companies had believed in the agreement that was made and actually went to invest in the Kaesong industrial complex. But they suddenly completely (dispensed with ?) and disregard this agreement overnight and deny various medical supplies and food supplies to Korean citizens left in that industrial complex, refusing to accept our requests to allow in those supplies, which is what prompted us to withdraw all of our citizens from that park. This situation unfolded in the full view of the international community. So who would invest -- (inaudible) -- Korean companies but also companies of other countries -- who would invest in North Korea, in a place that shows flagrant disregard for agreements? And how could they, under those circumstances, actually pull off economic -- (inaudible)? So I think in this regard, they're actually paying the price for their own misdeeds.   Q: (Through interpreter.) I am -- (off mic) -- President Obama, President Park has been talking about the Korean Peninsula trust- building process as a way to promote peace on the Korean Peninsula. I wonder what you feel about this trust-building process on the Korean Peninsula. PRESIDENT OBAMA: Well, as I indicated before, President Park's approach is very compatible with my approach and the approach that we have been taking together for several years now. And as I (may ?) -- understand it, the -- the key is that we will be prepared for deterrence, that we will respond to aggression, that we will not reward provocative actions, but that we will maintain an openness to a -- an engagement process when we see North Korea taking steps that would indicate that it is following a different path. And that's exactly the right approach. All of us would benefit from a North Korea that transformed itself. Certainly the people of North Korea would benefit. South Korea would be even stronger in a less tense environment on the peninsula. All of the surrounding neighbors would welcome such a transition, such a transformation. But I don't think either President Park or I are naive about the difficulties of that taking place. And we've got to see action before, you know, we -- we can have confidence that that in fact is the path that North Korea intends to take. But the one thing I want to emphasize, just based on the excellent meetings and consultation that we had today as well as watching President Park over the last several months dealing with the provocative escalations that have been taking place in North Korea, what I'm very confident about is President Park is tough. I think she has a very clear, realistic view of the situation, but she also has the wisdom to believe that conflict is not inevitable and is not preferable. And that's true on the Korean Penisuala; that's true around the world. And we very much appreciate her visit and look forward to excellent cooperation, not only on this issue but on the more positive issues of economic and commerical ties between our two countries, educational exchanges, work on energy, climate change, helping other countries develop. You know, I've had a wonderful time every time I've visited the Republic of Korea. And what is clear is that the Republic of Korea is one of the great success stories of our lifetime. And you know, the Republic of Korea's leadership around the globe will be increasingly important. And what underpins that in part has been he extraordinary history of the alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea. And we want to make sure that that remains a strong foundation for progress in the future. So thank you so much, Madam President.  
- Custom HTML field content: JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE
- Custom HTML field 2 title: STEPHEN NOERPER:   Welcome to Studio Korea First Take, a rapid reaction report, and welcome to The Korea Society. I am Stephen Noerper, senior vice president.   For reflections on the historic May summit between Presidents Park Geun-hye and Barack Obama, we are joined by Scott Snyder, senior fellow for Korea studies and director of the program on US-Korea policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. Welcome, Scott. I'm delighted to have you back.   SCOTT SNYDER:   Good to be here, Steve.   STEPHEN NOERPER:   Scott, your thoughts on the meeting between Presidents Park and Obama and the atmospherics conveyed.   SCOTT SNYDER:   Well, this was the first in-person meeting for both presidents. I thought that both of them worked hard to project messages of assurance to each other on the basis of close cooperation and shared common interests. President Obama, I think, indicated clearly the US security and defense commitments to South Korea. He also cited in his remarks that President Park is a cool and seasoned crisis manager who has [already] shown her strong leadership qualities in office.   STEPHEN NOERPER:   And how does the Joint Declaration between the two [countries] hold up against the 2009 Joint Statement?   SCOTT SNYDER:   This is the 60th anniversary of the US-Korea alliance [and] this Joint Declaration was released in that context. It draws on many elements of the June, 2009 Joint Vision that was released when President Lee visited President Obama, but there are a couple of differences.   One is that the challenge of dealing with North Korea was elevated in the statement. [Secondly], this statement is much more focused on the Peninsula than on global cooperation; although global cooperation is included in the statement as a shared objective. A third aspect is that it talks about President Park's own desire to build trust with North Korea; but it clearly places that trust-building process in the context of the objective of trying to bring North Korea into compliance with its international obligations.   I think it's a strong statement. It very much shows that this is a comprehensive strategic alliance. It shows a measure of progress compared to where we were in 2009; but I think it's much more focused on the joint sense of purpose in trying to respond to the challenge posed by North Korea.   STEPHEN NOERPER:   Scott, what do you think will be the reaction in Pyongyang?   SCOTT SNYDER:   I think that both presidents delivered a strong and stern message that the leadership in Pyongyang [will probably not enjoy hearing]. At the same time, the North Koreans do tend to view public statements of this sort as propaganda. They also have propaganda that they release. I think that with regards to their ongoing efforts to evaluate Park Geun-hye, [the missing element] is probably that we don't see yet (and perhaps won't see for a period of time) whether or not, or how, the South Korean government positions itself in terms of any private messages that it tries to deliver to North Korea; and whether North Korea can find a way to respond.   Certainly President Park's approach seems a little bit more open in terms of trying to engage North Korea, but it also has a lot of elements of commonality with the approach of President Lee. It's going to be very interesting to see whether North Korea is willing to pick up on the positive elements, or whether they move into a more confrontational approach as they try to manage the inter-Korean relationship.   STEPHEN NOERPER: Scott Snyder of the Council on Foreign Relations. Thank you.
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Korea-U.S. Relations: From Allies to Global Partners with Ambassador YJ Choi & Ambassador Hubbard

Thursday, April 18, 2013 | 6:00 PM
- Event Content: http://traffic.libsyn.com/koreasociety/2013-04-18_DenverBrownChoiHubbard.mp3
- Podcast URL: Korea-U.S. Relations: From Allies to Global Partners Thursday, April 18, 2013 His Excellency Choi Young-jin, Ambassador of the Republic of Korea to the United States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard, Chairman of The Korea Society Introduction by Ambassador Mark Minton, President of The Korea Society   AMBASSADOR MINTON: It is my pleasure to introduce this evening's main speakers for a discussion about Korea's growing global role as well as its current relationship with the United States. We are honored to have with us the Ambassador of the Republic of Korea to the United States, His Excellency Choi Young-jin. We are especially honored to have Ambassador Choi with us tonight as President Park Geun-hye is visiting Washington in just a few weeks. All of us who have been in diplomatic service know that one has little extra time in the month before such an event. Ambassador Choi assured us he would attend this evening, and we are very grateful to have him here. Ambassador YJ Choi has had a long and distinguished forty-year career as an international statesman and diplomatic representative of his country. His Excellency served in the Francophone countries of France, Senegal, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo and graduated from the Sorbonne (University of Paris) with masters and doctorate degrees in international political science. He held an important position as deputy executive director of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization here in New York City, charged with implementing the Agreed Framework between the DPRK, the United States and the Republic of Korea along with the involvement of Japan. His Excellency served as South Korea's ambassador to Austria and Slovenia. He has served as an assistant secretary-general at the United Nations and as his country's ambassador to the United Nations. He served in Seoul as a vice foreign minister and currently, of course, holds the assignment of Ambassador to the United States. His interlocutor tonight is Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard, Chairman of The Korea Society. Ambassador Hubbard was my boss in Seoul when I was his deputy. He served as ambassador to the Philippines as well as to the Republic of Korea. He is currently with McLarty Associates of Washington, DC and holds the title of senior director for Asia with that consultancy. Of course, his major role is as chairman of The Korea Society. Ambassador Hubbard is one of the most knowledgeable career diplomats on Japan and has deep experience in the U.S.-Japan relationship. He served in other Asian countries, as well. Please help me in welcoming both Ambassador Choi and Ambassador Hubbard to the stage. [Applause] AMBASSADOR HUBBARD: Thank you very much, Mark, for your kind introduction. I'd like to thank all of you for joining Ambassador Choi and me tonight as we discuss important aspects of the US-Korea relationship. I also wish to thank our gracious hosts here in Denver. WorldDenver is a wonderful organization, and we appreciate the support of the Denver World Trade Center, as well. I am particularly pleased to also have our sponsors from McKenna Long & Aldridge with us this evening. My relationship with McKenna Long has been with the Atlanta and Washington offices, and I have worked very closely with partners Song Jung and Andy Park as they’ve built their practice in Seoul. Song Jung is a valuable member of our board at The Korea Society. I'm sorry he couldn't be with us tonight but am very pleased to see Lino and all the rest of you here this evening. I don't have any prepared remarks, but Congresswoman DeGette covered just about everything I planned to say (which usually happens to me) about the valuable relationship between the United States and the Republic of Korea. As part of our broader presence in Asia, we have a very significant presence on the Korean Peninsula and a lot in common with the South Koreans. Just a few weeks ago, Mark and I had the great pleasure of attending the inauguration of President Park Geun-hye. I would have told anyone even five years ago that they were crazy if they believed South Korea would elect a female president before the United States did likewise. As it turns out, South Korea has a very able female president. Mark and I are very pleased to know her and to have had the chance to be at her inauguration. [Applause] Going back twenty or thirty years, I don't think anyone would have forecast South Korea's extraordinary success as a vibrant democracy and major economic world player, or that it would successively elect different parties to the presidency along with having a female president. Going back twenty to thirty years ago, I don't think any of us could have imagined South Korea as one of the world's top twelve to fifteen economies with an even higher rating in per capita income. We enjoy excellent relations with South Korea as an ally, as a security partner and additionally as a valuable free trade partner. After I retired from government service eight years ago, I became actively involved in ensuring the successful movement of the Free Trade Agreement through Congress (with much thanks to people like Congresswoman DeGette). We even solved the beef problem so important to Colorado. Your state is, once again, a major exporter of beef to the Republic of Korea. This beneficial relationship is well reflected in statements and speeches by President Obama and other senior US officials, including Secretary of State John Kerry during his visit to Korea at the end of last week. In partnership with the United States, global Korea is now a major economic and cultural player on the world stage with an increasing role solving global problems. It is no accident that the Secretary General of the UN is Korean. A Korean-born Korean-American is the President of the World Bank. Korea is reaching out to lead the world community and to help solve the world's economic problems by encouraging broad-based inclusive growth around the world and dealing with the environmental problems stemming from global warming. South Korea has been and continues to be a wonderful and welcome partner. Unfortunately, a lot of what we see on the news is about the other Korea—North Korea—a closed dictatorship with a regime neglecting the needs of its people and focused on the production of nuclear weapons and missiles. North Korea's leadership is spreading bombast through the news cycle in a manner we haven't heard for years. Russell Kemp told me that his eleven-year-old daughter recently turned on the television and was frightened to learn that Kim Jong Un was targeting Colorado Springs with nuclear weaponry. The good news is we're sure he can't hit Colorado Springs with anything close to a nuclear weapon. He probably can't hit Guam either. Over the medium to long-term, however, the North Korean weapons program is a problem which will have to be dealt with. The tension emanating from the Korean Peninsula is a big problem today and in some ways detracts from the success we see elsewhere in Korea. Representative DeGette has already covered this very interesting topic and I am pleased to have Ambassador Choi here to talk about this, as well. And so without further adieu, I'd like to ask Ambassador Choi to share his opening remarks. AMBASSADOR CHOI: Thank you, Ambassador Hubbard and Ambassador Minton, for inviting me here this evening. Ever since I attended some ball games played by the Colorado Rockies, the Denver Broncos and the Denver Nuggets, I have dreamed that one day I would be able to come to Denver, and here I am. [Applause] When I saw this evening's menu of Korean dishes, such as naengmyeon noodles, kimchi and bulgogi, I felt really at home. Denver is a city whose culture of hospitality is just like that of Korea's, and I thank you for that. Let me start by talking about the special relationship between the United States and Korea. Sixty years ago, the Korean War ended, yet the alliance between our countries continues. This year we celebrate the 60th anniversary of the armistice. Let us go back sixty years and talk about what Korea was like at that time. Sixty years ago, Korea was much like every other underdeveloped country in the world—one of extreme poverty with very little hope for the future. During the last sixty years, Korea has come of age on every account with the adoption of democracy, through the development of economic growth and by sharing Korean culture around the globe. Korea's democracy produced the first female leader ever in the East Asian Confucian part of the world, and her arrival in Washington in three weeks is testimony that Korea's democratic form of government has come of age in only two generations. Three years ago, Korea surpassed the $1 trillion mark in terms of its trade volume and national GDP. Only seven other countries have accomplished this, and today Korea is ranked within the top ten to twelve economies in the world. Of course culturally we have "Gangnam Style" YouTube videos. Even before that there were Korean dramas, Korean songs and Korean movies spreading rapidly beyond Asia. All of this has been possible because of America's friendship and alliance with South Korea. I ran a nine-nation peacekeeping operation in Africa for three years. A president of [one] African country asked me for the secret that led to the success of South Korea. When that African country became independent six years ago, their per capita income and prospects were much better than Korea's. Now most African countries import cell phones, cars, air conditioners, TV sets and almost all of our industrial products rather than exporting these products to Korea. This has become possible because of the extraordinary relationship between the United States and Korea. People in Korea never forget, and they believe that the success story derived from the U.S.-Korea relationship has been America's most successful engagement in history. None of Korea's rivals have benefitted as Korea has through its engagement abroad. Korea learned from America and established a relief program like the Peace Corps. No other country in the world does that. For the Peace Corps members, we have a program which invites them to observe the difference they have made in Korea so they can be proud of what they have done. In reference to the FTA, Korea has the most Free Trade Agreements. The US-Korea FTA serves as a model for other FTA agreements being negotiated in the world today, including the TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership), the Korea-China free trade agreement negotiations, and Korea-China-Japan free trade negotiations. Korea has a very special relationship with the United States. This year we'll be celebrating the sixtieth anniversary of the Korean War armistice in July. We will have ceremonies concurrently in Washington and Seoul, and will then have the opportunity to take stock of where we are now and to also envision how we can make this special relationship relevant well into the twenty-first century. [Applause]   THOMAS HUBBARD: Thank you very much, Ambassador. I talked a bit about Korea's increasing role with international institutions. Could you perhaps elaborate on your new government's view towards Korea's ongoing role around the globe?   CHOI YOUNG-JIN: Korea is a very old country. During dinner, we discussed that the establishment of Seoul, the capital of South Korea, dates back over 2000 years. As Korea was confined to the small geographic region of the Peninsula, it remained a parochial country for most of its history—until America came to open our doors. As our economy develops, Korea is becoming increasingly regional while contributing to peace and stability in the region, including Northeast Asia. Recently, the slogan global Korea has become the watchword for the citizenry as well as for the Korean government. Korea is the very first country, on record, to transform itself from a recipient country to a donor country, and this is one of Korea's strengths as it develops into a global country. Korea is very keen on developing itself internationally because otherwise it cannot thrive or perhaps even survive. We depend heavily on our trade with other countries. We have virtually no natural resources. We only have the human resource of brain power. Should we not go global, our future is not very promising at all. It is for this reason that we have become a donor country. We are expanding our relationship with Africa as well as North America. We have hosted many international conferences including the APEC Summit, the Nuclear Security Summit and the G20 Summit meeting in order to link Korea with the outside world. The importance of trade and investment to our international growth means we must be very visible on the world stage, as without a healthy state of competitiveness, Korea will only stagnate. We are determined to go global, and America is our best partner for moving forward. Diplomatically, we are on the same page with America when it comes to the difficult issues posed by places like Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and even Somalia. This proves that Korea is determined to go global by developing its economic strength along with the indispensable partnership of the United States. THOMAS HUBBARD: Thank you, Ambassador Choi. I'd like to make note that among Korea's other distinctions, they have the first company, Samsung, capable of challenging Apple. That is surely a symbol of Korea's industrial creativity and of your growing success in the world. After such a positive discussion, I hesitate to bring up the subject of North Korea. You did mention that South Korea and the United States have been successfully collaborating, dealing with issues such as Somalia, Iran and Afghanistan. How can the United States and South Korea collaborate to resolve the issue closest to the hearts of all South Koreans—that of North Korea? How would you suggest we improve the situation on the Korean Peninsula? CHOI YOUNG-JIN: To explain the issue of North Korea, I like to introduce the concept of American exceptionalism. Early in the last century, when East Asia was opening up, European powers came to our region and brought the paradigm of colonialism and military raids. America, unlike the old colonial powers, came to our region with the paradigm of trade and an open-door policy. That made all the difference. As you know, Japan's economic growth came first. The Four Dragons of East Asia (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore) followed suit. Now China is with us, and other East Asian and South Asian countries are registering phenomenal economic growth. The basis for this was, in part, made possible because of American exceptionalism; that is, America is a different country from Eastern European countries whose philosophies are based on colonialism, expansionism, war and military might. We must acknowledge that, that trade paradigm is the key to understanding what's happening in the East Asia and Pacific region. North Korea is the only country in the entire East Asian region which has yet to accept the trade paradigm. The best reference to understanding North Korea is the Soviet Union, clinging onto the old paradigm of military raids and colonialism, along with the building of heavy weapons and weapons of mass destruction while making the military the focus of their citizenry. This is the Soviet style. The North Korean problem can only be resolved once the country comes in from the cold to join the paradigm of trade with other countries in the region, increase interdependence with us and engage in trade and investment. What's happening in North Korea today is the same pattern we have seen for the last twenty years. They test their nuclear weapons or they declare that they have a nuclear weapons program. They test fire some missiles, heighten tension, and then right at the climax they de-escalate and ask us to negotiate. We have cooperated three times in the past. I believe this current phase of escalation is either reaching its peak or near there, because we are still waiting to see whether North Korea will test fire their medium-range Musudan missiles. I predict that de-escalation will come very soon, and North Korea will again ask to negotiate with us. I think North Korea is mistaken this time, because unlike the past twenty years, neither Washington nor Korea will reward their unacceptable behavior. If they use the same pattern as they have done over the last twenty years, this time it cannot possibly work. So, the future is not very bright, because a negotiation will not easily take place. Even if it does takes place, it must be preceded by North Korea demonstrating that things are different this time in approaching normalization. The one silver lining is China, because China is accepting the trade paradigm. They are increasingly on the same page with America, Korea and Japan. That means North Korea is becoming more of a problem and a liability for China, and Beijing will increasingly see that the future lies with us. Last year, China's combined trade with the US, Japan and Korea exceeded $1 trillion. We are talking to China with an increased understanding that we must work together on the problem of North Korea in order to make that country come in from the cold and abandon the Soviet-style nuclear paradigm, adopt the Chinese style or even the South Korean style of a trade paradigm, and get rid of their weapons of mass destruction. Barring any unacceptable conflict taking place, I am not too worried about the current rhetoric or hyperbolic words coming from North Korea, because it will de-escalate. I expect negotiations will come and go; but in the end, the nuclear weapons problem is linked to the North Korean problem itself. We have to tackle these issues together. The solution is to make North Korea come in from the cold. [End]
- Third Tab: http://traffic.libsyn.com/koreasociety/2013-04-18_DenverBrownChoiHubbard.mp3
His Excellency YJ Choi, South Korea’s Ambassador to the United States, and Ambassador Thomas Hubbard, The Korea Society Chair, dialogued on the remarkable relationship between Korea and the United States, and Korea’s rise globally. Korea and the U.S. share a common security and vibrant business relations. Korea figures as a growing investor in the United States and a vibrant actor on economic, political and cultural stages. The Korea-U.S. (KORUS) Free Trade Agreement implementation has seen new opportunities and... Read More
Global Korea with Ambassador Hill and Ambassador Minton

Thursday, April 18, 2013 | 12:30 PM
- Youtube Video:
Korbel School Dean, Ambassador Christopher Hill and The Korea Society President Ambassador Mark Minton, addressed Korea's rising regional and global influence. From the Seoul G20 and Nuclear Security Summit to the 2018 Winter Olympics, Korea has come of its own as regional host and hub. A harbinger of democracy, Korea supports international peacekeeping and leads in green growth. Korea is an Asian cultural leader--from film to KPop. From UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon to World Bank President Jim Yong Kim, Koreans and... Read More
TKS on Bloomberg/Tensions Rise On The Korean Peninsula

Friday, April 12, 2013 | 12:00 PM
- Custom HTML field content: About the Speaker
Tensions Rise On The Korean PeninsulaApril 12 (Bloomberg) -- Stephen Noerper, Senior Vice President at The Korea Society, discusses the mounting tensions between the U.S., South Korea and North Korea. He speaks on Bloomberg Television's "Market Makers." (Source: Bloomberg) WATCH HERE: http://bloom.bg/10UWbw9 Download the FREE Bloomberg TV+ iPad app fromhttp://itunes.apple.com/app/bloomberg-tv/id460459302&mt=8 Of interest: N. Korea Needs to Save Face in De-Escalation:... Read More
North Korean History and Culture

Thursday, April 4, 2013 | 9:15 AM
- Custom HTML field content: About the Speaker
North Korean History and CultureApril 4, 2013 (C-SPAN) -- Thomas Hubbard talked about North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, as well as the culture and history of North Korea and its relationship with South Korea, and other topics. He also responded to telephone calls and electronic communications. (Source: C-SPAN | Washington Journal) WATCH HERE: http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/311901-5# Read More
Rising Tensions on the Korean Peninsula: The Latest with John Park

Friday, March 29, 2013 | 12:00 PM
- Event Link: Dr. John S. Park is the Stanton Foundation Junior Faculty Fellow at MIT and an associate at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. He previously directed Northeast Asia Track 1.5 projects at the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP). These included the Korea Working Group, the U.S.-China Project on Crisis Avoidance & Cooperation, the U.S.-ROK-Japan Trilateral Dialogue in Northeast Asia, and the U.S.-PRC-Japan Dialogue on Risk Reduction & Crisis Prevention. He advises Northeast Asia policy-focused officials at the Departments of Defense, State and the Treasury, as well as on the National Security Council and Congressional committees. Dr. Park previously worked at Goldman Sachs, where he specialized in U.S. military privatization financing projects. Prior to that, he was the project leader of the North Korea Analysis Group at the Harvard Kennedy School. He previously worked in Goldman Sachs’ M&A Advisory Group in Hong Kong and The Boston Consulting Group’s Financial Services Practice in Seoul. Dr. Park’s writings have appeared in Wall Street Journal Asia, Financial Times, Jane’s Intelligence Review, International Herald Tribune (international edition of The New York Times), and Washington Quarterly. His publications include: “Assessing the Role of Security Assurances in Dealing with North Korea” in Security Assurances and Nuclear Nonproliferation (Stanford University Press, 2012); “North Korea, Inc.: Gaining Insights into North Korean Regime Stability from Recent Commercial Activities” (USIP Working Paper, May 2009); “North Korea’s Nuclear Policy Behavior: Deterrence and Leverage,” in The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia (Stanford University Press, 2008). Dr. Park received his M.Phil. and Ph.D. from Cambridge University and completed his pre-doctoral and postdoctoral training at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University.  
- Third Tab: http://traffic.libsyn.com/koreasociety/2013-02-25-PresidentParkInauguration.mp3
John Park, Stanton Foundation Junior Faculty Fellow at MIT and an associate at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, analyzes the rising tensions on the Korean Peninsula, the uptick in provocations and threats from North Korea and security implications for the region with The Korea Society's Senior Vice President, Dr. Stephen Noerper. Related News: North Korea threats predictable but Kim Jong Un is not, analysts say Read More

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